OLE
G. G. COLE
Wheaton College
Wheaton, Ill.

Lincoln Bible Institute
Library



The
Glen Gates Cole
Memorial Collection

LINCOLN BIBLE INSTITUTE

1956

CHRISTIAN ETHICS
OR
THE SCIENCE OF CHRISTIAN LIVING

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/christianethicso0000herv

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

OR

The Science of Christian Living

By

HERVIN U. ROOP, PH.D., LL.D., L. H. D.

Head Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Education, Wheaton College, Wheaton, Ill.

Author of "General Psychology," "Fundamental Truths of Christianity"

NEW YORK CHICAGO

Fleming H. Revell Company

LONDON AND EDINBURGH

Copyright, MCMXXVI, by
FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

New York: 158 Fifth Avenue
Chicago: 17 North Wabash Ave.
London: 21 Paternoster Square
Edinburgh: 75 Princes Street

171.1
R77

PREFACE

THIS volume has been the outgrowth of the demands of the classroom. It is designed primarily to be a helpful and suggestive text-book on Christian ethics for students in schools and colleges, and adapted to the use of teachers and all morally-minded persons who find pleasure in reading. The author seeks to present this most important of all sciences —the science of noble and consistent Christian living from the historical and psychological viewpoint, so as to set before the youthful mind the highest attainable human life and creative mission. It aims to embody the great principles concerning the nature of the true moral manhood and work, and the method of attaining the former and of performing the latter, in such a unified and natural order that the entire system may be most readily retained in the memory and made a lifelong possession, inspiration and guide.

The motives that enter into Christian living to-day are analyzed, and the Christian's relation to his family, his life-work, his church, his possessions, his social contacts, and his attitude toward recreation, industry, politics, and world problems are discussed. Christian living is presented as a creative task, and hence life situations which must be met by the individual Christian and other most vital questions confronting our social order are considered impartially as well as ethical theory.

For fuller views on the topics and for comparison

2054.

of opinion, references are made to a list of available works. Questions on each lesson, and problems calculated to test the skill and invite the research of the student, are placed at the end of each subject.

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby expressed to the various authors from whose writings material has been drawn.

H. U. R.

Wheaton College,
Wheaton, Ill.

CONTENTS

Part I. Historical and Introductory

Lesson	1.	Brief History of Ancient Ethics	11
	2.	Brief History of Modern Ethics	26
	3.	The Meaning of Ethics	36
	4.	Ethics in Its Relation to Other Sciences	45
	5.	The Methods of Ethics	55
	6.	Definitions and Explanations	66
	7.	Metaphysical and Psychological Implications	80
	8.	The Nature of the Moral Agent: an Active Being	88
	9.	The Dominant Human Urges to Action: the Appetites	96
	10.	The Desires as Urges to Action	103
	11.	The Affections as Urges to Action	111
	12.	The Complex Natural Tendencies in Man as Urges to Action	121
	13.	Conscience as an Urge to Action	130
	14.	The Will as the Executor of Action	140
	15.	The Guides to Action	146

Part II. Principles Underlying Christian Ethics

Lesson	16.	Ethical Theories: The Standard as Happiness	157
	17.	The Utilitarian Aspect of This Standard	172
	18.	The Standard as Perfection	184
	19.	The Standard as Motivity	202
	20.	The Standard as Authority	215
	21.	The Standard as Duty	228
	22.	The Ethical Ideal and Teaching of Jesus	244

PART III. PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO CHRISTIAN LIVING

LESSON 23.	The Christian as an Individual	261
24.	The Christian Family	275
25.	The Christian and His Life-Work	290
26.	The Christian and His Church	302
27.	The Christian and His Possessions	317
28.	The Christian and His Social Contacts	331
29.	The Christian Attitude Toward Recreation	343
30.	The Christian in the Industrial Sphere	359
31.	The Christian in the Political Sphere	374
32.	Christianity the Only Adequate Solution of Personal and World Problems	389

I

HISTORICAL AND INTRODUCTORY

LESSON I

BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCIENT ETHICS

ETHICS is the science of consistent human living. In most colleges, ethics is one of the last of the philosophical disciplines studied. Hence it will not be considered unpedagogical to set forth at the beginning of our study the history of the subject.

Christian ethics cannot be understood without its history, for in it are combined the better elements of the Socratic, Platonic and Stoic systems. We may conveniently adopt the usual division of periods into Ancient and Modern. Each of these represents a typical mode of thought, which determines the ideals and codes of ethics applicable to its time.

Ancient ethics will comprise the period and characteristics of Greek thought, because ethical thought first took definite shape among the Greeks. Every age and every community has had its moralists who were concerned with a rule of life, which rested upon some principle not wholly unreasonable. The chief characteristic of the whole Greek period was the overwhelming sense of subjection to power and the great need of conforming to its laws. Such a state of mind favored ethical codes based upon fear or obedience, with scarcely any respect for the power to be obeyed. But the struggle for political freedom, with its ideals, reacted upon the speculative conception. This encouraged a certain measure of libertinism in the individual and expressed the natural desire to be emancipated

from the restrictions of the law. Both these aspects of the Greek moral consciousness are reflected in the drama, and mark the ascetic and his opposite types of character, reflected in Greek speculative ethics.

All the ethical systems of the earlier and later times may be divided into two classes: (1) those which make virtue a means—practised for the good that will come of it; (2) those which make virtue an end—practised for its own sake, for its intrinsic excellence. The former class includes both the selfish and the utilitarian theory; the latter includes a wide range of views as to the nature, the standard, and the criterion of virtue.

Socrates directed the attention of Greek thought to the study of man. The pre-Socratic thinkers directed their thought toward the material world. Heraclitus and Democritus, two of the Greek physical philosophers, seemed to have touched with some definiteness upon the ethical problem, and by some thinkers are regarded as the founders of those modes of thinking which afterward developed into Stoicism and Epicureanism respectively. Fire was the fundamental physical principle of Heraclitus. In the life of man he thought that the struggle between the bright and dry and the dark and moist can be found going on, and that the great aim of the moral life is to secure the victory for the bright and dry. His fundamental moral law was—"Keep your soul dry."

This opposition of the moist and dry—the "blood and judgment"—seems to run through a very long period of philosophic thought. The fundamental moral principle with Democritus, on the other hand, seems to have been pleasure. It is not thought, however, that either of these philosophers made any at-

tempt to organize systematically his moral ideas. While all the pre-Socratic thinkers directed their attention chiefly to inquiries concerning the physical origin of the world, yet utterances containing moral reflections, rules for conduct and life, clothed in the garb of proverbs and aphorisms, are scattered throughout the works of the poets. In fact, the moral sense in Greece begins with poetry. Long before Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the human mind had learned to judge one action thus and another otherwise, to distinguish between good and bad, virtuous and vicious deeds. The power of reflection merely tried to collect the data and facts and inquired after the motives and reasons. Why was it wrong to kill and steal? Why immoral to tell a lie and moral to be truthful? Why necessary to be virtuous? There was much discussion of ethical problems in the Athens of the fifth century B. C.

The Sophists. This remarkable group of teachers did more than any other men to awaken the intellectual life of Athens and to bring the ethical problem to the front. Their aim was to prepare the young men of Athens to be efficient citizens. To instruct them in the duties of citizenship, they necessarily inquired into the basis of political obligation and of social morality in general. They explained positive law by convention and seemed to place the good in the object realized by the individual. This was the beginning of both the psychological and the utilitarian theories of morality.

Socrates (469–399 B. C.), the founder of scientific ethics, brought philosophy back from heaven to earth and regarded reflection upon moral problems as the only inquiry worthy of philosophy. He was a great preacher of virtue. Self-ordained as censor and re-

former, he directed his power chiefly against the Sophists, who had claimed to be teachers of virtue, but because of their skepticism, personal interest, and lack of moral earnestness, did practically nothing, as he thought, to regenerate the moral consciousness of Greece.

Besides his strong emphasis upon the scientific method and his earnest attempt at reconstruction, Socrates, by his life, character and death, aroused a strong interest in moral questions. He did not dispute the value of pleasure or happiness as the good, but, seeing the effects of its unbridled pursuit, sought to qualify it by making knowledge or wisdom the condition of attaining it. His whole ethical doctrine is summed up in two propositions: (1) that no man is voluntarily bad, and (2) that virtue is wisdom. Nobody would willingly act in an unjust manner or choose the wrong way if he knew the right one. If he does act wrongly or unjustly, it is on account of his ignorance—ignorance of what is good for him. The wise man alone who has reached the goal of knowledge is virtuous and happy, regardless of public opinion, of tradition and custom.

The three characteristics of Socrates which influenced his contemporaries in the formation of their ethical doctrines were: (1) his intense conviction that wisdom or knowledge was the essential factor of virtue; (2) his excellent self-control in personal life and conduct, and (3) his tacit supposition that pleasure or happiness was the end which all men sought. These three aspects of the man gave rise to three schools, each of which exaggerated the one principle they saw in their master. The Megaric, the Cyrenaic, and the Cynic, are the names of the schools.

The Megarics thought that the good was unknown; that knowledge or wisdom was the highest good, but that it went beyond mere knowledge of self to knowledge of the universe. The Megaric movement developed into the systems of Plato and Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists.

The Cyrenaics maintained that virtue consisted in the rational pursuit of it; that it consisted, not in the quest and possession of wisdom, but in the right or rational application of it to conduct. The pleasure of the present moment was the good, and wisdom was necessary to choose correctly when and how it was to be obtained. The Cyrenaic position develops into that of the Epicurean, and the Skeptics of the New Academy.

The Cynics admired in Socrates his self-control and independence of the pleasure of the moment, or rather of those impulses which lead a man blindly into wrong-doing. They agreed with him that speculative research into the nature of the good and of virtue was necessary to right conduct, but they maintained that the Socratic wisdom, or the exercise of man's well-being, was exhibited, not in the skillful pursuit, but in the rational disregard of pleasure, in the clear apprehension of the intrinsic worthlessness of this and most other objects of men's common aims. In this the Socratic self-control becomes contempt for pleasure. The doctrine of the Cynics develops into that of the Stoics, in which pleasure appears either as an evil, or as a morally indifferent object of will.

The Platonic Development. From Socrates, Plato derived both his intellectual and moral stimulus. His response went beyond his master's contempt for metaphysical knowledge. He made his ethical doctrine

consist very largely in its dependence on such knowledge. For him goodness and justice—identical with the idea of the Divine—are absolute and independent of opinion. The art of conduct, he taught, consists in man's striving to bring into his private and public life that harmony, beauty and order, which are the fundamental qualities and characteristics of the great cosmos, to imitate the good, which the soul, part of the great soul of the universe, had looked upon face to face in its pre-natal state. This is obtained by practising the four essential virtues: courage, the virtue of impulse; temperance, the virtue of appetite; and above all, wisdom, their conditioning virtue and accompaniment, and justice. Justice reaches its consummation in the organization of the state, the ideal of which Plato has sketched in *The Republic,* and in *Laws.* His ideal of the state emphasizes the social character of ethics. Plato subordinated the individual moral end to the universal, political end.

Plato's conception of morality or virtue was due to three chief influences: The *first* was his antagonism to the doctrine of Heraclitus, who saw nothing but flux or change in the universe; Plato sought something real, permanent, eternal. The *second* influence was his opposition to the Sophistic doctrine of the conventional origin of moral law, which made morality the sport of legislation and the pursuit of personal interests in a world without fixed or rational order. The *third* was the notion that man's chief end was the good which was fixed in the eternal nature of things, and not in the pursuit of transient pleasures. Plato identified the ultimate good with God, and thus founded his ethics upon an eternal principle. Virtue consisted in the rational pursuit of this end. Man must consciously and

rationally pursue the end which nature has fixed for him as his highest good, in order to be moral. For the realization of this good, Plato asserts the existence of a soul and its immortality in opposition to the materialism of Atomic, Heraclitic, and Sophistic doctrines. While Plato identified the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, yet it is not easy to trace in his writings the outlines of a definite ethical system, whether his own, or one derived from his great master.

The Aristotelian System, or Contribution. Aristotle, the prince of true thinkers, like Socrates, wholly separates his ethics from metaphysics, and hence wholly departs from the religious ideas and associations of the Platonic system. He stands only upon an anthropological and psychological foundation. He is the founder of the school of Perfectionism,—which advocates the theory that perfection rather than mere feeling is the highest good. Aristotle's thorough analysis of the problem was his chief improvement of ethical theory. His first step was to distinguish between the two kinds of virtue—the *natural* and the *moral.* The moral virtues are the product of man's will, and denote moral as opposed to natural excellence. Thus, to be virtuous, a man's conduct must be a law for him—the regular habitual expression of his will. This harmony between human will and reason or intellect produces the ethical virtues or happiness, the highest good, man's aim in life. But while Socrates held that virtue is only the result of reason and not the result of education and habit, that it consists in perfect practical wisdom or moral insight, Aristotle thought that education, practice, and habit were also necessary. He defines ethical virtues as a settled, fixed

habit, the outcome of practice, formed under the rule and guidance of reason and intellect.

With Aristotle, the virtues include: wisdom, justice, temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, ambition, gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, decorous wit. It is suggested also that, although scarcely a virtue, a sense of shame is becoming in youth.

The following propositions are considered a fair summary of Aristotle's ethics: (1) He separated metaphysics and ethics. (2) He repudiated pleasure, and accepted well-being or perfection as the summum bonum. (3) He distinguished between intellectual or natural and moral excellence, making morality a habit of will instead of a quality of intellect or nature. (4) He distinguished between voluntary or conscious action, and involuntary or unconscious action, and between impulsive and deliberate action, so as to develop a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. (5) He resolved all virtue into a mean between excess and deficiency, showing how reason (conscience) regulates the impulses toward either of these extremes. (6) His practical application of the ideal was placed in the contemplative life, reflecting the spirit of his race, and probably the consciousness of the political decline of his age, when democracy made it impossible for the noblest men to engage in politics. This is the continuance of that retirement from the world which was taught by Plato, encouraged by the Stoics, and made a religion by Neo-Platonism. It was the asceticism of Plato, without the metaphysics, that conditioned it.

Three Schools. Three schools represent the period immediately following that of Aristotle: the *Stoic,* the *Epicurean* and the *Neo-Platonic.* The whole pe-

riod was characterized by the decline of the political and social life. Athens had been conquered first by Sparta and then by Macedonia, both of which represented an inferior civilization. Hence the nobler intellectual spirits sought their highest good in withdrawal from all participation in political life—the Stoics because of their contempt for its baseness, the Epicureans because the intellectual life was incompatible with it, and their individualistic and egoistic ethics required every man to secure pleasure or happiness for himself; and the Neo-Platonists, because they considered the world unworthy of them, and must seek their good in religious ecstasy.

The Stoics. This school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who taught in the Painted Porch or Hall, whence the names—Stoic and Stoicism. To the Stoics, virtue was the highest good. With them, pleasure was of no value; it was a mere passive state of the soul, hence of no moral significance. Virtue alone is good; he who has it wants nothing, though destitute of all things. Four things are indispensable to virtue: Knowledge of good and evil, temperance, fortitude, justice. Man cannot wrong himself nor other animals, for they exist only for his good. As a system of pure and elevated morals, it has perhaps no superior among Pagan systems of ethics, yet it has some defects. The very elevation of its standard, the very loftiness of its ideal, rendered it in a measure unsuited to the ordinary conditions of humanity. It recognized no gradations of virtue or vice. The Stoic rule of life was to follow Nature and eschew the pursuit of pleasure. Marcus Aurelius said it is characteristic of the rational soul for a man to love his neighbor. Said Epictetus: Man's nature is social; wrong-

doing is anti-social; affection is natural.[1] The Stoic position touching citizenship is: "My nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antonius, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me."[2]

Stoic morality has been summed up in the following manner: (1) Morality is conformity to nature or reason, whether we regard it in man or in the world. (2) Virtue is the highest good, and this represents good will as the motive or attitude of reason, and perfection as the end. (3) Wisdom is not an absolute good or end in itself, but a means to virtue, being thus subordinated wholly to practical purposes. (4) The intention or motive is the essential element of morality. (5) Man's freedom is limited to internal choice, his dependence upon the course of nature restricting the satisfaction of desire to the government of reason. (6) All men belong to the same brotherhood, and national boundaries should give way to a federal life more after the type of the family.

But Stoicism is a system of fatalism and pantheism. In asserting the underived existence of matter, it exhibits one of the numerous types of materialism; and in referring all doctrines to reason as the ultimate standard, it is a system of rationalism. It is also considered the nearest approach the Pagan mind has made to Christianity. But a system that allows no forgiveness of enemies; that forbids repentance for wrong; that recognizes no need of redemption, or Divine aid in trial; that never rises to trust in God, or communion with Him; that seeks in suicide a cowardly relief from

[1] *Discourses,* Book I, Chapter XXIII.
[2] *Thoughts,* Book VI, 44; translated by George Long.

the ills of life; that is in its inmost essence a system of selfishness, is yet far below the benevolence, the mercy, the loving trust, and comforting hope of Christianity. However, the firm conviction, fortitude, patience, and persistence of Stoicism are commendable.

The Epicureans. Epicurus (340–270 B. C.) was the founder of this school and for many years a teacher of philosophy in Athens. He represented pleasure as the supreme good and its pleasure-yielding capacity as the sole criterion by which any act or habit is to be judged. Consequently, the quest for pleasure becomes the only duty and virtue. "Do that you may enjoy," is the fundamental maxim of morality. He specifies two kinds of pleasure—that of rest and that of motion. Action has its reaction; excitement is followed by depression; effort by weariness; thought for others involves the disturbance of one's own peace. His object was his own pleasure and happiness, and every arrangement of life, marriage, friends, political duties, personal habits, occupation, were sacrificed or made to bend to this one aim. Epicurus praises temperance and fortitude, but only as measures of prudence. He praises justice, but only in so far as it enables us to escape harm, and frees us from that dread of discovery that haunts the steps of the evil-doer. Some of his specific maxims are: Do not fall in love with a woman, or become the father of a family, or generally, go into politics. Epicurus put conduct above everything else in his philosophy.

The Skeptical School of Philosophy, of which Pyrrho was considered the founder, held that objective truth was unattainable; that the perceptions and conceptions of the same persons as to the same object vary at different times; that happiness consists in

suspense of judgment; the difference between good and bad was the result of convention, not of nature, and that it is our duty to live without desire or fear, preference or abhorrence, love or hatred,—in entire apathy. The Pyrrhonists, as the members of this school were often called, admitted that they were skeptical even of their own skepticism.

The Neo-Platonists. Neo-Platonism is a revival of Platonism and represents the last stage of Greek philosophy. It is a mixture of philosophy and religion. It combines oriental mysticism, magic, and myths, literally or allegorically, with the philosophic spirit of Greek thought, resulting in a kind of spiritualistic pantheism. It is emotional rather than volitional. The most notable exponents are Plotinus and Porphyry. Their principal teachings are: (1) A system of metaphysical absolutism arising as a revolt against skepticism; (2) a spirit of religious ecstasy aimed at freedom from the bonds of the flesh, or material existence; (3) an ascetic withdrawal from all the social and political life as it existed, designed to lead the human soul, degraded by corporeality, up to see God and become one with Him. To apprehend the Divine was their highest ethical aim. By means of virtue and that immediate intuition of God which is the soul's prerogative, the soul may thus become mystically one with Him and thus return to Him. The soul is in its very nature eternal, occupies a middle rank between the sensuous and the Divine, and is endowed with freedom of the will. Matter, in itself, is neither good nor evil. Neo-Platonism left its impress upon the later teachers who belong to its completely successful rival for supremacy in the religious world—Christianity. Augustine, one of the great

thinkers of the Church, says in the seventh book of his *Confessions* how much he owed to the perusal of the Neo-Platonic works.

Gnosticism is a general name given in the beginning of the second century to various heresies that existed about that time. It consisted in some cases of Hellenism, in others of Judaism, of the old Persian religion, or of Buddhism, reinforced with the idea of redemption borrowed from Christianity. *Philo* is its most distinguished exponent and is sometimes called a theosophist. He intermingled Platonic and Old Testament ideas.

References for Further Study

Leighton: *The Field of Philosophy.*
Paulsen: *Introduction to Philosophy, Trans. Thilly.*
Sidgwick: *History of Ethics.*
Wundt: *Ethical Systems.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Give some reasons for and against defining a subject at the beginning of its study.
2. Why is Ethics one of the last of the philosophical disciplines studied in a college course?
3. Why is it that Christian Ethics cannot be understood without its history?
4. Give reasons for division of ethics into Ancient and Modern.
5. Why did the earliest Greek speculation take little interest in ethical questions? What was the chief characteristic of the whole Greek period? How was it reflected?
6. Distinguish between virtue as a *means* and virtue as an *end.*

7. Point out the chief ethical contribution of Democritus? of the Sophists?
8. Tell of Socrates. Why was he called the founder of scientific ethics?
9. Sum up his ethical doctrines, and tell of their influence on his contemporaries.
10. How was the fundamental ethical doctrine of Socrates interpreted by the Megarics? By the Cyrenaics? By the Cynics?
11. Tell of Plato. Show how he brought to consciousness the unspoken word of Socrates and expressed the master's life in his own works.
12. Evaluate Plato's ethical doctrines.
13. Tell of Aristotle, and of his contribution to the history of Ethics.
14. How did his conception of virtue differ from that of Plato and Socrates? In what sense was he the first to recognize the WILL as the essential for the existence of the moral virtues?
15. Tell of the Stoics. Summarize their ethical contribution.
16. Tell of the Epicureans and of their morality.
17. Tell of the Skeptic School of which Pyrrho was the leader.
18. Tell of the teachings of the Neo-Platonists and of their impress.
19. Tell of Gnosticism.

Problems for Further Discussion

1. In what sense is discussion the life breath of Ethics? Why must the discussion be characterized by respect for facts, for self-evident principles, by love for truth, and by a recognition of the claims and excellence of morality?
2. Why has the value of ethical studies, indeed of all philosophical disciplines, been so greatly obscured in the minds of many college students?

3. Why is it very important that college students see knowledge as a whole, that is, philosophically, in its right perspective, that they have a proper appreciation of the great spiritual influences that have molded and made our civilization what it is to-day?

4. Which of the following questions will a study of Ethics help to answer: Who am I? Why am I here? Whither am I going?

5. In what sense is it true that every man has a "philosophy of life"? How would the philosophy of the uneducated differ from that of the man who has thought out for himself a reasoned rule of life under the guidance of the great moral thinkers of the past?

6. Critically examine: Aristotle endeavors to establish his ethics throughout on the basis of actual life in complete opposition to the idealistic and transcendental system set forth by Plato in his *Republic*.

7. How does Aristotle combat the Socratic law that virtue is knowledge, and the related statement that no one can knowingly do evil?

LESSON II

BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN ETHICS

THE human spirit, however, could not long be satisfied with philosophy. Religion took its place. Instead of the poet and philosopher of Greek antiquity, the saint of Christianity came. Christianity wrought the greatest revolution and revaluation of values that had ever come over mankind. It gave ethical reflection its main impulse; it substituted the motive of love for the motive of fear. Human philosophy gave its rôle to theology, whose object was man's redemption and the glory of God. Many of the great thinkers within the pale of the Church have been called the Fathers, a term implying soundness of doctrine, holiness of life, the approval of the Church, and undoubted antiquity.

Jesus, the Founder of Christianity, taught neither a philosophy nor a theology. Indeed, He ignored every form of philosophy, whether Judaistic or Hellenic, and especially the political hopes and ideals of His race. He offered the world regeneration by changing the heart and will of the individual, by awakening in him the springs of love to God and man. This Jesus effected by giving His own life and service to man and his upbuilding. Morality is internal as well as external, as was especially set forth in the Sermon on the Mount. From the outset, Christianity was a doctrine of salvation, comprehending reconciliation with God as well as with man, and spiritual perfection be-

yond the grave. Among the outstanding teachings of this period are: (1) A spiritual conception of the Messiah as opposed to the political; (2) the moral regeneration of the individual as the first step in social salvation; (3) the Fatherhood and sovereignty of God; (4) the brotherhood of man, including all nations; (5) a keen sense of sin, or alienation from God; (6) salvation or reconciliation with God by means of Christ's vicarious atonement; (7) the immortality of the soul, and the realization of "the Kingdom of heaven" after death.

The early Christian teachers (1) strongly recommended the following New Testament virtues: Obedience, patience, benevolence, purity, humility, alienation from the "world and the flesh"; and (2) ardently opposed the following "deadly sins": Pride, arrogance, anger, gluttony, unchastity, envy, vain-glory, worldliness, and so forth. The love of God and obedience to Him and the love of men are principles that require the exercise of such virtues as justice and benevolence. Greek ethics considered the perfection of the individual to be the ultimate aim of man. This was obtainable by a thorough exercise of his natural powers and capacities —culminating in happiness. Christian ethics demands the striving after pure morality in thought and action, the absolute power of the spirit over the flesh and over natural desires. This led in time to an unnatural life, as seen in asceticism, vows of poverty, celibacy, and submission to a cult of bodily pain and suffering. William of Occam, one of the most illustrious of Schoolmen, wrote: "If God commanded His creatures to hate himself, the hatred of God would be the duty of man." He meant that the very things which are forbidden under the severest penalties would become

virtuous and commendable if enjoined by Divine authority.

The discussions of such Scholastics as Abelard the Great and Thomas Aquinas about predestination, the sovereignty of God, and the freedom of the individual will, attracted much attention as affecting the conception of sin and responsibility. They laid stress upon a doctrine of conscience as opposed to objective and authoritative morality. The absolutely highest good is God: for man, it is the love of God. The way that leads to the attainment of this good is virtue, which is a confirmed habit of will. But it is in the motive or intention, which depends upon the consciousness of the distinction between right and wrong. The Reformation finds the source of human happiness within the human heart, and insists upon justification by faith. This faith is indeed likewise referred to the gifts of grace in later Protestantism. But the intellectual movement which made morality an inner principle of human nature, and, abandoning the attempt to discover the moral principle in external relations, striving rather to base it on human reason independent of tradition, could no longer be restrained.

Modern ethical thought originated largely with Martin Luther, the courageous monk at Wittenberg. It was characterized by a tendency toward "reality." It recognized that the aim of man consisted in the manifestation of his powers in the practical life; that the field of his moral activity was the world. Proceeding from this tendency, modern moralists, especially the English school, gradually separated ethics from theology, or morality from religion, and established it as a philosophic science. Locke, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith in England and

Scotland; Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Wolff in Germany, were most productive in this field of philosophy. Among the questions they raised and discussed were: (1) The origin and source of our sense of morality; (2) The inner motives which make us obey the dictates of our moral sense, and thus shape our conduct; (3) The aims, purposes, and ultimate result which we endeavor to obtain by our moral actions; (4) The criterion and standard by which our actions are regulated. The frequently quoted nineteenth proposition of the fifth book of Spinoza's ethics reads as follows: "He who loves God, cannot expect that God should love him in return." While this involves absolute abnegation on the one hand, it is at the same time the possession of the most profound spiritual joy, positive and thoroughly optimistic on the other. Spinoza's ethics exerted a profound influence upon Herder, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel.

Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1788) gave a new direction to the study of ethics. He taught that man bears in himself the source of law and the moral spirit. He said: "Two things fill my mind with awe: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." This moral spirit is independent of legislation or of any dictation from without. He calls this moral law, which can only be of a general and formal nature, the *categorical imperative*. It enjoins us "to act as though the maxim of our conduct were destined by the force of our will to become a universal law of nature." On the other hand, however, in a different formulation of his categorical imperative, Kant insisted with much emphasis and enthusiasm, that moral ends not only take account of humanity as a whole, but that each individual human

being must likewise be regarded as an end in himself. "Act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or in any other, as an end always, and never as a means only." Our actions thus are free and moral only when our will is subordinated to this law, so to speak, wholly free from all sentimentality. Otherwise our action is dictated by inclination and not from a sense of duty.

To Kant, "the executioner of Deism," succeeded Fichte, the forerunner of the modern socialism; Hegel, the collectionist and reactionist; Schliermacher, the Christian and philosopher; Schopenhauer, the Nirvana-intoxicated pessimist; and Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer continued to develop ethical and moral problems and to set forth theories of their own.

Hobbes in his *Leviathan,* chapter fifteen, recommends among other virtues: Justice, equity, requital of benefits, sociability, a moderate degree of forgiveness, and the avoidance of pride and arrogance.

Locke, in his *Essay on Civil Government,* Book II, Chapter 2, gives us such statements as these:

No government allows absolute liberty.

Where there is no property there is no justice.

All men are originally equal.

Men ought not to harm one another.

Parents have a right to control their children.

Hume, in *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* Section 6, Part I, gives us two lists or classes of virtues.

(1) Those immediately agreeable or useful to ourselves: Discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, frugality, economy, good sense, temperance, sobriety, patience, perseverance, considerateness, secrecy, order,

and so forth; (2) Those immediately agreeable or useful to others: Benevolence, justice, veracity, fidelity, politeness, wit, modesty, cleanliness.

Thomas Reid, in his *On the Active Powers of Man,* Essay V, Chapter I, gives us five fundamental virtues: We ought to exercise a rational self-love, and prefer a greater to a lesser good. We should follow nature, as revealed in the constitution of man. We should exercise benevolence. Right and wrong are the same for all in the same circumstances. We should venerate and obey God.

Not all ethicists lay such strong emphasis upon virtues or duties,—especially not the Utilitarians and self-realizationists. The former aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number; the latter at the harmonious development of the faculties of man. They regard as virtues only such qualities of character as make for the attainment of the one or the other of these ends. While many ethical writers have given the same virtues, yet in many cases the spirit and meaning have been changed. Take, for example, the so-called cardinal (from *cardo,* a hinge) virtues stressed by Plato: wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. The Stoics and Cicero both changed their meaning and spirit. St. Thomas, the great Scholastic of the thirteenth century, finds it convenient to add the Christian virtues (faith, hope, love) to the four Pagan virtues of Plato. St. Augustine finds the cardinal virtues to be different phases of love to God. Our present-day ethical writers reveal the same tendency to follow Plato. Dewey and Tufts, pages 404–423, *Ethics,* conceive the cardinal virtues as "traits essential to morality." To them temperance implies purity and reverence; justice includes love and sympathy; courage is

synonymous with persistent vigor; and included in wisdom is conscientiousness.

Cicero, in *De Officiis,* Book I, Chapter 16, teaches that whatever one can give without suffering loss should be given even to an entire stranger. Among such opportunities or obligations he mentions: To prohibit no one from drinking at a stream of water; to permit any one who wishes to light fire from fire; to give faithful advice to one who is in doubt. Such things are useful to the receiver and do no harm to the giver.

Thus has been set forth the accepted content of morals as recognized by the more prominent ethical writers and thinkers of ancient and modern times—those like the Epicureans, who make virtue an accident, a variable, subject to authority, occasion or circumstance, and those like the Stoics, that endow virtue with an intrinsic right, validity, immutableness, and supremacy. Even the cursory glance thus given of the different moral codes will suffice to bring any thoughtful man to the consciousness that they differ widely among themselves, and that the differences are not insignificant. A little reflection will convince him of two things: (1) that it would be indefensibly dogmatic to treat all other codes as if they were mere pathological variations from his own; and (2) that the differences among the codes should not be unduly emphasized. Unless "good," "right," "obligation," "approval," or the rudimentary conceptions which foreshadow them in the mind of even the most primitive human beings, had a core of identity traceable in societies the most diverse, there could be no history of the development of the moral ideas. As has been well said, "collections of disparate and disconnected

facts do not constitute a science, nor are they the proper subject of a history." We do not hesitate to treat as similar and yet dissimilar the customs, laws and ethical maxims of different ages and of different races. And the reflective man strives to be rationally critical.

However, we must ground our young people in the belief that right and wrong are immutable; that they are neither the mere dictate of human teaching nor created even by revelation. They are a perennial fountain of strength, as personified in HOLY WRIT,— "Jehovah possessed me from the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When he prepared the heavens, I was there. When he appointed the foundations of the earth, then was I by him." He who has this conception of the Divine and everlasting sacredness of virtue does not imagine that he has power over the Right, can sway it by his choice, or vary its standard by his action; but it overmasters him, and by subduing, frees him, fills and energizes his whole being, ennobles all his powers, exalts and hallows all his affections, makes him a priest to God, and a king among men.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY

Alexander: *Moral Order and Progress.*
Dewey: *How We Think,* and Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics.*
Hobbes: *Leviathan.*
Hume: *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.*
Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason.*
Locke: *Essay on the Human Understanding.*

Reid: *On the Active Powers of Man,* Essay V.
Wundt: *Ethical Systems.*
Sidgwick: *History of Ethics.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Outline this lesson.
2. Why cannot the human spirit be satisfied with philosophy?
3. What is meant by saying that Christianity substituted the motive of love for that of fear?
4. Tell of the Founder of Christianity, and of His mission and method.
5. What were the outstanding teachings of Christianity?
6. Mention the New Testament virtues recommended by the early Christian teachers; the "deadly sins" ardently opposed.
7. Distinguish between the aims and demands of Pagan and Christian Ethics.
8. Who were Abelard the Great, Thomas Aquinas, William of Occam? What ethical teachings did they advocate?
9. In what sense did modern ethical thought originate largely with Martin Luther? Tell of his work and influence.
10. What ethical questions were raised and discussed by the English, Scotch and German philosophers?
11. Enumerate the virtues recommended by Hobbes; by Locke; by Hume; by Thomas Reid.
12. State the aim of the Utilitarians; of the self-realizationists.
13. Who added the Christian virtues (faith, hope, love) to the Platonic virtues?
14. What did Cicero teach?

Problems for Further Discussion

1. What are the chief points of difference between the religious and moral philosophy of Christianity and that of ancient ethics?
2. Distinguish between the Pagan and Christian conception of *Salvation.*
3. Why is Augustine considered the most important teacher of the Church as regards his permanent influence upon ethics? Tell of Pelagian controversy.
4. Critically evaluate Scholastic Ethics.
5. Tell of Christian mysticism, and of its relation to the thought of the Crusades.
6. What was the scholastic conception of the Freedom of the Will and of Conscience?
7. Discuss the Ethics of the Reformation.
8. Tell of the development of empirical ethics through Bacon and Hobbes; of the development of secular ethics.
9. What change in ethics was introduced by Kant? To what extent was the profound influence of Kantian ethics due to the sternness of its notion of duty?
10. Interpret Fichte's moral law: "Always fulfil thy destiny."
11. Interpret Hegel's principle: "Be a person, and respect others as persons."
12. Evaluate the modern realistic ethics of Herbart, Adam Smith, Comte, Mill, Darwin, Spencer.

LESSON III

THE MEANING OF ETHICS

ETHICS is the study of man, choosing rightly, and doing well what he ought to do in this present world; in other words, ethics is the science and art of consistent Christian living. This definition covers the field of moral action—actions of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil, duties to be done, rights to be respected and maintained. Life is not static, but dynamic; one thing after another, calling for vision, venture, and the highest creative endeavor. The name "Ethics" is derived from the Greek τὰ ἠθικά; this again comes from ἦθος, meaning character; and this is connected with ἔθος, custom or habit. In like manner, the term "Moral Philosophy," which means the same thing as Ethics, is derived from the Latin *mores*, meaning habits or customs. Thus, Ethics tells of men's habits and customs, or of their characters, the principles underlying their habitual acts, what constitutes the rightness or wrongness of these principles, the good or evil of these habits.

The term "ethics" is frequently used in popular speech as the synonym of morality or of a particular moral code current in some circle or profession, as when we speak of medical or legal ethics. But it is preferable to confine the term ethics to description of a theory of morality. Morality is an art as well as a science, that is, it is a way of living and of doing. Ethics is the attempt scientifically to understand this

way of living and acting. It is the science of right conduct or behavior. Some say that ethics, or moral science, is the science of obligation, or duty; others say that it is science of the morally right and obligatory, considering also with this the morally wrong; others say that it is the science of moral law, meaning by this law those rules collectively which reason teaches to be right and dutiful. These definitions seem equivalent to one another, and are all justified by the fact that rational beings consider certain objects of pursuit and certain modes of conduct to be right and obligatory, and by the fact that a certain manner of life, which we call moral, originates from these judgments and perceptions.

Logically, then, ethics must be defined as both a science and an art. This leads us at once to a brief consideration of the words "science" and "art." A science teaches us to know; an art, to do. The scientist describes exactly and, if possible, explains the facts which he observes. Science voluntarily limits itself to one group of facts, takes for granted the existence of coördinated groups, and does not seek to reduce one to the other or both to any deeper kind of reality. Science begins with a question mark. It begins when reasons are sought after. It would know why things are as they are, why they act as they do. Science asks the question—Why is it so, what is the reason for its being as it is? What are its consequents or effects? What place does it occupy in the world of facts? How does it fit into the system of things? Now, each particular science marks out and studies for itself a particular subject matter.

For example: physics investigates the general properties of matter; biology treats of matter in the living

state; psychology examines mental processes or states of consciousness. By subdividing each of these sciences, we have many special sciences with limited fields to be investigated. The attempt is made in every case to analyze and classify and describe and explain a particular group of facts, to learn what made them as they are, to relate them to other facts, and to insert them into a system. Now ethics studies the habits and customs of men—their characteristics, the principles on which they habitually act, and considers what it is that constitutes the rightness and wrongness of these principles, the good and evil of these habits. In so far then as ethics is a name for the observation, classification and explanation of these phenomena, it is a science; in so far as it attempts to regulate and to influence human behavior by instruction, admonition or advice, it is an art. Hence we may define ethics as the science of the phenomena of consistent human behavior, and the art of directing the human will toward the ideal order of life. This twofold nature of this definition gives us the twofold division of the subject of ethics—theoretical and practical.

What, then, are the phenomena of essential human conduct and character, of consistent Christian living? We answer: The tastes, disposition, desires and aversions, affections, motives, and all mental conditions related to the fixed or changeable nature of the will; the phenomena of conduct are man's volitions and actions, including all forms of behavior affecting his own welfare and the welfare of others. Both together constitute morality, the subject-matter of ethics; that is, consciously purposive action. As a science, then, ethics discovers principles of Christian living; as an art, it applies them.

Perhaps there are other definitions of ethics which should be mentioned in this connection, as follows: "The science of right and wrong"; "the science of duty"; "the science of the good, the summum bonum"; "the science of man's moral nature"; "the science of conduct"; "the science of the conditions of morality"; "the science of moral principles"; "the science of social obligation"; "the science of human worth"; "the science of the ideal in conduct," and so forth. All these conceptions help to throw some light upon the nature, meaning and comprehensiveness of ethics as conceived at different times and by different persons. But not all of these definitions take sufficient account of the relation of motives and character to conduct, as for example, Ethics as the science of conduct. Ethics denotes a study of character as well as of conduct; a study of *persons* as the agents in realizing an ideal order of social action, and of *things* and conduct as conditions and elements in such an order. Hence we regard ethics as the science of moral personality and of the good,—the moral good, or end.

From what has already been said, we may infer that ethics has at least three distinctive features or characteristics. First: *Ethics is the science of the good as contrasted with the merely true.* The true, the beautiful, and the good are considered the primary ideas of the mind. We like to include a fourth,—*religion.* The true is the inner substance or reality of things as apprehended by reason. The true appeals to the intelligence. The beautiful is the inner substance or reality of things as apprehended by the senses. It appeals to the imagination. The good is the inner substance or reality of things as appre-

hended by both reason and imagination, and is at the same time something that is ideal, the essential of life as it is by an act of the will. When we do what we ought to do, then we have the good. The good is not to feel good, but it is that which is realized by a process of human right activity. From this viewpoint, ethics seeks to compare facts and events with their causes and to distinguish their relative worth to man and his aims or his destiny. Lotze took pleasure in saying that the field of ethics was the *world of worths* as contrasted with the *world of facts* and laws of the physical sciences. It deals with ought judgments, with the world of values; it may be in the form of pleasure, of happiness, of perfection, of welfare, of obedience to the moral law for its own sake, for love of God, or any other end. On the other hand, the so-called static sciences—the " is " or " fact " judgments—deal with facts as they are and try to determine their laws and causes; to consider them as effects to be explained by antecedent facts, and do not care for their worth to mankind. Ethics, however, reduces them to a scale of values; considers their worth with a view to adjusting them in the future to man's development, or to his own adjustment to them. Ethics thus acts as a judge over the world's order rather than as a mere observer of it.

Second: *Ethics is the science of the ideal as contrasted with the actual.* An ideal means a type, model, or standard; that which is ideal is that which conforms to its type or standard. Ideals are products of imagination, and are our nearest mental approach to perfection. The ideal is to be obtained by selecting and assimilating into one whole the perfections of many individuals, excluding everything defective. The

psychologist gains many of his best lessons from language and literature and art. Through reading, hearing, and observing, we appropriate the experiences of the best people at their best, and learn what high moral activity means. Then from our accumulated experiences we create our ideals of moral greatness and goodness—our judgments of worth or evaluation. These ideals become a perpetual stimulus to higher moral activity and better living. The ideal thus becomes a preparation for the actual. The general plans to-morrow's battle and thus organizes victory. The teacher plans her school before it opens and thus organizes success. Demosthenes had made his great oration many hundred times in imagination before he electrified the Athenians. To idealize anything is to set up a possible state of existence. The sciences of the actual explain facts, and do not form ideals or endeavor to move the will in the direction of them. They treat of what is; ethics treats of what ought to be,—determines what an ideal existence is and how to promote its realization. The physical sciences, or the sciences of the actual, or of facts, do nothing of this kind. Ethics starts with the world of facts and goes on to assert the existence of ideal possibilities and to maintain the obligation to realize them. When one is led to create for himself a worthy ideal of life, a life full of hope and courage, and cheerfulness and patience and high desires and noble achievements, foundation is laid for a grand life.

Third: *Ethics is a* NORMATIVE *science.* A normative science is one concerned with an end, or ideal, or standard,—one that lays down rules or laws, or that seeks to define a standard or ideal with reference to which rules or laws may be formulated. There are

ethical facts as well as ethical laws and ideals. Ethics, therefore, is the science which distinguishes between values, forms ideals, and imposes an obligation to respect them. This obligation is the sense of duty, or Kant's "Categorical imperative." "Ought" announces a normal standard, ideal, or preference. What shall it profit to feel the worth of a certain order, or even to idealize it, if we cannot feel that it ought to be realized? In ethics, we study what ought to be ends, such as perfection, goodness, happiness, or honesty, temperance, purity, and the like, and then we lay down their pursuit as a binding law upon our natures. Just as Logic prescribes rules for correct thinking, Ethics prescribes rules for consistent living, seeks to *legislate* for the will, while the descriptive sciences *explain* for the intellect. Hence Ethics is a normative science, because it seeks to ascertain the norms, rules or maxims which formulate the right and wrong modes of behavior. Ethics as a normative science is sometimes called the science of appreciation; the science of the ideal; the moral, practical, regulative, judicial, teleological, unlike the natural, positive, or observational sciences, the sciences of the actual. These latter sciences discover the laws of what already "is," while the former sciences declare what "ought" to be.

Ethics, then, is the science of what is truly good or valuable. The whole history of ethics has been a continuous study of this important problem. It has occupied a central place in the thinking of such men as Plato and St. Augustine, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Lotze, Höffding, Münsterberg, Windelband, Schiller, Sorley, Bosanquet, Croce, Hocking, Dewey, and Perry. The following are some of the questions that require answering: What are the values of life, and how are

they to be classified? What goes on in consciousness when we value anything? How may we determine what is the most valuable end for human living? What is the relation between values (what ought to be) and existence (what is)? Are values subjective or objective? Independent of persons, or do they exist only in and for persons? We need a system of values to complete our thinking.

References for Further Study

Bowne: *Principles of Ethics,* Introduction.
Dewey: *Outlines of Ethics,* Introduction.
Everett, W. G.: *Moral Values,* Chapters II, VII.
Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics,* Chapter I.
Sidgwick: *History of Ethics,* Chapter I.
Sidgwick: *Methods of Ethics,* Book I, Chapter I.

Review Questions

1. What do you understand by Ethics? Give etymology of the term.
2. Distinguish between a "science" and an "art."
3. In what sense is Ethics a science? An art?
4. Tell all you can of the phenomena of essential human conduct.
5. Give six or more definitions of Ethics.
6. What are the three distinctive features of Ethics?
7. Distinguish between the true, the beautiful, and the good.
8. Explain Lotze's statement, "The field of Ethics was the world of worths as contrasted with the world of facts and laws of the physical sciences."
9. What do you understand by a "normative" science? By a "descriptive" science?

10. Give reasons for saying that ethics is a normative science.
11. Arrange a table or scale of Moral Values.

Problems for Discussion

1. In what sense is it true to say that the ordinary sciences, such as botany, biology, anatomy, geology, deal with particular classes of facts?
2. Tell why the normative sciences, such as logic, æsthetics, ethics, deal definitely rather with standards of judgment than with particular facts.
3. Does Ethics show me what I ought to do? If not, why not?
4. Is one more apt to be virtuous when he is doing what he likes or when he is doing what he dislikes? Give examples.
5. In what sense can Ethics help us to think straight, clearly, and sympathetically on many sides of a question?
6. To be good is to be absolutely loyal to the interest that is most yourself. Explain.
7. In what sense is there a right and wrong about every subject?
8. A man sets out to be an explorer and scientist; show that his choice of a hot or cold climate, of hunting or navigation, of anthropology or ethnology must depend on his fitness and the opportunity.
9. Name the moral qualities that are needed to play football, or to learn to play the piano.
10. How does the study of ethics help us to get the most out of life?
11. Does history reveal an unchanging code of ethics?
12. Before the next lesson, let every member of the class notice how often they hear the words, "right," "wrong," "ought," "good," "wicked," "ideal," "standard," used.

LESSON IV

ETHICS IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER SCIENCES

FROM what has already been stated, Ethics appears to belong to that group of sciences called philosophic. Philosophy, in the wide sense usually given it, denotes the investigation and explanation of the causes of things; it studies the nature of experience as a whole; it seeks to discover, and scientifically to state, the general laws of both matter and mind; its object is to ascertain facts, and their relation to one another; it seeks to understand the whole in the light of its central principles, while the particular sciences seek to investigate special portions of the content of our experience.

General Statement. From the earliest days the primary division of the sciences has been into physics and philosophy. The physical sciences deal with the non-mental world and the philosophical sciences with the conscious world; the former deal with unconscious objects, the latter with the facts, the laws, and the implications of consciousness. In so far as an object is unconscious, we study it physically; in so far as conscious, we study it philosophically. All facts like all sciences are interrelated. James says: "To know one thing thoroughly would be to know the whole universe. Mediately or immediately, that one thing is related to everything else; and to know all about it, all its relations need to be known." In the last analysis, we cannot know one fact without knowing them all. Tennyson expresses the same idea poetically in the oft-quoted lines:

> "Little flower—but if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is."

Leibnitz, in "Monadology," page 61, says: "Everybody is affected by everything that happens in the world, so that a man seeing everything would know from each particular object everything that takes place everywhere, as well as what has taken place; he perceives in the present that which is remote in time and space."

All sciences are interrelated, dependent upon one another, and subservient to one another. For example, Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, seeks to analyze the various elements that enter into the constitution of the world as we know it. The facts of Psychology are in some way related to the facts of physiology and physics, logic, æsthetics, politics, and metaphysics. The inquiry that enters into the discussion as to the kind and degree of reality possessed by the various elements in our experience is known as Ontology. Epistemology and Ontology tend to coalesce and they together constitute what is generally known as Metaphysics, the alpha and the omega of the philosophical sciences. Hence it is easily seen that Ethics, along with Logic and Æsthetics, lies about midway between Psychology and Metaphysics, and is also closely related to many other subjects, as shall be pointed out forthwith briefly.

Ethics and Physical Science. This relation is but slight and essentially indirect. The chief value of Physical Science to ethics lies more in its help toward the understanding of the environment within which the moral life is passed than as to the nature of the

moral life itself. It treats of natural phenomena and their causes as opposed to phenomena of will and their value. While the chief object of Ethics is wholly independent of them inasmuch as it determines what ought to be in contrast with what merely is or occurs without volitional interposition, yet Ethics cannot dispense wholly without their conclusions.

Relation to Biology. The relation of Biology to Ethics is considerably closer than that of Physics or Chemistry to Ethics. Some recent writers, under the influence of the theory of evolution, have represented the connection of Biology with Ethics as being of a much more fundamental character. They tell us that the criterion of good or bad conduct is to be found in the tendency to promote the development of life or the reverse, and that consequently, we may speak of good or bad conduct in the lowest forms of life in quite the same sense as in man. But the meaning of the term conduct in Ethics refers only to a being who has a national will, and whose development of life is but a subordinate part of the end. Hence, Biology's bearing upon Ethics is rather indirect. It studies such processes as nutrition, and growth and reproduction; how plants and animals keep alive; how they grow from the egg to maturity; how they repair injuries; how they produce offspring like themselves. Such study throws light on the development of the moral consciousness only in so far as animal life is studied from the psychological, not from the purely biological, point of view.

Relation to Psychology. We have found that the facts of Ethics are not isolated and independent; they are connected with the rest of the world. Ethics is concerned with moral human beings, while Psychology

is concerned with the science of consciousness. Psychology analyzes, classifies, and explains states of consciousness; Ethics is interested in the *moral* states of consciousness, and must analyze and explain especially the so-called ethical sentiments, the feeling of obligation, conscience, etc. Ethics asks, Why do men judge as they do? What is the ground of moral distinctions? Why is wrong wrong, and right right? Is there a standard or criterion, or ideal by which conduct is judged, and what is it? Given a certain ideal or standard, what conduct is moral, what immoral? What is the highest good for man? the end of life? Such are some of the questions Ethics asks and seeks to answer. Psychology does not inquire into the principles underlying conduct, only with the observation, classification, explanation of mental events and processes. To be more specific, Psychology asks, What sorts of impressions do we get from the outside world and from our own body? How is this information put together into perceptions, thoughts, desires, emotions, and other mental experiences? How do we remember things and how do we learn to do things in the right way? How do human beings develop a social life, by means of which they talk and work together? How do men master their own environment and use it for their own ends? What is man's personality, which receives this information about the world and puts it together and uses it? Such are the main problems of psychology. Psychology is explanatory: Ethics is legislative; evaluative.

Relation to Logic. Logic is the science of the laws of discursive thought; or the laws of correct thinking. It is occupied only with the phenomena of thought, and inference and reasoning, but without explaining

them. It seeks to show which are valid or invalid. Logic studies the standard of truth; the validity of the various processes of thought. Logic is concerned with reasoning; Ethics with volition. Logic deals with ideals of the intellect; Ethics deals with ideals of the will. Logic employs the understanding; Ethics employs the conscience. The laws of Logic are the *necessary* laws of reason; those of Ethics are the *moral* laws of the will. Logic discusses the correct action of thought; Ethics, the correct action of volition. Logic is what is valid in reasoning; Ethics what is valid in conduct.

Relation to Æsthetics. Both sciences are essentially cognitive, normative, and concerned with the discussion of standards—with value or worth estimates. Æsthetics investigates the standard of beauty—worth for feeling; Ethics of goodness—value or worth from the point of view of action,—valor, as Mackensie puts it. In æsthetics our admirations of beauty are scrutinized, classified, organized; in Ethics, our laws and commands, declaring what a man should be or do, are studied. Ethics is occupied with *personal worth* as expressed in perfection of will and conduct. The sole object of æsthetics is *impersonal worth* in terms of beauty as opposed to utility. Ethics, therefore, as the study of the good, is closely related to æsthetics as the study of the beautiful.

Relation to Political Philosophy. The sciences upon which Ethics may be said to rest have been referred to in our discussion thus far. Such departments of study as Politics, Economics, and the science of Education rest upon Ethics. The study of Ethics deals with the facts of social life and relationships. Aristotle said, man is a political animal—always a member of

some kind of a community,—and that Ethics is essentially a part of POLITICS. If we assume with Plato that Ethics is the science of the highest good, and that the object of the state is to realize that end, then Politics depends on Ethics. We must know what the highest good is before we can tell what the state ought to do. If the state is the highest good, then conduct must serve the state, and Ethics becomes a branch of, or another name for, Politics, as Aristotle declares. Our view is rather that Politics is a branch of Ethics, since Ethics lays down the general rules of conduct, telling us how to act ethically or morally as individual members of the state.

Relation to Economics. This science, like Ethics, is concerned with GOODS, that is, with things having value with reference to certain human ends. But Economics-goods include only the means of satisfying human wants, and the worth of the goods will depend on the importance of the ends served. Economics represents the material products necessary to subsistence; it treats of utility values, as Æsthetics treats of the artistic, and Ethics of the moral values. However, the actions involved, like those of Politics, are subject to the jurisdiction and authority of Ethics, though in respect to object matter the several sciences can be classed as coördinate with one another.

Relation to Education. Ethics and Education are very closely related, since both sciences emphasize the importance of seeing life steadily and seeing it whole and through. Education is the science of human development. We cultivate plants, train animals, and educate persons. The science of education formulates the educational thought and experience of the race. Around the central idea of development through ef-

fort are grouped the facts of mind, the laws of growth, the means of education, the methods of promoting growth, and helpful devices and suggestions. Education has to do with the whole man—body, mind and spirit; includes all of man and all of life; complete development for complete living; the science of manhood. Both sciences aim by formal instruction to establish such habits of reaction on the moral side as to fix the conduct of the individual, both as a citizen and as an economic unit above criticism. This ethical phase of our education seeks to secure for each pupil courtesy, which is the virtue of the social life, and dependableness, which is the virtue of the ethical life, and the crowning good of a humble spirit, which is the virtue of religion. In short, the central idea of both is a reverent regard for the rights of others, a wise orienting of the individual for consistent living, and a right conception of the nature of the ethical end.

Relation to Religion. The relation between morality and religion is very vital and also very complex. The field of religion approaches that of ethics more nearly than that of æsthetics. The religious man of every faith is a person of both subjective and objective worth. In every age there has been a large consensus of opinion that religion and morality are one and the same thing. But religion should not be confused with Ethics, which is a normative science dealing with the standards of right conduct, nor even with right conduct itself. Religion is more than righteousness. Says L. P. Jacks: "The spirit of religion is that of uncompromising loyalty to the highest." The motive of loyalty makes the most powerful appeal to men. While the chief note of religion is reverence and its peculiar aim is harmony with the highest in-

volving righteousness of conduct, yet it is hard to *compel* men to do right. It is love more than fear that enlists the energies of men and makes them really effective. Palmer says: "The moral man is always thinking of matters limited in time and space, limited in scope and consequence, limited in the individuals concerned. . . . Ethics studies infinite principles so far as they receive a finite expression. . . . The attitudes of the moral and religious man are not merely unlike, but there is a conflict between the two. "Morality fulfils itself in religion, even though its gaze is directed manward rather than Godward." Kant defined religion as morality viewed as Divine command. Schliermacher says religion is rooted in the sense of dependence. Matthew Arnold says that "religion is morality touched with emotion" —a very ambiguous definition. Morality gains three things through religion: A wider horizon; the principle of stability, and the element of hope. Ethics is a science; Morality is an art. Palmer[1] presents in the following table his answer to the question, What sort of a person is capable of conduct and character? He says: Ethics deals with a human being who is conceived as unlike the being of:

1. Physics, through being conscious	Spirit	Ego or Self
2. Philosophy, through being active	Spirit	Ego or Self
3. History, through being free	Spirit	Ego or Self
4. Law, through possessing subjective worth	Person	Ego or Self
5. Æsthetics, through possessing objective worth	Person	Ego or Self
6. Religion, through being finite	Individual	Ego or Self
7. Common Life, through being coherent	Individual	Ego or Self

[1] Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, pp. 209 ff.

Palmer defines a few of the terms used in table:

The word "spirit" signifies something that acts; and when acting, is moved of itself and from within. Its opposite is matter, something passive and inert. When we inspirit a man, we give him life and power of action. Ethics investigates spiritual laws, the laws which guide beings conscious, active, free. But a moral being is something more than a spirit; he is a person, which is the great law term. A person thus fully particularized is single, individual. A moral being must be a coherent, dynamic whole, who, though connected with the infinite, is busied with finite affairs. Such an individual spiritual person can really be known only internally as a self. Primarily ethics is a study of the self. Society and the world are considered in it only so far as they too are implied in selfhood and are the appropriate field for its activity.

References for Further Study

Alexander: *Moral Order and Progress,* Introduction, pp. 1-19.
MacCunn: *The Making of Character.*
Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics,* Chapter II.
Muirhead: *Elements of Ethics.*
Palmer: *The Field of Ethics.*
Roop, H. U.: *General Psychology,* Chapter V.
Spencer: *Principles of Ethics.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. In what sense is Ethics a philosophic science?
2. Distinguish between the physical and the philosophical sciences.
3. Explain: "To know one thing thoroughly would be to know the whole universe."

4. Distinguish between Epistemology and Ontology.
5. How is Ethics related to the Physical and the Biological sciences?
6. Cite the questions asked by Ethics and Psychology.
7. What is the relation of Ethics to Logic and Æsthetics?
8. Is Politics a branch of Ethics or vice versa?
9. Tell of the relation of Ethics to Education and to Religion.
10. Explain the diagram, showing the relation of Ethics to other sciences.

Problems for Discussion

1. Moral life is the life in which we carry out our purposes. Why does this require foresight, sympathy, and will?
2. Distinguish a purpose from a fact, a wish, a vague idea, or an instinct, and by this analysis prove that it includes thought, will and foresight.
3. Explain how everybody is affected by everything that happens in the world.
4. In what sense does morality gain through religion a *wider horizon? Stability? Hope?*
5. "Ethics investigates spiritual laws, the laws which guide beings conscious, active, and free." Give examples.
6. "Society and the world are considered in Ethics only so far as they are implied in selfhood and are the appropriate field for its activity." Explain.
7. Ethics is the study of how life may be full and rich, and not how it may be restrained and meagre. Explain.
8. Why should there be a science of Ethics at all?

LESSON V

THE METHODS OF ETHICS

IN the last two lessons we have emphasized that Ethics is a science of character and consistent conduct, of good will and right results in human action; that it investigates what is man's highest good, and ascertains the principles upon which this can be rationally pursued while exercising the functions of a normative or regulative science and art; and that it is very closely related to various other sciences, and occupied with all the problems of man's moral nature, its genesis, meaning and value or authority, conscience, the good, virtue, freedom, duty, and whatever is contained in a moral ideal.

In this lesson we shall consider the methods of Ethics. Generally speaking, the methods of our science are much the same as those followed by other sciences. Moral phenomena must be examined with the same care as are the phenomena in other fields of research. Wherever possible, moral data or facts, both external and internal, must be observed, gathered, investigated, reflected and speculated upon. The modes of conduct of different races, nations, classes, individuals, and periods of time must be studied in order to discover what they considered right and wrong. "What a wealth of moral facts we find in the works of Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek tragedians, in Shakespeare, Byron, and Goethe! What an insight we gain into the moral feelings of the Middle Ages from the contemplation of their great works of

art; and how much the social conditions of our own times tell us of the moral ideals of the age!"

Sidgwick has defined a method of ethics as "any rational procedure by which we determine what is right for individual human beings to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action." He points out that many methods are natural and are habitually used, but claims that only one can be rational, that is, the methods of determining right conduct advocated by the different schools of moralists must be reconciled, or all but one must be rejected.[1]

The ethical method is both inductive and deductive. The purpose of this lesson is to point out the scientific aspects of these methods and their bearing upon ethical investigation. As an inductive science, Ethics observes, systematizes and explains the facts of man's moral consciousness. So far as Ethics respects these facts of consciousness, its method of inquiry is the introspective or reflective. Inner perception—the power by which the soul takes cognizance of its own acts and states—is the instrument of observation in this science, as outer or external perception is in the physical sciences. The facts of consciousness may be found not only in the present mental state of the investigator himself and in his past mental states, but also in what he discovers of other men's thoughts and feelings as expressed in their words and actions. Man's moral nature is studied best in the man of fully developed moral power and character.

Induction is the process of inferring a general truth from particular truths. For example, This magnet and this and this attract iron; since Nature is uniform, we infer that all magnets attract iron. Thus we think

[1] See Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics,* Book I, Chapter I.

up to principles and laws. The essentials of induction are: the observation of particular cases, their comparison, the formation of a generalization, and verification. We do not make rules and generalizations just for the sake of having them, but because we wish to apply them in handling the concrete situations of life.

Deduction is the process of inferring a particular truth from general truths. This is the method of labeling particular events, facts, or situations with some general rule. For instance, I meet a man and say, "He is an American; an honest man; a fraud." When I say this I am making a deduction, for I have a generalization about Americans, honest men, and frauds, and I place this individual in one of these classes. To have keen powers of deduction is of great value. If I cannot say whether a man is a thief or an honest man, I do not know whether or not to trust him. If I happen to make an error and call a thief an honest man, I am likely to lose what I trust to him.

Induction makes rules, principles, theories; deduction applies them to particular cases. While induction is important since our rules need to be right, deduction is used more frequently. Deduction is usually analyzed into three phases,—general principles, a particular case, and the inference which places the case under its appropriate principle. The formal cases are usually thrown in the form of the syllogism, with its premises and inference or conclusion. The making of the inference or searching for connections is the most difficult of these phases because, for the most part, it is a more or less haphazard thing which can be influenced by experience, by general training, and by

that wide scientific training fills the mind with efficient rules for handling cases. So it is that the expert in a field can be counted on to make more correct inferences than one not an expert. James said that about all one can do in such a case is to saturate one's self with all the facts of the case, hoping thereby that the inference will spring forth. By careful examination of the facts, it is possible in many cases to narrow the search for inferences by collecting all possible cases and eliminating them one by one.

Induction and deduction always go together in all the higher processes of thought. In every act of thought both are present and blend together so intimately that it is often difficult to separate them, or to find or trace the line where one begins and the other ends; it is hard to decide whether both these relations —the particular and the general—are not considered together.

The scientific investigator in the field of Ethics or any other field seeks the prediction and control of events as a means to human happiness; he seeks not merely the pleasure of the investigator, but to make a real contribution toward better living.

Christian Ethics is the system of morals reached by the scientific investigation of the moral consciousness of man as enlightened, elevated and purified by the teachings of the Christ.

Objective Methods of Measuring Character.[1]

The following is a bibliography of the available objective tests and of articles about such tests, pertaining to character traits, attitudes, interests, ethical dis-

[1] *The Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology,* March, 1925.

crimination, moral judgments, instincts and emotions, and certain minor skills:

A. *Tests Claiming to Measure Ethical, Moral, Social, and Religious Discrimination and Judgment.*

1. Ability to judge foreseen consequences—Chassell, Myerson.
2. Ability to discriminate relative values—Chapman, Chassell.
3. The content of moral concepts—Brotmarkle.
4. Ability to evaluate offences, ambitions and meritorious acts—Fernald, Kohs.
5. Ability to judge rightly in a moral dilemma—Sharp, Fernald.
6. Ability to pick out the worst word in a list—Pressey.
7. Judgment of the moral, religious, or pleasure values of certain situations—May.
8. Identification of motives—Van Wagenen.
9. Social-ethical vocabulary—Kohs.
10. Ethical discrimination—Kohs, Cady, Hartshorne. Union School of Religion Survey Quiz Forms E2 and JH2.

B. *Tests Claiming to Measure the Following Character and Personality Traits.*

1. Aggressiveness—Moore.
2. Ascendence-submission—Allport.
3. Caution—Brown.
4. Confidence—Row.
5. Conformity—Deutsch.
6. Conscientiousness—May.
7. Decision Speed—Bridges, Filter, Gobson.

8. Decision Types—Bridges.
9. Expansion-reclusion—Allport.
10. Flexibility—Downey.
11. Honesty—Franzen.
12. Honor—Voelker.
13. Insight and evaluation—Allport.
14. Interest in detail—Downey.
15. Originality—Chassell.
16. Persistence—Chapman.
17. Perseveration—Lankes, Bernstein.
18. Reliability—Voelker, Cady.
19. Resistance to opposition—Downey.
20. Self-assurance—Downey, Filter.
21. Self-estimation and evaluation—Allport, Knight, Franzen.
22. Social Perception—Allport, Gates, Langfield.
23. Suggestibility—Brown, Otis.
24. Trustworthiness—Voelker, Cady.
25. Truthfulness—Voelker.
26. Unselfishness—Miles.
27. Volitional Perseveration—Downey.

C. *Tests Claiming to Measure Interests, Attitudes, Prejudices, etc.*

1. Interest analysis—Freyd.
2. Range of Interest—Miner.
3. Degree of Interest—Burtt.
4. Attitudes, such as altruism, international mindedness, conventionality, money mindedness, etc.—Hart, Shuttleworth, Manry.
5. Prejudices, such as economic, radical, capitalistic, fundamentalistic, anti-catholic—Watson.
6. Religious Attitude—Case.
7. Social Relations—Ream.

D. *Instincts and Emotions.*

1. Fear, anger, sex, aggressiveness—Moore.
2. Emotional stability—Woodworth.
3. Emotional affectivity—Pressey.
4. Emotional inhibitions—Crane.
5. Relative strength of certain instincts—Moore.

The writers, May and Hartshorne, have classified these tests according to what they *claim* to measure, as stated by the author or as suggested by the title.

Theory and Application. A system of Ethics properly consists of two parts,—the one theoretical, the other practical. This division is made according to the distinction between its explanatory and its normative or legislative functions. It is our purpose to discuss Christian Ethics in theory and practice; the principles underlying Ethics and the application of these principles to Christian living.

Theoretical Ethics employs the explanatory or scientific method; practical ethics, the normative or regulative method. Theoretical Ethics investigates and reduces to logical and scientific order the principles which mark out and govern man's life of duty, or that life-task which he ought to fulfil. *Practical* ethics lays down obligations, laws or maxims for the regulation of human conduct in all the relations of life and prescribes the means of attaining the ends recognized by theoretical ethics. The science of Psychology tells us what are the conditions or causes of certain mental phenomena; pedagogy applies the truths discovered by the Psychologist in practice, so the science of Ethics discovers the principles of Christian living —teaches us what is done,—and the art of Ethics ap-

plies the principles in such a way as to insure the morality of the agent's behavior.

Of late years theoretical ethics has received much more attention than the practical questions of every-day living. Indeed, some have said that ethics is not a practical science at all. This is wrong teaching. The science of moral life cannot be complete without the careful study of both the theoretical and the practical. No theory of ethics can be well founded and well formed without throwing a powerful light on every practical problem. Speaking to the point, theoretical ethics seeks to discover and to realize the highest good in human life. It assumes that when the good is actually known, its very goodness leads men to seek it. Religion means right relations with God, the absolute Good. The Christian religion, based on the spirit and teachings of Jesus, furnishes spiritual power for right living. Christian ethics strives to define the highest good, and to point out how man may attain it and exhibit the Jesus way of living.

Of course, no man is infallible and impeccable. The sooner he learns that fact the better it will be for him and for all others concerned. Every man has at least four helpers: (1) The morality (objective) of his community, *i. e.*, custom, law, and public opinion, all worthy of serious consideration; (2) his moral intuitions, which may be of the finest; (3) his reason, which suggests reflection before making decisions; and (4) the inspired *Word* and all its implications.

There are various aspects of the ethical problem, according to the different points of view from which it has been approached. The chief aspects of the ethical problem are: The good; the right; the moral law; conscience; virtue; duty; pleasure; altruism; self-

sacrifice. Various theories contend with one another for preëminence. At the present time no one of them has gained any marked preëminence over the rest. The whole philosophy of moral life is still under debate. Utilitarians maintain that the promotion of the welfare of men is the radical moral end. Happiness, not virtue, is the highest aim with them. Perfectionists say that inward spiritual excellence is the fundamental aim of duty. The essence of virtue to them is to desire and seek the realization of the true self, or person, in a noble character and life. In scholastic quarters, this is the most popular of ethical theories. Others advocate the view that the essence of all duty lies in the regulation of one's own motive dispositions. It stresses the duty of keeping the heart with all diligence. Still others maintain that all duty consists in obedience to the will and direction of a superior, and that all virtue is loyalty to the authority of government. Some others assert that "oughtness," or "moral obligation," "the categorical imperative," is the fundamental conception of ethics. Such is the situation to-day in ethics. The fundamental problem of ethics has not yet been solved. However, there is much to inspire to patient persevering effort in the hope that through the application of scientific methods of inquiry faithfully pursued clearer visions of truth may be obtained.

References for Further Study

Alexander: *Moral Order and Progress,* Book I, Chapters I, III.

Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics,* Introduction, Chapters I, II.

Paulsen: *An Introduction to Ethics.*
Roop: *General Psychology,* Chapter III.
Sidgwick: *The Methods of Ethics.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. What is meant by "The Methods of Ethics."
2. Define induction, deduction, and state the function of each.
3. Mention four essentials of induction, and illustrate them.
4. Why should induction and deduction always go together?
5. Distinguish between theoretical and practical ethics.
6. Why is undue emphasis upon either division unsatisfactory?
7. What is the ethical problem?
8. What are the various aspects of the ethical problem?
9. Why is the philosophy of moral life still under debate?
10. Mention the leading theories contending for preeminence.
11. What is the present method of inquiry followed and its plan?
12. What is the Christian conception of ethics?

Problems for Discussion

1. Herbartians apply the inductive method to teaching in what is known as the FIVE FORMAL STEPS, which are: Preparation, Presentation, Comparison, Generalization, and Application. Explain.
2. How many particular cases does one usually examine before forming a generalization? How many must one examine in order to be certain enough for practical purposes?

3. Give four examples of the brightest cases of practical deductions of which you know.
4. What is the difference in one's attitude toward the generalization sought in induction and that used in deduction?
5. Look up the words "implies," "implication," "meaning," "inference," "virtue," "duty," "authority," "motivity," "perfectionism." Write out definitions and derivations.
6. Make a list of moral qualities or traits (eight at least) and check those which you would consider most important for (*a*) a salesman, (*b*) a teacher, (*c*) a druggist, (*d*) a statesman.
7. Why is an habitual or customary judgment of a certain type of conduct often right?
8. What are the essentials of good ethical thinking?
9. Happy is the man who knows the causes of things. Explain implications.
10. A good hypothesis must be simple, plausible, adapted to the facts requiring explanation, self-consistent, capable of being proved or disproved, and harmonize with accepted explanations in related fields of research. How many of these are demands of ethics? Why?
11. Is intuition a guide to moral conduct? Conscience?
12. How is faith related to issues of the moral life?

LESSON VI

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

IN this lesson we shall aim to distinguish different classes of terms which are commonly used to express moral distinctions. Conduct or behavior may be spoken of as RIGHT or WRONG, or as GOOD or BAD.

I. RIGHT AND WRONG. The term RIGHT (Latin *rectus*, straight; Greek equivalent, ὀρθός), denotes literally directness or straightness, and WRONG (Anglo-Saxon *wringen*, to twist), denotes obliquity or crookedness. In ethics, however, they describe certain qualities of action. The term "RIGHT" has several distinct meanings which may be reduced to its *substantive* and *attributive* import.

1. "RIGHT" (Latin *Jus*) as a *substantive*, "a right" or "rights," denotes a claim of one person against the infringement of others, or a possession which can be defended against aggression, as, for example, "the right to life," the "right to vote," "human rights." In this usage it is practically identical with liberty of action, or a privilege which it is proper to exercise. It implies a duty on the part of others to respect it and not to interfere with it, though it does not necessarily imply any kind of morality. Animals are said to have "rights" but not duties; but they have "rights" only in relation to man, who has duties toward them. It is the possession of a rational nature that determines the existence of duties, and it is a relation to rational beings that determines the existence of "rights."

2. "RIGHT" (Latin *rectus, honestus,* etc.) as *attributive* qualifying *actions,* denotes moral quality, and so indicates their imperativeness or praiseworthiness. Phrases like "right conduct," "right action," and statements like "that is right," "temperance is right," etc., denote moral quality and hence imply an obligation to realize them. The term right expresses both moral quality and casual connection when describing the means to an end.

3. "RIGHT" (Latin *rectus*), as an *attributive* qualifying *objects,* denotes correctness of choice or judgment between alternatives, and so distinguished from wrong as true is from false. It is illustrated in such phrases as "the right person," "the right path," "right judgment," "right opinion." The term has no moral implications in this usage and does not express a moral quality in the object described. Right in this sense simply denotes *intellectually* correct determinations, not moral quality.

4. "RIGHT" sometimes denotes merely moral indifference, or not wrong. This is a peculiar use of the term and shows its extreme flexibility. It appears in such expressions as: "It is right to take a walk, or to play ball, if I desire to do so." There is no moral obligation expressed by this manner of statement, but only that the act is not wrong provided the liberties of others are not infringed.

5. "RIGHT" (Latin *equitas, honestum, justitia,* etc.) as *substantive* again, denoting *ends* or an object of moral volition, signified that which carries the highest obligation with it. It is purely an abstract conception to describe the quality, either of an action or of an end that gives it morality and imperativeness. In this use it denotes pure morality, or the duty that rests

upon all wills, absolutely considered and irrespective of any other object than itself.

The term "wrong" has simply the opposite import of the term "right," except a general meaning opposed to that of "a right" or "rights" is not common.

II. Good and Bad. These terms have both an absolute and a relative import; an absolute to denote inherent characteristics, perfections or imperfections, and a relative to denote fitness or unfitness for achieving an end. Things are good when they are fitted for the purpose for which they were meant. If we do not know the purpose of anything, we cannot tell whether it is good or bad. If a thing has no purpose, it really is neither good nor bad, except as it interferes with other purposes. It is characteristic of man to find purposes for what before was considered useless. The good man is he who is preëminently human, that is, who is fitted for the purpose of manhood. Goodness is the essence of manhood. The term "good," then, expresses estimation by reference to an *end*. Sometimes the word *good* marks the quality of conduct, sometimes the end which the conduct has in view. For instance, to be a peacemaker is to do good, to perform a good act. Good, then, will qualify *objects*, animate or inanimate, *persons, actions*, and *ends* or *purposes*, with varying import in each case. When we speak of "a good piano" we mean only that it comes up to a certain standard of excellence, and not that it is useful for any material purpose. However, when we speak of "a good knife," "a good horse," "a good government," "a good automobile," etc., we intend definitely to express only their value as means to an end. We should not call them "good" if they did not serve this useful

purpose, although their intrinsic qualities might remain the same.

In its application to *actions* "good" has only a relative value. Courage, fortitude, humility, honesty are all actions which must be estimated or valued solely on the ground of their relation to the end they serve, or because of the character they express. Our inference from this is that where actions are described as good or bad, we can view the terms only in their relative significance, to denote merely adjustment to prescribed ends. If the end cannot be shown to be ideal, or moral, these actions cannot be good. In ethics, therefore, good and bad cannot describe any absolute quality in action.

"The Good" as distinguished from things that are simply "good." In its widest sense, by the term "good" is meant whatever is willed or wished, hence every object of will, of desire, of wish, is good in the sense of being valued. Each of the conceptions of "good," as, for example, "useful," "pleasant," or "adapted" implies the more fundamental truth that the object, or some function of it, is valued, desired, or sought. Goodness is thus the quality of being wanted by somebody, and everything which any one wishes or wills is in so far good. Thus we speak of good bread, good ball, good poetry—meaning food, play, literature which people like and seek. But not everything good can be described as "the Good." Aristotle defines the chief good as that which is willed for its own sake. He also shows that for the sake of the "good" all other things are willed. Hence "the good" is that object, or end of will which is regarded as supreme or ultimate.

The theory of ethics as the study of the Self who

wills the good is held by ethicists who diverge widely as to the nature of the good which is the object of the will of the moral self, as evinced by the following quotations: Kant says: "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside the world, can be regarded as good without limitations except a good will. . . . A man's will is good not because the consequences which form it are good but . . . because it wills the good."[1] Hegel says: "The starting point of the right is the will" (*The Philosophy of Right*). Wundt says: "The norms of ethics . . . are directly applicable to the free voluntary acts of thinking subjects." T. H. Green says: "The distinction between the good and bad will . . . must lie at the basis of any system of ethics" (*Prolegomena,* p. 154). G. H. Palmer says: "Ethics, the science of the will par excellence" (*The Field of Ethics,* p. 32). L. T. Hobhouse: "The conception of the Good is the central point of ethics" (*Morals in Evolution,* Chapter I, p. 9).

W. G. Everett, in *Moral Values,* Chapter II, page 36, says, "Ethics is a science of values. But VALUE is a word of wide and varied meaning. It may be used both in a positive and a negative sense; positive value will then be the good; negative value the evil." The term "value" is used by Everett and others as a substitute for the older word "good."

Among the eighteenth century English moralists are Frances Hutcheson (1694–1747) and Adam Smith (1723–1790), and David Hume (1711–1775). Hutcheson's *Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil* begins thus: "The word Moral Goodness in this treatise denotes our idea of some quality apprehended

[1] Kant: *Metaphysik of Morality,* Hartenstein Ed., pp. 241–242.

in actions, which procures approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness. . . . Approbation and Condemnation are probably simple ideas which cannot be further explained." Hume holds that the good is that which is useful (that is, agreeable) to a person approved by the morally appraising spectator.

In this conception of the good, most ethicists are also agreed. Even Kant, who is commonly supposed to define the moral consciousness as acknowledgment of objectless obligation, says: "Suppose . . . that there is something the existence of which has in itself absolute value, something which, as an end in itself, can be a ground of definite laws; then there would lie in that, and only in that, the ground of a categorical imperative or practical law." In the words of J. S. Mackensie: "Ethics . . . sets itself to consider . . . the supreme or ultimate end to which our whole lives are directed. . . . If ethics is to be strictly an exact science, we must presuppose that there is such a supreme end." [1]

The Good and the Good Man. The good man is he who deliberately seeks the good; the man with a noble purpose.

We use the term "good" both as a noun to designate an object of will, and as an adjective to describe the man who wills "the good." An important character of this ultimate object, "the good," is that it is always personal in nature. While subordinate objects, such as good and clothes, may be of the material or impersonal sort, the supreme purpose for which, in the end, these and all things else are willed, is personal experience, individual or social. This being inher-

[1] Mackensie, J. S.: *A Manual of Ethics,* Chapter I, Section I.

ently personal is one of the ways in which "the good" is distinguished from both the true, or ultimate object of thought, and from "the beautiful" or ultimate object of æsthetic delight. But writers differ greatly in their idea of the specific nature of this ultimate end or purpose. To one it is a pleasure, to another it is service, to another it is individual perfection, and to another social harmony. From this follows an important consequence, according to Miss Calkins: a man is good or bad, moral or immoral, according as he wills or refuses to will what is to him, and not to any one else, the good. There are, therefore, no objective criteria of a man's goodness or badness. In other words, she says, there is nothing in his behavior, in the character of his special volition, which unequivocally stamps his act as the outcome of good or bad will.

William DeWitt Hyde says: The good man is one who makes the good of all whom his action affects the aim of each choice, and who limits the good he does by the closeness of the claim to himself and his family life; to the line of his special aptitude and training; who turns aside readily to urgent claims from without, truth, duty, country, or wide human welfare; and who, so far as he can consistently with the foregoing principles, prefers the larger to the smaller sphere of work.

III. Duty and Obligation. These two words have logically the same import though from the etymological standpoint they are distinct. Duty (Latin *debere,* to owe) and obligation (Latin *obligare,* to bind). Both terms express the relation of indebtedness of one to the other with the thought that the service is a fixed debt or obligation unconditionally binding upon a rational subject toward all others.

They set forth what *ought* to be done as contrasted with that which we are at liberty to do or not to do. Like most ethical terms, they have become ambiguous. Duty is one of several other terms connected with the idea of *right,* and means that which is due, whatever a man is bound by law to perform. *Ought* is a term allied with *duty,* and expresses indebtedness, while *obligation* expresses the bondage in which law involves those who are subject to it. *Responsibility,* or accountableness, is the state of being liable to be called upon to render an account of behavior before some supreme authority representing the law.

IV. Virtue and Vice. The general and popular sense of the term Virtue is moral excellence. The word itself is from the Latin *virtus,* from *vir,* which denotes not, like *homo,* simply a human being, but a man endowed with appropriate manly attributes, and comes from the same root with *vis,* strength. Hence it is easy to see how its primitive signification meant all that is implied in our word *manliness,* and perhaps something more. In Roman civilization this was largely represented by the martial type of thought embodying the conceptions of a militant stage of life. But in the course of intellectual development, the term was used as the equivalent of the Greek term ἀρετή (ἄρω, to fit), whose original import seems to have been fitness, harmony, adjustment, and so apparently describes the adaptation of means to ends. But in Greek ethics this conception seems not to have been current and the term denoted excellence, without distinction between natural and moral, original and acquired, qualities of beings. Thus virtue was excellence of any kind, whether of blood, of talents, or of character. But Aristotle's distinction

between intellectual and moral virtues narrowed the term's significance until now it properly denotes only moral qualities, either *qualities of will,* or *qualities of conduct.* The former meaning refers to quality of character, of nature, of personality, and may well be an end of desire or of action. With this view of it the Stoics and later writers might well consider it as the highest good.

The second meaning which describes conduct denotes a merit which is purely relative to the end at which the conduct or excellence is aimed. All action is a means to an end and cannot very well be conceived as an end in itself. If the end be good, the act may be good, and if the end be bad, the act will be bad. In this meaning of the terms, virtue and virtuous denote only the fitness of a means to an end approved on other grounds than the nature of the means, hence the reluctance of the human mind to think or speak of such particular virtues as veracity, honesty, courage, as ends in themselves to be sought on their own account. But when virtue expresses excellence of will, nature, or character, it is then the equivalent of perfection. In this sense it is an object to be aimed at, not a means for attaining some other object. The two very distinct meanings for the term virtue are, therefore, first, a quality of being which is an *end,* and second, a quality of action which is a *means,* the one having an absolute and the other only a relative value.

Virtue is conduct in accordance with the right, and vice is the opposite, violation of fitnesses known by the agent. Virtue may be defined also as conformity to the moral law, or obedience to conscience as the urge to do what we judge to be right, and to refrain from

what we judge to be wrong, where there is, or has been opportunity, and more or less inducement, to do the opposite. In principle and essence, virtue is one and indivisible, and is pure-minded, decided, and independent, yet, in its external manifestations, it may present widely different aspects and elicit a corresponding diversity in specific traits of character. A truly virtuous action must be right in its motive, or aim or intention. The motive (motor) is that which (mental situation) moves to action. The intention seems to include all the foreseen consequences of an act. Virtue has reference to all kinds of moral relations and obligations. For example, Piety, or Religion has reference to the relations of the soul to God, and the obligations growing out of those relations, with which we are bound to act in moral accordance. Piety implies virtue, yet they are not the same. Since the moral law is also the law of God, and to be religious implies the doing of the will of God, no vicious or immoral person can be regarded as a pious person.

The duties of piety are an essential part of virtue. We stand in definable relations to God, and those relations are made definite through Christianity. He who is willingly false to these relations with God, needs only adequate temptation to make him false to his human relations, and to the fitnesses of his daily life. Loyalty of conduct deepens loyalty of spirit, obedience nourishes love. He who faithfully does the will of God can scarcely fail to become worshipful and devout. The Christian religion furnishes the most efficient of all motives to a virtuous life. A virtuous life or perfect character is not secured in any one single act; it comes only through a perpetual course of action. To attain the highest virtue or perfect char-

acter, man will be required to exhibit, each in its proper time, the virtues of veracity, honesty, charity, temperance, frugality, and so forth.

The ancients recognized four cardinal (hinge) virtues—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice. These four Virtues comprehended all the fitnesses of man's condition in this world. There are fitnesses and duties appertaining, first, to one's own being, nature, capacities, and needs; second, to his relations to his fellow beings; third, to his disposition and conduct with reference to external objects and events beyond his control; and fourth, to his arrangement, disposal, and use of objects under his control.

Character and Conduct. These terms mutually presuppose each other. They are inseparable. Character is the name for the man as he has determined himself to be. Conduct is largely due to the reaction of character upon circumstances. Character is dynamic, not static. Every fresh act of self-determination gives to character a new form. It is self-expression as well as his self-determination. Conduct is therefore the expression of character. This view of conduct emphasizes its personal nature. Conduct can be conduct only as the action of a person. So that both character and conduct are subject to ethical approval and disapproval, since the morality of any act depends upon its motive. But the motive is considered the idea of the end in which the self finds satisfaction, and it also represents the character of the agent. Thus goodness may be predicated of the character, of the motive, and of the act, all three of which are stages in the one process of self-determination. We have seen that the true object of desire is the act of satisfaction, and so it is with the end of conduct. It is

the doing of the act itself which constitutes the realization of self, the attainment of the end. The end is the act itself. The end must be activity, not mere self or mere object, but self and object together. In volition man is an end to himself and must be. The object of the will is always the good, or what is conceived as the good. In all conduct man seeks self-satisfaction as the *good*. The *good* then simply means that which satisfies and realizes self.

References for Further Study

Baldwin: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.* Encyclopedia and Dictionaries.

Questions on the Lesson

1. Cite some reasons for defining terms at the beginning of a subject.
2. In what ways is the term "right" used? Give illustrations.
3. What does the term "wrong" imply? Cite examples.
4. Distinguish between the absolute and relative import of the terms "good" and "bad."
5. When are things *good?* Illustrate various uses of the term.
6. Why does the term "good" have only a relative value in its application to actions?
7. Distinguish between "The Good" and the things that are simply "good."
8. Give the view of "the Good" as held by Kant, by Hegel, by Green, by Palmer, by Hobhouse, by Everett, by Hume, by Mackensie.
9. Distinguish between "the Good" and the "Good" Man.

10. State the import of the words Duty and Obligation. Illustrate their use.
11. Explain the use of the word *responsibility*.
12. Define *virtue*. Trace the change in the meaning of the word.
13. How is *virtue* related to *perfection?* to the *Right?* to *vice?*
14. What is a truly *virtuous* action?
15. Tell how virtue is related to all kinds of moral relations and obligations.
16. Mention the four cardinal virtues of the Ancients. Why are they called Cardinal?
17. How are the terms character and conduct related?
18. In what sense may goodness be predicated of the character? of the motive? of the act?
19. In what sense must the end be activity?
20. What do you understand by "In conduct man seeks self-satisfaction as the good"?

Problems for Discussion

1. What do you mean by a truly good person? By a truly bad person? Give examples.
2. Why is an act right or wrong? Why do people do wrong?
3. Is there a right and wrong about every subject? What will enable one always to do right?
4. What truth is there in the statement, To be good is to be absolutely loyal to the interest that is most yourself? Illustrate.
5. Before the next meeting of the class, notice how often you hear the words: "good," "bad," "duty," "obligation," "virtue," "vice," "character," "conduct," "end" or "goal," used.
6. What is the difference between being responsible and being blameworthy? Cite examples.

7. Is a general theoretical explanation of sin of more practical importance than a discovery of specific reasons why men go wrong? Why, or why not?
8. List the common sins due to uncontrolled impulse.
9. What is meant by such phrases as "original sin," "struggle against sin," "salvation from sin," "the reality of sin," "true repentance," "the need of salvation," "consequences of sin"?
10. To judge an act as sinful or virtuous, why must we know the purpose behind it?
11. Define self-control; an "inferiority complex"; "a psychological complex"; "righteous indignation"; "inevitable contacts"; "social repentance."
12. To be virtuous is to be open-minded, considerate, and resolute in the choice and execution of that purpose for which you believe yourself most fitted. Examine critically.
13. Interpret: Things wear out with use, but character grows stronger.
14. Why was Esau's act in giving up his birthright to Jacob for a mess of pottage a wrong one? Read the account (Gen. 25:29–34).

LESSON VII

METAPHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

THE idea of Ethics turns on conduct. By this we do not simply mean action; we mean human action as related to motive, as grounded in human will, mediated by intelligence and accompanied by a sense of responsibility. Ethics can be applied to a human subject only. We do not speak of the conduct of animals for the reason that the impulse is not prompted by a motive. There must be a knowledge of results. No creature lower than man can have the attribute of moral responsibility. Hence conduct cannot be predicated of such a creature. This self-conscious subject with which ethics deals is called Spirit, Person, Soul, Mind, Self, Ego, Intelligence. It is the "I" of individual experience.

As already stated, Ethics is last in the course of philosophical studies in many colleges. This is not an accident. Ethics is the result or outcome of a movement in the development of philosophic studies previously considered. A few propositions give the conclusions to which we have come.

I. The world or universe as a whole, including the starry heavens, constitutes a system determined toward an ultimate end. Things do not exist independently—of themselves, or by themselves. The world presents itself to us as *one,* as a unity, a concrete whole. All parts are so related that they work upon one another and contribute to the solution of the problem.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole
Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

This statement of Pope's may be somewhat pantheistic, but the first part of it is true. The point we hold is that (1) ALL constitutes a system, and that it has an end in view. This conclusion we reach from the second proposition, (2) Natural science teaches that things have their significance in *genus, i. e.,* individuals have their significance in the whole system, and then we have different parts. If we take one part away, we destroy the unity. Thus the world is an organism. All is unity of connection. It affects not only the physical but also the spiritual. (3) There is a spirit world as well as a natural world, and they do not exist independent of each other. There are no two separate worlds. The one exists within the other. There is a relation, a reaction, between the two. Nature is essential to human development. There is the necessity of contact with the fountain or source from whom all life proceeds. The development of the world moves legitimately only as held in contact with its source (God). Faith is thus a necessity by which we know that God is. We investigate, we reason, we reach conclusions. We *believe* in our conclusions, for we *trust* them and *act* on them; this is faith. Rational beings are so constituted that they accept as true conclusions based on sufficient data, or reason. Faith introduces us to the larger life of the race. The historian, through historic premises, infers historic conclusions which he trusts. Our history-world is a thing of faith. The scientist experiences one truth and accepts a thousand on faith, and thus builds into science the experience of the race.

Blind credulity is not rational—is not faith. The engineer concludes that the bridge is safe; the conductor accepts this conclusion, trusts it, risks his life, and that of the passengers on it; he believes that the bridge is safe. This is faith. The Christian reasons that the Bible is completely adapted to man, and hence must be the work of the Author of our being; he believes this conclusion, trusts in it, risks his eternal all on it. This is faith. The moralist cannot accept, as ultimate, the principles of the different ethical schools or their deductions, without the closest scrutiny. The validity of their principles must first be established. Hence the study of ethics requires faith in the presence of God in the order of the universe.

If this is true, we have to view all this from the standpoint of the earth. For our earth, man constitutes the end. We do not mean man as an individual, but man in his general character,—humanity. Nature culminates in man all the different orders we see around us. Nature implies the Personality of God. When Nature is viewed as a whole, Spirit is revealed. Nature is then dominated by an End or Final Cause. Man and Nature are linked together. Man is recognized as the highest type of creation—the highest possible development. Man is true man only as he exists in his social development. Man is man in three ideas: (1) human, (2) ethical, (3) historical.

II. Humanity is essentially and ideally one as to spirit. This is an important thought. The question, Is humanity one? has been questioned. We believe in a unity of origin; that all mankind has come from one source and therefore there is a historical basis for the unity of the race. Spiritual relations and aspirations are found inherent in all men. The human heart is

everywhere capable of reflecting the Divine image. There is a oneness in humanity in this: "A touch of Nature makes the whole world kin." In each individual there must then an idea of the whole race be found. The individual is the echo of the universe. The truth is that these facts are so deeply ingrained in our nature that they appeal to our consciousness. This makes life significant. Man does not only have traits in common with animals, but has things in common with animals in growth and development. Each individual came through that which the whole world came. There is that within an individual which will vibrate in harmony with the whole human race. This is Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence. The soul of man existed some other place before in man and so we account for our new experiences not seeming sometimes strange, as the poet Wordsworth says:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home."

Man is both general and particular. Our human life develops along the particular, but the true ground is in the general. And the moral is the general in the humanity, and while we begin our existence as individuals, we become cultured as we become general.

The three psychological propositions are:

I. Man as related to the world of sense (nature) is psychically an individual. Three things constitute a

man in the sense under consideration: intellect, sensibilities, and will. Mind is a unit—is one indivisible, not complex; the same principle putting forth its activity under different forms in thinking, feeling, willing or acting. In all the manifold relations in which he comes before us, man is a distinct unity, a self-poised body. Man is thus a part of the system in which he lives. He belongs to Nature, but he is more than animal. He towers above nature. He is psychically an individual in his relation of soul to his physical nature. He is compound of matter and spirit. The spirit or soul is the immaterial part of man. It was created by God and placed in the body of clay that He had made. It was not made of dust and does not return to dust. "Dust thou art, to dust returnest, Was not spoken of the soul." Solomon says (Eccles. 12: 7): "The dust (body) shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit (soul) shall return unto God who gave it." Being living things, plants and animals are frequently described as having souls. Aristotle, for example, speaks of three kinds of souls, corresponding to three types of living creation—vegetative, animal and human. The vegetative soul is occupied with mechanical and chemical changes in assimilating food and in propagation. The animal soul has in addition to the powers of the vegetative soul also the power to move about freely, besides a variety of psychical powers, such as sensation, memory, feeling. Man possesses the soul powers of both plants and animals, and far outstrips them in both degree and kind of powers. Man's body is like that of plants and animals—dust, but his soul is different from theirs. It came into man as a breath from God Himself. It is spiritual, real, immortal, rational, moral and religious.

The soul of man has standards of right and wrong to which it tries to conform. An animal has no such standards; has no conception of virtue, duty, and the good. The animal is said to be simply unmoral, or non-moral, not immoral. Man is said to be immoral when he acts contrary to the moral standards. But he is always moral in the sense that he is created with the power to distinguish between right and wrong. This soul-life of man is such that his existence terminates in self-hood. God has given man not only supremacy over nature, but far greater, also, over self. God makes man free, and then says to him, "Choose the right or the wrong, do the right or do the evil, choose death or choose life; I put the responsibility, the power, the self-supremacy on you." Thus man has in himself the power of holding the helm of his own life, directing, controlling, shaping his own destiny.

At the beginning, his life unfolds so that individualization becomes manifest. Therefore, his life admits of characterization. There is room for distinction between one man and another. Humanity admits of distinctions as to sex, race, nationality, and so on, which run out into endless peculiarities. No two men look exactly alike, or are influenced equally by the same motives, or view the same subject in the same light. In man's highest development, these distinctions must not be ignored, but rather brought to completion in the ethical life.

II. Man is individualized as to spirit, that is, by virtue of his endowment as spirit. The intellectual and moral life in men is not always the same. It is the essence of human nature that each man should be different from every other, so that this fact is of pro-

found significance. In virtue of it every man is endowed with a spiritual nature peculiar to himself. Men differ spiritually as much as physically. They differ in modes of thought, feeling, will, and so forth. Only by differentiation can come development. This requires organic union of these differences. There are distinctions in God—a possible trinity, and yet essential unity. Man is a triune being,—thinks and feels and wills. In his mental life the "immortal I" is a triune being. Through the intellect, man comes to live in a world of knowledge; through his feeling life, man comes to live in a world of appreciation, and through the control of will, man comes into the world of conduct. Thus the balanced man lives in three worlds—the world of knowledge, the world of appreciation, and the world of conduct.

Man's moral nature consists of all the mental capacities and phenomena which are essentially connected with conduct, such as judgment, conscience, emotion, desire and volition, with subordinate phenomena. Desire, feeling, will and purpose are not useless events. Our actions accomplish our will and fulfil our purpose.

Joining all into a whole, we get the perfect idea of humanity. Each must represent the Divine Spirit in a different way—from a different aspect. All are made in the image of God, but each reflects it in a different way. Every man has a genius of his own—a peculiarity of physical, mental, and moral constitution.

III. The problem before every man in the world is the unfolding or development of his own peculiar genius. There is individuation on the spiritual side. In virtue of it, every man is endowed with a different spiritual life. No two spiritual orders of existence

are exactly alike. In man these distinctions are found, and every man is thus a genius of his own. Given an individuality, it is required that he should make the most of himself. As a lapidary takes a diamond in the rough and polishes each part according to its possibilities, so man finds in himself raw materials out of which his destiny is developed. Each man must solve his own problem. No one can solve it for him. Others may lead astray or set aright, but the making of himself is in his own hands. The life of the individual can come out only as a process of mutual influence, or complementation. One man needs others; they need him. Mutual complementation is the bosom of society; it can solve the problems of human life. A man can be true to himself only as he is true to others. The two great commandments—one like to the other—Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind, and further, thy neighbor as thyself, form the whole of moral philosophy. Only in the love of man is the love of God perfected. They are essentially one. They are the indispensable conditions of moral development, and the basis of ethical life.

We have thus stated the three philosophical propositions: (1) The world constitutes an organism; (2) The centre is man, and (3) Mankind is one as to spirit. Psychologically considered, we have said, (1) Man is an individual possessing a character which distinguishes him; (2) Man is an individual by virtue of his endowments as spirit, and (3) Man has a spiritual individuation.

LESSON VIII

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL AGENT: AN ACTIVE BEING

HUMAN action requires a personal self-active agent and goal. Hence the essential elements of human agency must be considered. Man is a spirit or person; a self-conscious, self-objectifying agent. As a spirit, he is linked with God under Whose government, in this present world, he is in a state of probation and development for an endless future. Any complete view of man as an active being considers these facts essential:

I. *Man is Self-Active.* Man is by his very nature self-active; conscious of his active powers and of his freedom to exert them on the various appropriate objects. As an act or action is the intentional exercise of any power of body or mind by an intelligent being toward an end and the means of realizing it, a personality is implied, that is, a will and freedom in its exercise. Thus a human action is an action by a human being in the full possession and exercise of intelligence and will. When act and action are distinguished, the former is individual and is applied chiefly to internal or mental activity; the latter is collective, or applicable to a course made up of many external or bodily actions. Meaningful and purposeful words and thoughts are actions. And the character of an action, whether good or bad, depends on the intention of the person.

(1) *Man is Consciously Self-Active.* Says Sir William Hamilton: "I know myself as a force in energy.

. . . Human existence is only a more general expression for human life, and human life only a more general expression for the sum of energies in which that life is realized, and through which it is manifested in consciousness. In a word, life is energy, and conscious energy is conscious life."

(2) *Man is Consciously Free in Action.* In its normal forms, man's action is determined by himself. He himself thinks, feels, and wills; he is not forced by some extraneous influence toward some end. He himself is conscious of the end, and directs himself toward it; acts by his own choice and determination; is free to turn his powers toward any object he may wish, and is conscious that in his experience he actually does this. Man is an intelligent, or knowing spirit; a sensitive or feeling spirit; a choosing, willing, or determining spirit; knowing, feeling, and willing are, therefore, forms of human action, ways in which man manifests his life.

(3) *Man is Constantly Active.* He never for an instant ceases to act. Nearly all the greatest investigators of the soul—Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Hamilton—have held that the bodily senses rest but that the soul is always consciously active—probably never rests; always finds some train of thought passing within; always active when we are awake. But the soul is probably always active also when we are asleep. The argument against and for the activity of the mind in sleep runs somewhat as follows: "I do not recollect such constant and conscious activity, therefore there is no such thing." But conscious activity and recollection of it are not the same thing, and do not always go together. In somnambulism the mind is vastly more active than when awake; new

powers are temporarily acquired by it, and the body is in a state of high activity and under perfect control of the will; yet waking always cuts the consciousness in two, so that there is never any recollection of the experience. In dreaming, the mind is constantly active. In deep slumber, if suddenly awakened, the writer always found himself in the midst of a dream, which sometimes could be traced far back. A man can appoint his hour for waking and awaken himself at just that hour. These clearly ascertained facts, corroborated by experience, go far toward proving that it is the body only that is inactive and asleep. The soul is awake and active.

(4) *Man is Progressively Active.* Development and progress are the law of his activity, and to which no definite limit can be set. There is a twofold development: an *outward* and *visible* development, beginning, and proceeding through childhood and youth to manhood and age, and an *inner-life* development, reflected in all the forms of the activity of the soul. "From the infant soul, capable only of a wail, the human being may grow through the years into a Moses, or a Luther, or a Newton, capable of comprehending a destiny of immortal glory, of rejoicing with unspeakable joy in the prospect of it, and of directing all the powers of the being to the securing of it; or into an Alexander, or a Napoleon, capable of fashioning a plan seemingly glorious, but in reality dark and fatal; of exulting in it, and of perishing in its attempted accomplishment." Man's powers of body and soul develop by exercise. To make the strong man physically and otherwise, the exercise must be vigorous and persistent. A finite being can never become a being infinite. While man can never become God, yet

no definite limit can be set to his progress, no point of attainment can be fixed beyond which there is not possible a career of progress greater than all that has gone before. Time and opportunity are the only limits to human development and growth.

(5) *Man is Immortally Active.* Man's unceasing activity will continue everlastingly; he has an endless existence before him. His life in the future must rise to a power and greatness beyond his highest possible conception. Man's soul is immortal because God has willed to preserve it forever in being. God has indicated His purpose of immortality in man's nature as that nature expresses itself in the consciousness of the race. From this source arguments are drawn from the belief, from the longing, and from the moral expectation of mankind. Butler, in his *Analogy,* gives almost demonstrative force to the argument as drawn from man's present state as one of discipline and probation for a future condition.

The Christian doctrine of immortality rests on the solid basis of the teachings of the Scriptures. In bringing life and immortality to light, they commend themselves to man's consciousness the more powerfully because the revelation is substantially the same in both Scriptures and consciousness. In the New Testament, God Himself, in the person of His Incarnate Son, has spoken to man the doctrine of the future life by bringing back that Incarnate Son from the life beyond the grave in His resurrection from the dead; so that the truth of the Christian doctrine of man's immortality is established by the proofs of Christ's Divinity and of His resurrection.

Man longs for a great immortality. We are conscious of a boundless capacity of research, knowledge,

and progress, and our curiosity grows faster than its gratification, our sense of ignorance faster than our knowledge. In no department of life do we ever reach our aims or embody our conceptions. All great souls pass on, longing for the ever nearer and grander views of beauty and truth and holiness in the presence of God—in the "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" into which Paul hoped to be introduced through the blessing and instruction and discipline of the life that now is. No true and adequate conception of man or of his creative life-task can be gained without giving these elements, namely, constancy, progressiveness and immortality, in man's activities a prominent place.

II. *Man is a Spirit Embodied,* but not Imprisoned. Man has a body but is a soul. His self-active spirit lives its earthly life in a material body. The body is the soul's earthly home and workshop and its medium of communication.

False Theories. The Pagan conception of the body was that it was the source of all sin and therefore it should be despised and mortified rather than to be considered as fearfully and wonderfully made by God Himself for a wise and beneficent end. In the reaction against this error, the irreligious materialists ignored the body; but Christian moralists have seen the necessity of taking a correct and adequate view of the mission of the body as subservient to the spirit.

(1) The body is the physical basis of the soul in its life-work.

It is a fact that the powers of the soul and of the body develop together. After the body is completely developed for all its functions, it passes through certain stages of growth, increasing in size and strength

During the same period, the soul is also unfolded and matured. It is natural, therefore, that there should be a very close sympathy between body and soul.

(2) The body through the senses as the windows of consciousness furnishes the Spirit's medium of Intercourse with Nature, and between one soul and another. Hence arise the various earthly relations which express themselves in the several stages of life (childhood, youth, manhood, old age), in the difference of the sexes, in the variety of temperaments, individual and national, and in all the forms of social relations and activity, such as the family and state. The fact that man is spirit-embodied is very necessary to a true view of man's work in this life and so subject to the conditions, limitations, and relations of time and space.

III. *Man is Consciously Linked with God*—in his origin, in his activities, and in his immortal destiny. Man is made to know God and to work out his immortal destiny under God. The idea of God and the belief in God are somewhat natural to the human heart. The facts relating to God furnished by observation and experience are the facts of the universe material and spiritual, and especially of man himself with his material and spiritual being. The common sense, or reason, of man furnishes the intuitive principles of causation, of design, of moral obligation, and of the infinite—which rise up spontaneously in the soul when the facts concerning God are presented. It is through the intuitions and the facts that man reaches the idea of God and the belief in God.

With man's own consent and coöperation, everything will combine to elevate and give power and fit him for a higher future destiny. Thus the world is manifestly a training-place for higher work. "At the

same time, the call to a grand mission of duty—having reference, in his present relations, to God, to himself, and to his fellow man—which comes up from the soul itself as the voice of God, is accompanied with the assurance that here the moral destiny of man is to be decided for all the future; that this is the moral training-place for immortality, where man is to fit himself, as saint or sinner, to a being of virtue or vice, of blessedness or of woe, forever."

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why does human action require a personal actor, origin, movement, and aim?
2. In what sense is man self-active?
3. Distinguish between act and action.
4. What are the fundamental forms of human action?
5. In what sense does man determine his own action?
6. Give the argument against and for activity of mind in sleep.
7. Tell of man's progressive development.
8. In what sense is man immortal?
9. Give the proof of immortality from universal belief.
10. In what sense is man a spirit embodied?
11. Tell how man is linked with God in his origin, and in his activities.
12. In what sense is man in a state of probation under God?

Problems for Discussion

1. Explain "The activity of the self is not the activity of the material cause but the activity of Self-determination."

2. Write out definitions and derivations of the words "Spirit," "Person," "Soul," "Mind," "Self," "Ego," "Intelligence."
3. The knowing subject is a unifying principle; for human thought it is the ultimate principle of unity. Explain the implications.
4. Science takes experience as it stands, isolates a portion of it, and subjects that portion to analysis; philosophy takes experience as a whole and seeks the conditions of its possibility. Illustrate.
5. Cite Shakespeare's conception of a man; the Psalmist's.
6. Neither Fatalism, Materialism, nor Pantheism is a solution of the problem of the universe or of man. Why not?
7. Theism is the only adequate theory of the universe and of man. Give reasons.
8. "For man not to know of a God, he has only to sink beneath the level of our common nature; but to deny Him, he must be a God himself." Chalmers. Interpret critically.
9. What is the objection to the idea of chance in the universe?
10. How can duality of self be overcome?
11. Is all good action conscious action?
12. How are ideals formed?

LESSON IX

THE DOMINANT HUMAN URGES TO ACTION: THE APPETITES

IN evaluating human behavior, we must consider both the human agent (the doer) and the circumstances under which the deed is done. Behavior may be good or bad, desirable or undesirable, according to its setting. All action must have certain starting-points. For man as a moral agent, they are found in his relation to the good. The good in its various forms exists around and within him. Man has a conscious need for that good. The good and evil furnish the object of action; the capacity for appreciating their nature and of seeking or avoiding them furnishes the proper starting-point, or motive, or urge to action.

Both ancient and modern ethicists have said much concerning the nature of man and his environment. His constitution has furnished them with certain principles which should guide human action. To Aristotle, who assumed that every man seeks his own good, this good or "well-being" meant fulfilling the proper functions of man, or acting as the nature of man prescribes; to the Stoic, man's duty was action in accordance with his nature; to Butler, years later, this "constitution" indicated the conduct appropriate to a human being.

There is in every man a natural organization—a mysterious reservoir from which his emotions and actions are supposed to flow. It is different in differ-

ent men. In other words, every man is infinitely peculiar in body and soul. This peculiarity which all have depends on the spiritual nature as well as upon the physical, and gives peculiarity of temperament, feeling, thought, and aspiration. It is the potent power in the moral development. It is the sum-total of the natural endowments and settings. In this process of development, this peculiar (this natural) must be made ethical—must be brought under the control of the will and woven into it. It must be ethicized—lifted up into the moral. The instinctive develops into the moral. The natural as the groundwork out of which the moral structure is to rise carries a force which necessitates the course the moral development is to take. It is active and not passive. The natural begins to manifest itself in a rudimentary way and becomes an appetency, and this enters more and more into the moral development, according as it is met and controlled under the inspiration of the moral idea. The rootlet of a tree gets nourishment first from within and then from without. So man seeks nourishment first and then light. The craving of a human being is not satisfied with mere food and drink; it reaches for something higher, and rises into the realm of spirit and light. The impulse in man is to seek the spiritual. His very appetencies force him to struggle toward a higher stage of development.

The natural in man's nature is made up of countless interests, which can be developed only in interaction with his environment. Lying at the base of the outgoing of his nature is the system of appetencies or tendencies—a part of himself with which he is confronted. These may be classified in the way in which they proceed in the moral problem. These certain

elements of the human constitution, in part natural and in part acquired, which always prompt and urge men to action, without reference to the good or evil there may be in the action and without reference to its ultimate effects on the actor's well-being, are: the *appetites,* the *desires,* the *affections,* and *conscience.*

I. *The Appetites: Definition and Analysis.* The appetites are cravings for such things as are for the well-being of the body and the preservation of the species. They are hunger, thirst, sex, and perhaps the cravings for air and sleep. They are common to man with the lower orders of animals, with this difference: in man they may be controlled, directed, modified, in part suppressed, while in brutes they are uncontrollable and always tend to the same modes of gratification. At every stage of his development, man must have food, shelter, and some means of defence. His struggle with physical nature may spur him to action, may call out his powers and result in growth and development, or may result in defeat. At man's early stage of development, nature may be too strong for him and thus thwart his efforts and dwarf his life.

Appetite is periodical and self-limited. In a healthy and well-balanced person the appetites are satisfied when they have been indulged so far as is good for the body. But they are often abused in such ways as to minister to physical disorder, and the degradation of the soul. For instance, when one eats of a certain kind of food, there is, besides the satisfaction of the normal appetite, the pleasure of the palate and other concomitant organs; and there is frequently an inducement to prolong this enjoyment by continued eating, and this is usually to the detriment of the body. Especially is this the case in the indulgence of artificial

appetites, such as the use of tobacco. Probably no human being ever naturally enjoyed the use of this drug. The first use of it almost always results in nausea. Yet to many, it becomes a luxury and the occasion of a slavish habit which they have not the energy to shake off. The same is true of other narcotics, the use of which destroys lives, ruins character, brings poverty, degradation, and untold suffering to many families.

II. *Their Significance.* But the normal use of the appetites is essential to the well-being of man, individually and collectively. In their normal action the satisfaction of them is a source of pleasure. For instance, but for hunger and thirst and the pleasure of their satisfaction, we might be indisposed to eat or drink at proper times, or in proper quantities, of the most nourishing food, and we would often become aware of our neglect only too late to arrest consequences. A similar remark applies to the appetite designed to secure the preservation of the species. But for this, it may be doubted whether men would willingly take upon themselves the cares, labors, responsibilities, and contingent disappointments and sorrows involved in the rearing of children.

In a life conformed to nature, hunger and thirst recur only when the body actually needs the supply which they crave. But stimulating food, by the reaction that follows strong excitement of any portion of the nervous system, often creates hunger when there is no need of food, and in like manner not only intoxicating, but highly stimulating liquids, may occasion an excessive, morbid, and injurious thirst. There is hardly any substance so offensive that it may not by use become agreeable, then an object of desire, and at

length, of intense craving. Hunger is a powerful urge which persists as long as life and health. It surely is a craving extensive in its influence on behavior and learning.

The craving for food also spurs men to the effort to secure it, and thus we have productive labor. Men do not naturally like to work; it is largely the pressure of some want. Were it not for this, many, perhaps most, would not work. In these appetites, which are mere bodily impulses and thus liable to excess and misdirection, as in other urges to action, there needs to be some check and balance among the several incentives which will keep them all within their designed limits. They need the control of the will and of the principles of action by which the will is determined and regulated.

Urges are important factors in determining human conduct. An urge is a form of adjustment which is a reaction aroused by some inner condition of the body or by some external situation or both. To a considerable degree, human activity is initiated and sustained by such urges. Beneath many of our acts one or several cravings may be found. Life may be largely directed toward the relief of a number of dominant urges, wisely or unwisely.

Questions on the Lesson

1. What is meant by the urges to action?
2. Tell of the starting-points of action.
3. Distinguish between cause and object of action.
4. The possible ends of action are happiness, perfection, and virtue as good to be sought; and unhappiness, imperfection, and vice, as evil to be shunned. Explain.

2054.

5. What are the urges to action?
6. Tell about the Appetites.
7. In what sense are they periodical and limited?
8. In what sense are they essential to man, individually and collectively?
9. Why do they need to be brought under the control of the will?
10. What is the dynamic rôle of the urge? Why are urges important factors in determining human conduct?

Problems for Discussion

1. Tell why the true spring of activity is within rather than without; in the unformed self of the man rather than in his external circumstances or environment.
2. "Nature, disposition, or temperament, is our original endowment, the given raw material of moral life—the natural, undisciplined, unformed, unmoralized man, while character is acquired, the fruit of effort and toil—the spiritual, disciplined, formed, moralized man." Explain the implications involved in this statement.
3. Why is the natural man, as such, neither good nor bad, neither moral nor immoral, but simply non-moral?
4. The honest man is the man to whom it would be difficult and unnatural to act dishonestly, the man in whom honesty is a "second nature." In what sense is this so?
5. "We rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things." Tell why and how.
6. Evaluate: If we were made to act the right mechanically, we should not be ourselves, for it is moral life that makes us ourselves and moral life is the life of choice.

LINCOLN BIBLE INSTITUTE

7. If you have to decide whether to spend a winter in Europe or to stay at home and take a year's study in college, what should you consider in order to make up your mind?
8. Do religious people always vote rightly? Is that the fault of the religion or of the people who profess religion?
9. To judge any act as sinful or virtuous, we must know the purpose behind it: we can truly judge only ourselves and those whose purposes we know. Explain.
10. Tell why loyalty to any purpose requires memory, imagination, courage, perseverance.

LESSON X

THE DESIRES AS URGES TO ACTION

WE have found (1) that the Appetites originate from the body; (2) that they are for the most part, and primarily, periodical and self-limited; (3) that they are essential to the well-being of men, individually and collectively, and (4) that they are modified by habit.

Our lesson is on the Desires, which also are urges to action.

I. *Definition.* The Desires are cravings of the mind for such things as are for the well-being of the soul. They do not originate from the body and are not necessarily intermittent. Their tendency is to increase indefinitely, often through the whole of life, and to gain strength by the attainment of their specific objects.

II. *Classification.* The Desires seem very numerous if classified by their objects. They may all be included under the following titles: The Desire for Life; the Desire for Action; the Desire for Knowledge; the Desire for Society; the Desire for Power; the Desire for Property; the Desire for Completeness.

1. *The Desire for Life.* Man is constituted with a love for life. The great mass of men love life. The forces of life must work or death will ensue. The utility of this desire is shown in the care men take of their health, in the way they guard against accidents, and instinctively seek to protect themselves in sudden danger.

2. *The Desire for Action.* Man begins life with movement, action. The good which man desires is realized only through the exercise of his bodily and mental powers. This desire for action is firmly implanted in human nature. It is the basis for man's development and for all his work in life.

3. *The Desire for Knowledge.* In the human being, with action comes the dawn of intelligence. The desire for knowledge is innate, inborn. The child is busy with eye and hand throughout his waking moments. This accounts for his rapid growth of knowledge in the first years of life. His curiosity compels him to observe the nature of familiar objects of the house and the street, the faces and names of relatives and acquaintances, the events in daily domestic life, and the meanings of many words addressed to him. With advancing years this eagerness to get at the secret of things causes him to think, to classify, to reason, to explain, to trace causes and consequences, to arrange thought in system. It assumes different directions, in part determining, and in part determined by—condition, profession, or employment. It is out of these labors and sacrifices that sciences are born and philosophies are constructed, that marvellous discoveries are made, and that the most wonderful inventions are rendered possible. Of course, this natural desire so early manifested may be abused. In the eager pursuit of knowledge, health may be sacrificed and life shortened.

Some seek knowledge for its own sake as well as for its uses. But many voluntarily sacrifice ease, gain, and position, in the pursuit of science or literature, without attempting publicity. Many, indeed, make their knowledge the property of others, and are zealous

in diffusing their own scientific views, or in dispensing instruction in their own departments.

4. *The Desire for Power.* This, too, is a proper and innocent desire. It is manifested in every period of life, and in the exercise of every faculty, bodily, mental and moral. This craving for personal power begins with physical power and advances to soul power. It is not only desirable for every good man to be as powerful as possible, but it is also obligatory upon him. A man, devoted to the production of all kinds of moral utilities, for himself, for the community and the race, must needs make himself as influential as his condition permits. A bad man often seeks power for bad ends, and in this is actuated by pernicious motives. Thus this desire is often carried to excess and prompts to various vices. Much of the evil, degradation and suffering prevalent to-day are caused by the selfish ambition of men.

5. *The Desire for Wealth and Property.* Money is power, preëminently so at the present day. Property confers influence, brings under control of man resources for the increase and extension of his power over nature and man. If the ends are legitimate, this desire leads to industry, frugality and thrift, and to energy and enterprise in securing it. It gives birth to the arts of agriculture and manufactures, to commerce and to all the varied industries of civilized society. It is legitimate to secure as much wealth as will be a defence against want, in both the present and the future. This desire, like the appetites and other cravings, may become inordinate and eventuate in the vices of avarice and covetousness, and lead to extortion and fraud, and may result in robbery and other crimes.

A striving after ideals anticipates the moral ideas

in the form of natural impulse toward them, before discovered in true character as the true, the beautiful and the good. Man instinctively stands at the threshold of the moral. The will must come to lift these forces up to the higher plane of morality. The whole moral economy is reached through the natural order of life, which serves as a stepping stone to the spiritual life. When the aforementioned desires function helpfully, they beget in man, (1) the desire for excellence in manhood; (2) the desire to direct his developed powers to the accomplishment of such a life-work as befits a man, and (3) the desire to direct his powers to the execution of some noble life purpose.

Man is made to form ideals of life and conduct which shall represent for him that best man and serve as his pattern in attaining the coveted manhood. But this noble desire must be guided by the higher revelations of God's will as his moral Governor. If not thus guided, under the influence of sin, the ideals often become the falsest and basest, leading the gentleman to become the polished hypocrite, the merchant the cunning cheat, and the lawyer the shrewd trickster. Power must be economized and wisely directed if it is to avail much in the work of life. Hence it is that punctuality, order, timeliness, fitness, steadiness and dispatch are necessary for the conservation of man's power. Common observation reveals the craving for rational order and definite purpose in the work of man.

6. *Desire for Social Contacts.* As a social being man has desires. He is born a social being. The social order into which man is ushered without his own consent and his own connivance, may be most varied in character. It may be a primitive group living from hand to mouth by hunting or by fishing; it may be a

pastoral people given to the care of flocks and herds; it may be an agricultural community, rooted to the soil. Moral behavior varies in different groups. Men associate most when they differ most, and this difference is what constitutes their individuality. No human individual is sufficient unto himself. Every man for the completion of his being needs intercourse with his fellows. He needs to receive and to give help. He needs the latter as much as the former for the perfection of his being. A mutual dependence rests on all men. This principle constitutes the basis of social wholeness. The individual and society must work together for the perfection of humanity. In this way man and society are made whole and complete together. Whatever man does to render society weak or inefficient reacts upon himself and is a damage to him. Whenever society diminishes the individuality of its members by despotic measures or tyrannical policy, it brings ultimate damage to itself.

To furnish the requisite basis for the association of his life and development with others, there is placed within him the desire for esteem, for the approbation of his fellow men. This is another of the inducements to action which affect all men. Were man not made to crave the esteem of others, society would perish. Were the good opinion of his fellows withheld from him, man could do little good to them and get little good from them. Like other desires, the desire for esteem may become a vice. When indulged beyond its province, it becomes vanity, a foolish disposition, one to be deprecated, and, in certain of its forms, to be despised. A yearning for the Divine approval forms an essential part of true piety toward God.

It is also true that man finds many of his keenest and highest enjoyments and many of his highest motives to exertion and elevation in his social relations. He desires the society of man,—in the family, in the state and in the race. The desire for the assistance of others in his own work rises up spontaneously. The provision made in our social nature and relations by which willing and affectionate aid is rendered him is one of the most beneficent arrangements of Providence. In the true man there is also the desire to aid others in their life task. This desire to help and influence others is seen in the child, it grows in the youth, it holds sway in the man. It prepares the world for its great leaders in all the departments of human activity. Man's desires as a social being appear as a craving for coöperation for grander than individual ends. They are found in the mission of the family as the training school of man; in the work of the state, as furnishing a broader field for human endeavor by the protection of life, freedom, industry and property, and the wider mission for the race, which needs to be delivered from ignorance and error and tyranny and want and misery. Nature is perfected by such interaction. It is as important for society as for the individual. The motto is—" not to be ministered unto, but to minister." Perhaps it is even more important that the heart go out in helpfulness than to receive help. " It is more blessed to give than to receive." This principle of man's devout relation to God is also based upon the fundamental constitution of man's being. God is the source of man's being. The recognition of this is religion. When a man feels his dependence upon God, he wells up in devotion. It is a relation of dependence of man upon God. Without

religion man's desires are centered upon material things, upon the immediate wants of the body. But when God enters into our desires, it lifts them above the natural and glorifies them. They seek a spiritual end. Such seeking changes the whole ethical attitude, and men strive for higher values. They ask concerning their actions, are they right? Are they in accordance with the moral law? In accordance with the Divine standard of human action? Has religion any contribution to make in the right formation of helpful habits? How is the power of motives touched by religion? How can the sanctions and ideals of the moral life be helped by religion?

Questions on the Lesson

1. Outline the lesson.
2. Distinguish between the appetites and the desires.
3. Why are the desires a prominent and permanent part of human experience and properly subject to rational control?
4. What is implied in our desire for knowledge?
5. Tell of the right and wrong desire for wealth and property.
6. Distinguish between the order of desires in man individual, and in man social.
7. How can I cultivate a desire to form a high ideal in life?
8. Explain the desire for approbation.
9. Tell of the desire for superiority.
10. Why do the desires need the control of reason and of the principles which reason recognizes in the science of Christian living?

11. Tell of the desire—(*a*) for new experience; (*b*) for security; (*c*) for recognition.

12. Which of the desires or urges to action listed in the lesson are most prominent? Which do you experience most frequently daily? Which ones persist through adult life? Become stronger in adult life? Are taken into account by religious doctrines or public laws?

Problems for Further Discussion

1. Why is the need for the good the starting point of action?

2. Explain: Man was made to enjoy the agreeably good in objects, to be the perfectly good in character, and to do the morally good in Christian living, and to shrink from suffering, being, or doing the evil.

3. Why is the desire to accomplish a manly life-work commendable? What characteristics are implied?

4. Comment on the desire to fulfil the highest mission: (1) to Family, (2) to State, (3) to Race.

5. Explain the signification of the desires for duty: (1) to God, (2) to self, (3) to mankind.

6. What is the ethical value of the desire to bind to duty by reward and punishment?

7. In what sense is the desire for power one of the chief elements of what is known as "ambition"?

8. Evaluate the statement: The desires are all moral when in their place, and all immoral when unseasonably gratified.

9. For the religious man, who traces morality to its source in God, devotion to the good becomes the love of God. Comment on this.

10. Tell of the relative ethical importance of the desires.

LESSON XI

THE AFFECTIONS AS URGES TO ACTION

THE Affections are like the Desires in that they imply a craving for certain objects. The desires are generally cravings for impersonal objects; the Affections are for persons. The desires are self-regarding and urge to actions that have a direct reference to self; the affections are altruistic and prompt to actions that have a direct reference to others. The affections are thus of a complex character, involving along with the feeling of delight and satisfaction in the object, or the reverse, the wish, more or less definite and intense, of good or ill to the object that awakens the emotion. The feeling thus assumes an active and transitive form, going forth from itself, and even forgetting itself in its care for the object. Love seeks to promote the happiness of the object loved.

I. *Classification.* The Affections as Urges to action have been variously classified. One writer speaks of them as impulses of feeling arising upon the cognition of some form of the good; feelings connected with the agreeably good, with the ideally good, and with the morally good, and with their opposites. As man is by his nature not merely an individual and isolated being, but also a social, moral, and religious being, there must be a corresponding subdivision of the affections, as they have reference to the individual who cherishes them,—to society, or to God. As man

is at once animal and rational, some of these affections are instinctive, and implanted chiefly for the purposes of the body, or the animal nature; others are intelligent, and given chiefly for the purposes of the higher nature, or spirit.

The Affections are usually divided into the natural and the moral. The former spring up spontaneously when the object of them presents itself; the latter are those that may be cultivated. But generally speaking, all affections are primarily natural, and take on a moral character only when they are liable to be prevented or suppressed by other influences. To resist and correct bad tendencies in children becomes an obligation and so takes on a moral character. Sometimes also affection toward an unworthy object springs up spontaneously, and thus duty requires that it be checked and neutralized. In such instances, the affections also take on a moral character.

Many writers divide the affections into the *Benevolent* and the *Malevolent,* according as they seek the good or the ill of the object on which they fasten. As the simple emotions are but so many forms of *joy* and *sorrow,* so, likewise, the affections are but so many modifications of the principle of *love* and its opposite, *hate*. When these give tone to the general character of an individual, he becomes the philanthropist or misanthropist, the man of kind and gentle disposition, or the hater of his race, according as the one or the other principle predominates.

There are objections to these terms as to all others. But since they have come to be of nearly universal use, and are readily understood by readers, we shall adhere to them.

The more prominent Benevolent Affections are Love

of kindred, Love of friends, Love of benefactors, Love of home and country, Reverence, Gratitude, Sympathy.

Love of Kindred. The love of kindred includes parental, filial, and fraternal affection; all of which are natural and spontaneous affections. They spring up as soon as the objects of them are known. Parental love, though common to both sexes, finds its most perfect development in the heart of the mother. The love of the mother for her child has come to be the synonym of all great affection. These affections may become extravagant and inordinate; may be perverted or interrupted or cease altogether. In this condition they may be rectified only by moral means. Climatic conditions often alter family affection. For instance, out-of-door life is often unfavorable to the intimate union of families; while domestic love is considered the strongest in countries where the shelter and hearth of the common home are necessary for a large portion of the year.

Love of Friends. Much has been said in praise of friendship. Poets and moralists have vied with each other in its praise. There can be no doubt that it is a demand of our nature, a part of our constitution. The man who finds no one in whom he delights, and whom he calls his friend, must be wanting in some of the best traits and qualities of our common humanity, while, on the other hand, pure and elevated friendship is a mark of a generous and noble mind. Friendship is generally recognized as another name for the love between persons unconnected by domestic relations, actual or prospective. Love for the Supreme Being, God, rightfully transcends all other love, since the benefits received from God include and surpass all others. To be really conscious of our actual relation to God

is "to love Him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and all the soul, and all the strength."

Reverence is defined as the sentiment inspired by advanced superiority in such traits of mind and character as we regard with complacency in ourselves, or with esteem in our equals. Qualities which we do not esteem we may behold with admiration (that is, wonder), but not with reverence. Our reverence for age is chiefly for the valuable experience and the maturity of excellence which belongs to the old age of good men. A foolish or wicked old man commands no reverence by his years. God, as possessing in infinite fulness all the qualities which we revere in man, must ever be the worthy object of supreme reverence. Love to Him, whom we have not seen, needs to be kindled, renewed, and sustained by gratitude for the incessant blessings from Him, and by the promise—contingent on character—of blessings unmeasurable and everlasting.

Love of Benefactors. The love which we feel for a benefactor differs from that which we feel for a friend, as the latter again differs from that which we feel for a parent or a child. It differs from friendship, in that the motive which prompted the benefaction, on the part of the giver, may be simple benevolence, and not personal regard; while on our part, the emotion awakened may be simple gratitude to the generous donor, a gratitude which, though it may lead to friendship, is not itself the result of personal attachment. The kindness of men awakens a grateful response in every human heart whose right and normal action is not hindered by disorder, or prevented by crime.

Love of Home and Country, or the patriotic emo-

tion, holds a prominent rank among the affections which constitute our sensitive nature. It falls into this class of affections inasmuch as it involves not only an emotion of pleasure but a desire of good toward the object which awakens the feeling. To man in all his wanderings, there is no place like home, no land like his native land. It may be barren and rugged, swept by the storms, and overshadowed by the frozen hills; it may be of narrow boundary and poor in resources, where life is but one continued struggle for existence with an inhospitable climate, unpropitious seasons, and an unwilling soil; but it is his own land, it is his fatherland, and sooner than see its soil invaded, or its name dishonored, he will shed the last drop of blood in its defence. The same principle is concerned in the love of home. Our homes, in a measure, become identified with ourselves. To love the home of our childhood, and our native land, is but to love our former selves, since it is here that our little history lies, and whatever we have wrought of good or ill. This affection is an original principle of our nature, showing itself essentially the same under all conditions of society, and in all ages and countries. It waits not for education to call it forth, nor for reason and reflection to give it birth, while at the same time reason and reflection doubtless contribute largely to its development and strength. It is often the strongest where it might be least expected. The inhabitants of wild, mountainous regions, of sterile shores, of barren planes, manifest as strong love for home and country as any people on the globe. Even beggars have been known to die of nostalgia, or homesickness.

Pity and Sympathy. *Pity* is the emotion occasioned

by the sight or knowledge of distress or pain, while *Sympathy* is feeling *with* others rather than *for* others. It has for its objects successes and joys, no less than sufferings and sorrows. In order to feel with another, we must either have passed through similar experiences, or must have an imagination sufficiently vivid to make them distinctly present to our thought.

Kindness is considered benevolence for one's kind—a delight in their happiness and well-being, a readiness to perform friendly offices whenever and however needed. In its lowest forms, it is designated as *good-nature;* when intense and universal, it is *philanthropy.* It is deemed so essential an attribute of the human character, that he who utterly lacks it is branded as *inhuman* while he who actively relieves want and suffering is considered a philanthropist.

The Malevolent Affections. These affections may be comprised under the general name *Resentment,* as that which underlies and constitutes the basis of all of them. Anger, envy, jealousy, revenge, hatred, and so forth, may be regarded as but so many perversions or modifications of this general principle. As the benevolent affections are all so many forms of love, going forth toward diverse objects, and varying as the objects vary, so the malevolent affections are so many forms of the opposite principle, that is, aversion, varying, likewise, with the objects. These malevolent or irascible feelings, like the benevolent, are, as to their principle, instinctive; they have their foundation in our nature. They are as such universally exhibited under the appropriate circumstances; they are early in their development, showing themselves prior to the exercise of the reflecting and reasoning powers; they are also, to some extent, common to man with the brutes.

They are generally characterized by a desire to do the object some harm.

Anger is the sense of indignation occasioned by real or imagined wrong. It is perhaps the foremost among the malevolent affections and is in some sense implied in all the rest. Is anger ever justifiable? When excited by actual wrong-doing and contained within reasonable grounds, it is justifiable. Indeed, it is salutary because it intensifies the virtuous feeling which gives it birth, and its due expression is among the safeguards of society against corruption and evil. But when it passes beyond this and implies hatred of the person, it is in itself evil, and may become an outrage against the rights of man and the law of God.

Among the modifications of anger are: *Indignation,* a more or less intense feeling of the culpability of an action accompanied by a sense of the ill-desert of the doer; *Wrath* is anger expressing itself in outward manifestations often alarming to the objects of it; *Fury* is considered a still more excited form of anger in which the subject tends to lose all self-control.

Envy and *Jealousy* are base feelings that belong in this group too. Envy is a hatred excited by beholding the success of another simply because he has succeeded better than ourselves. Jealousy is the state of mind excited when a person to whom we are attached is suspected of bestowing his affection or friendship on another. It is a groundless, painful, unreasonable sentiment, indicative of a mind weak and ill-balanced.

Revenge is the desire to inflict evil for evil, and is always wrong in principle. In practice, revenge is scarcely ever justifiable.

Hatred results from the carrying to excess of any of the malevolent affections referred to, or suffered to

become permanent. No man can rightfully be the object of hatred; for all men have some possibilities of good, some rights to be respected, are entitled to some pity for their sufferings and sins.

The affections, benevolent and malevolent, are common to man with lower animals. Love and hatred are manifested by all of them whose habits are open to our inspection; anger, by not a few; gratitude, kindness, pity, sympathy, resentment, and revenge, by the more intelligent; envy, by those most completely domesticated; reverence, perhaps, by the dog toward his master.

II. *Significance of the Affections.* Since all the affections prompt to action, but do not discriminate the qualities of actions, they need to be ethicized—brought under the control and guidance of reason. They can be safely indulged—only in accordance with the principles which reason recognizes as supreme in the conduct of life.

It has been a much discussed question whether the class of feelings under discussion in this lesson has any moral significance, and if so, what? So far as regards those forms of the malevolent affections last considered, envy, jealousy, and revenge, there can be little doubt. Their exercise involves, as already stated, something of reflection and choice. They are not instinctive, but voluntary in their operation, capable, therefore, of control. They are perversions of that principle of resentment, which, for wise reasons, nature has implanted in our bosoms. Their tendency is evil, and only evil. They are malevolent in the full and proper sense of the term. A moral character attaches only to the voluntary form of resentment. The same may be said of other affections, and of the sensibilities

in general. In so far as they are purely instinctive, they have no moral character. An action must be the fruit of a volition, else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness, or of blame for its criminality. An involuntary action is an unfit subject for any moral reckoning.

Questions on the Lesson

1. Outline the lesson.
2. Distinguish between the affections and the desires.
3. Give the various classifications of the affections.
4. Tell the difference between the benevolent and the malevolent affections.
5. Distinguish between love of kindred and love of friends; between reverence and gratitude; between pity and sympathy. Give an illustration of each.
6. When is anger justifiable? When not? Give illustration.
7. Tell about the modification of anger.
8. Give an illustration of envy; of jealousy; of revenge; of hatred.
9. State the moral values of the affections.
10. List a dozen things which people do to secure social approval. Evaluate the strength of this urge. Trace its development to maturity.
11. What amount would you be willing to pay to see a good football game if you were the only spectator on the bleachers? Explain.

Problems for Discussion

1. How does the intensity of affection vary with intensity of stimulation?

2. How far can observations of affections in animals be used in the study of human affections?
3. Describe the most primitive affections.
4. Why is it difficult to classify affections?
5. To what extent are the affections unsuited to civilized conditions?
6. Are love and beauty in the objects or in the mind?
7. What is your present idea of Ethics? of Morality?
8. Loyalty to any one requires open-mindedness toward the good in others. Interpret this statement.
9. Evaluate Emerson's statement: "We ought at least to do a man as much justice as a picture and put him in a good light."
10. Envy and jealousy shut one off from widening experience and make the soul shrivel. Tell why.
11. The strength, width, and loyalty of your sympathy show how much of a person you are. Illustrate this statement.
12. We must learn to see ourselves as others see us, and to see others as they see themselves. Tell how this can be done.

LESSON XII

THE COMPLEX NATURAL TENDENCIES IN MAN AS URGES TO ACTION

WE have been considering the simple natural tendencies or cravings implanted in the nature of man. There are also certain general and complex tendencies in man which result from his special bodily organization and mental activities, such as Temperament and Disposition.

I. *Definition of Temperament.* Temperament is any type of permanent inborn tendencies and development resulting from man's bodily constitution; that phase of moral life which develops out of man's desires and emotional attitude. From its organization, the infant receives with its existence certain peculiar qualities. The ancient Greeks classified men by these peculiarities of organization, and accounted for the peculiarities by the doctrine of temperaments. With the progress of accurate and systematic knowledge, modern writers have placed this doctrine upon a more solid scientific basis.

II. *Classification and Analysis.* The four traditional temperaments are the Sanguine, Choleric (or bilious), Melancholic, and Phlegmatic (or lymphatic). This classification was based upon a doctrine of internal secretion connected with man's systemic life (the respiratory, circulatory, and digestive systems). The ancient physicians taught that the body contained four fluids—lymph, blood, bile and gall, and that the excessive amount of any one of these in the body

determined both the general state of the body and the general temperament of the soul. The sanguine or athletic temperament results from the predominance of the circulatory system of which the heart and lungs are the center. It manifests itself in a fulness of animal life and the highest degree of physical beauty. Men of this temperament are easily stimulated, quick to react, optimistic in disposition, genial, excitable, given to tender passion, not wise in counsel but often dashing in execution, not firmly bound to moral principle, peculiarly liable to excess. The *choleric* temperament is marked by a well-developed muscular system, less quick than the sanguine temperament, reactions slow and more enduring; also marked by much determination, self-reliance and confidence; more emotional and unstable in disposition than the phlegmatic; the will being generally uppermost.

The *Melancholic* temperament generally results from the predominance of the nutritive system of which the stomach and liver are the center. With the disordered action of this powerful system, the temperament often inclines the man to withdraw from the society of men, to brood over his own sorrows and trials, to take a gloomy view of things, and in its disposition is more emotional and less persistent and weaker in reaction than the phlegmatic. This was said to be the temperament of Milton in his old age, of Dante and of Tasso, of Demosthenes, of Columbus and Magellan.

The *Phlegmatic* temperament results from the comparative weakness of the three vital systems mentioned above. For instance, it is seen where the heart and lungs, the liver and stomach, the brain and nerves act

slowly or feebly. Such a man is born to sluggishness, is a good sleeper, fond of eating and drinking and is generally doomed to mediocrity, and can never be a great leader among men. Men of this type are less easily stimulated, are slow and steady in response, and careful, cautious, and reflective in disposition. When the vital systems are in proper combination, we have the man of powerful brain sustained by equally powerful circulatory and nutritive systems—our own Washington being the nearest model.

Nearly all temperaments are *mixed.* The exclusive presence of any one element would show a diseased rather than a normal and natural condition of the man. The seasoned temperament is that of the perfect man, since in that the whole physical system is fitted to be the powerful, complete, and willing instrument of the self-active spirit. Other types might easily be added to the traditional four. In modern American life, it seems that we have a real need of recognizing at least one more, namely, the *nervous* type. There are people who by virtue of their inherited constitution are high strung, easily stimulated, quick to react, and excitable in disposition.

Temperaments are affected by sex, age and race. Women are generally sanguine or sentimental in temperament, or as possessing temperaments in which these elements predominate; men have temperaments which generally fall into the choleric and phlegmatic classes. The child's temperament is considered as sanguine; the man's as choleric, the old man's as phlegmatic. The Latin races may be described as sanguine and sentimental, the Teutonic races as choleric and phlegmatic. The best work of the world has been done, not by the enthusiasts nor by the day-

dreamers, but by the practical men and women. The causes of the differences are due practically to fundamental capacity and hereditary elements, and to physical and social environment.

In the matter of temperament, the good teacher or worker may be expected to possess those qualities which contribute to alertness of attention, ready self-control, evenness and steadiness of disposition, optimism within practical limits, and a pervasive, penetrating, and steady moral earnestness and good feeling in the pursuit of his calling.

I. *Definition of Disposition.* We have seen that temperament is confined mainly to emotional tendencies. Disposition includes man's general tendencies resulting from his mental constitution. It embraces the emotional tendencies and the active tendencies or instincts—a total of the inherited active and emotional tendencies. Disposition thus denotes the prevailing tone or turn of a man's mind, not so much in reference to his intercourse with his fellow-creatures, as in reference to the spiritual make-up of the soul.

II. *Classification.* The disposition gets its name from its dominant characteristic. The following four types are generally given:

1. The *Callous.* Here the sympathetic instincts are weak or wanting. There is more or less insensibility to the feelings of others. This type is by no means confined to the brutal and debased. It may be associated with great intellectuality, where the total vigor of the system has run disproportionately into the three phases of the mind.

2. The *Excitable.* The characteristic of this type is said to be a lack of prudential instincts, and of those present, none is very stable. This type is based on a

sensitive temperament, which seems to be a combination of the sanguine, choleric and sentimental.

3. The *Energetic.* In this type the practical instincts are said to be well developed. The temperament is described as robust and normal, but lacking refinement. According to our classification, it appears to be a combination of the sanguine and choleric.

4. The *Sluggish.* This is a combination of the phlegmatic temperament with a lack of moral instincts or urges.

III. *Ethical Significance.* These dispositions or acquired active tendencies thus become very powerful urges to action, for they set limits to man's possibilities. While it is true that dispositions do not necessarily produce conduct, yet they do mean that man has certain possibilities or impossibilities of self-realization which otherwise he would not possess. Character is not a mere set of dispositions. It is the man, as possessing the disposition and yielding to it or not according to the way in which he exerts his power of self-determination. Character is to be found in what a man is, that is, in his activity as a self-determining agent. Thus the man, whether he follows the bent of any disposition, or determines himself to do what seems to him to be "the good" in spite of that disposition is, in his conduct, expressing himself.

The three chief powers of the soul are: the intellect, the feelings, and the will; these three give character to the several varieties of human disposition. The predominance of the first mentioned power gives us the *intellectual* man; the predominance of the second, the *sentimental* man; the predominance of the third, the *active* man; the comparative weakness of all three powers produces the imbecile or inefficient man; and

the proper and balanced combination of all three, the well-balanced man. This well-balanced man is considered the man of most perfect disposition. In him the intellect observes, thinks, and constructs its thought systems of truth, beauty, and goodness, with power; the feelings respond quickly and fully; and the will is the ready and active servant to urge to the formation of the best and noblest purpose, and to execute it with ease and energy.

Habit. Another factor influencing the development of the urges to action is *habit.* Habits are secondary or modified tendencies of man's nature. They are tendencies to forms of activity which are induced by frequent repetition. That such tendencies should originate in such ways is a radical law of spiritual beings. The word "habit," which anglicizes the Latin "habitus," signified primarily an acquired state or condition of more or less permanency. Even to-day we speak of a diseased or of a healthy habit of either the body or of the mind. So the word "habit" has several meanings, but especially the two following: a psychical tendency produced by frequent repetition; and also the mode of action to which that tendency is related. We are chiefly concerned with the first of these.

Habit is the result of repetition, association of ideas, or custom, acting upon the original power or tendency. These may be set to their work of forming habits, by authority, education, example, fashion, from without; or by mental constitution, or bodily temperament, or mental or bodily condition, or experience, or opinion.

These modified tendencies or habits may be divided into bodily and mental, and these have been distinguished, "objectively, into specific and generic, ac-

cording as they are formed in reference to single, isolated acts or indulgences, or in reference to acts which constitute a course of conduct or mode of living."

Habits are distinguished, subjectively, into active and passive, according as the agent is active or passive as to their formation and power. When habits manifest themselves by an increased facility of acting, as in the use of the organs of speech in speaking and of the hand in writing, they may be called active; and when they manifest themselves by the recurrence of thoughts and feelings and inclinations which come into the mind readily and, of course, by reason of their having been there before, as in the readiness with which the meaning of words is understood by us when we hear them pronounced, they may be called passive.

These habits, or acquired active tendencies, become most powerful urges. They are as varied in their range and form as the native activities in which they have their origin. There are ambitious habits, covetous habits, envious habits, slovenly habits, studious or diligent habits, immoral habits, humble or haughty habits, selfish or generous habits, conscientious habits; indeed, every cultivated disposition and the mode of conduct which it supports may be called a habit. One's character is chiefly composed of motive habits. No duty is more vital than to build up character through the development of good and noble habits. Virtue itself, the fountain of spiritual prosperity and blessedness, has been well described as the fixed habit of loving and doing what is right and good. Vice is the habitual love and practice of evil. As our powers of doing and of desiring increase in strength and effectiveness under the operation of the law of habit, so the disused faculties and suppressed or neg-

lected incentives to action become weak and impotent.

References for Further Study

Calkins: *A First Book in Psychology,* page 93.
James: *Psychology* (Briefer Course), pages 138f.
James: *Principles,* Volume I, Chapter IV.
Rogers: *The Theory of Ethics,* page 169.
Roop: *General Psychology,* Chapters XII, XIII.
Thorndike: *Psychology,* see *Temperament.*
Warren: *Elements of Psychology,* pages 262ff.

Questions and Problems

1. Define temperament.
2. How is it related to man's moral nature?
3. What are the three principal vital systems of which the body consists?
4. How do they give character to the several temperaments?
5. Tell of the Sanguine temperament and give illustration.
6. Describe the Choleric temperament.
7. How does the Melancholic differ from the Phlegmatic?
8. What are the characteristics of the nervous temperament?
9. What is meant by mixed temperament?
10. How are temperaments affected by sex, age, and race?
11. From the standpoint of temperament, what are the qualities of a good worker?
12. Distinguish between disposition and temperament.
13. Give and illustrate the four types of disposition.

14. Point out their moral value.
15. Explain: Character is not a mere set of dispositions.
16. How do the intellect, the feelings, and the will give character to the several varieties of disposition?
17. Habit is a facility in doing a thing, and an inclination to do it, acquired by having done it more or less frequently. Comment on this statement.
18. How have habits, whether bodily or mental, been distinguished?
19. In what sense are habits powerful urges to action?
20. Describe a dozen different habits.
21. How are habits strengthened? how inhibited?
22. Make a list of *useless* and *annoying* habits observed in those around you, including some of your own.
23. The learning process, or habit-formation, includes two steps: *acquisition* and *fixation.* Explain.
24. Comment on: Conceptions such as those of theft, murder, blasphemy, perjury, or such as telling the truth, doing good, obeying one's parents, observing the Sabbath, keeping one's word, are short, practical rules through which rational habit influences human life.

LESSON XIII

CONSCIENCE AS AN URGE TO ACTION

WE have thus far considered "the Good" as the motive object in action, and the motive cause as found in man's own self-active nature. Man was made with two fundamental needs: the need of *giving out* from his own being and resources toward the good, and the need of *receiving* from without to replenish his own being and resources. The urges to action are (1) the Appetites, or cravings of the animal nature,—the blind impulses without any implication of intelligence,—which have for their object the well-being of the body and the continuance of the race; (2) the Desires, which have in view the happiness (including pleasure in its physical relations) of man and of society; (3) the Affections (or giving powers), cherished toward the object of affection, that which may influence it for good or ill; (4) the more complex tendencies in man which result from his special bodily organization and mental activities, such as Temperament, Disposition, and Habit.

In this lesson it is our purpose to consider briefly the last and most important urge to action, namely, Conscience. There is much confusion among ethical writers as to the characteristics of this constituent of the soul. They agree that man has a moral consciousness, or a conscience, and that he pronounces moral judgments, that is, that he is continually distinguishing between right and wrong in thoughts, feelings, acts, institutions, and so forth, but to get a simple

and definite conception of Conscience and its functions seems difficult, and is thus not attempted by some writers.

I. *Definition.* Conscience and Consciousness are similarly compounded and are originally two forms of the same word—*conscientia* (conjoint knowledge). Consciousness is the more general term, the knowledge of ourselves and of every phase of our experience, while Conscience as a power, a process, and a product is the moral faculty of the soul, the power to know and feel and will in matters of right and duty; it is the awareness of the right and its obligations; it is that within us which urges us to do what we judge to be right, and to keep us from doing what we judge to be wrong; it also awakens in us a feeling of approval of acts which we regard as right, and of disapproval of acts which we regard as wrong.

The conditions for the exercise of Conscience are fourfold: (1) There must be a conception of some act to be performed. This will be by the same powers of the mind as those by which other individual concepts are formed. (2) The act must be seen to have a moral quality. The reason or intuition gives us this just as when the occasion occurs it gives beauty, cause and effect, power, and so forth. (3) Then the judgment decides whether the action is right or wrong. It is the same judgment that determines whether an object is small or great, hot or cold, comely or uncomely; or whether it be wise or foolish, prudent or imprudent. It may in this case, as in others, err in its decision, but such as it is finally we must act upon it. (4) Then Conscience asserts itself. If the judgment decides that the action is right, Conscience urges to the doing of it, and if wrong to refrain from the doing

of it. It does this always if it does anything, and is so far forth infallible. We may disregard its monitions, and yield to some other impulse; it does not compel our action. The consequence of such action will be followed by the reproaches of conscience, a sense of guilt and ill-desert, and an expectation of punishment.

As to the *origin of Conscience,* even before the time of Socrates, thinkers have divided themselves into two general classes: (1) The Idealists, intellectualists, or intuitionalists, and (2) the Empiricists, materialists, externalists, sensationalists, experientialists. The former all affirm that conscience is a special inborn, original capacity, which the workings of sense and experience can do nothing more than develop; they disagree as to whether it is a simple faculty or a complex one, or both a faculty or combination of faculties and an inner rule or law. The latter (the empiricists) all agree or affirm that conscience, or the moral faculty, is derived from sense and experience; that man is not born with it, nor even with the germ of it; with them all, the soul is to begin with morally a blank; there is in it no idea of right, obligation, duty; man creates for himself the distinction between virtue and vice, and creates it by the aid of experience.

Some moralists put the urge in something *without* man—something external to the mind (objective), and others find it within man—in something within the mind or soul itself (subjective).

1. *The Objective View.* Under this Class we find:

(1) The Authority of the State as the supreme urge. They argue that man must live in civil society, and this cannot be sustained without political regulations. The state, through its constituted authorities, legislates

for conservation of public welfare—makes its laws, which every citizen is bound to obey. The civil authority is ultimate. Therefore, read the law and act accordingly. This is the theory of Hobbes, a rival of ancient sophistries which were exploded long before by Plato and Cicero.

(2) There is something inherent in the nature of things which furnishes the urge. (*a*) One says there is *fitness* in things themselves. For example, there is a fitness in returning gratitude for a favor, in the payment of an honest debt, in love and honor toward parents, and homage toward God. Samuel Clarke advocated this theory. (*b*) Another finds it in the *Truth* of things. Man is a rational being, and therefore ought to be treated as such. When a man lives as if he has an amount of income which he has not, he does wrong. He lives a lie. Whatever action denies the truth is wrong; whatever action conforms to it is right, says Wollaston. (*c*) The *Relations* of things. There are certain relations, such as of parent and child, of benefactor and beneficiary, of the state and the citizen, of Creator and creature, which give the urge for the duties enforced. Says Wayland, "We need only to know the relations and the duty is seen in them and made up from them." Conformity to them is right; want of conformity to them is wrong. (*d*) The *Beauty* in things. There is beauty in the union and consent of one mind or heart with the great whole of being, and which may be termed good will to being in general, and in this moral beauty is the essence of true virtue. Edwards taught that action which is benevolent is right; that action which is without benevolence is wrong.

(3) The Highest Happiness View. This view

assumes: that happiness is the only good. It has various modifications: the putting of pleasure as the chief good and personal enjoyment the only virtue; or the Aristotelian view—the modifying of all our appetites and desires so as to keep "the golden mean," neither too lax nor too intense in any inclination; or Paley's religious aspect view, which denies present gratification for the endless happiness of heaven; or Bentham's general conception of utility—"the greatest good to the greatest number."

All three of these general views find the highest urge of life in some source external to the mind, and have regard to some object which seemingly makes the strongest claim upon man.

2. *The Subjective View.* Different views are held respecting what that something in the nature of man himself is which urges and even binds him to the right and good.

(1) An Immediate Intellectual Intuition. According to Kant, the conscience is simply the power of perceiving by intellectual intuition the great moral principles which constitute man's supreme law. It is absolutely infallible. "An erring conscience is a chimera."

The Ought is immediately seen by the reason, and needs and admits of no other explanation than that it is so seen in its own light. The reason sees the right, and that is conclusive.

(2) There is an inner sense or feeling which gives moral distinctions; which perceives a right and wrong as the organic senses perceive colors and sounds. It is the duty of mankind to do only such acts as gratify this sense, which is each man's source of all obligation and to him his measure of all virtue. Adam Smith finds in an inner reciprocal sympathy the sole ground

and possibility of morality. Virtue is simple fitness, propriety, decency, as decided by each man from his own point of view. All the conscience man has originated through his sympathy with his fellow man.

II. *Classification.* Various classifications of conscience have been made: As to the time of its activities, conscience is either antecedent or subsequent. The antecedent conscience goes before the performance, the subsequent follows after. As to quality, conscience is said to be good or bad, pure or defiled, strong or weak, tender or hardened, scrupulous or careless, and so forth.

Then again, conscience is either individual or collective. The former is the conscience of a single individual; the latter of a group of individuals, as a nation, people, sect, church. As to standards, conscience is either absolute or relative. The standards of God are absolute; those of men are relative. As to training, it is either natural or supernatural, secular or Christian. The former training is the education that the world gives in the moral standards of the world; the supernatural which the Bible gives about God and His will, supplementing the knowledge which the conscience has from the very start. The secular training is considered identical with the natural; the Christian corresponds to the instruction in the Bible, the revealed Word of God.

III. *Significance.* Conscience is significant in itself and reacts upon knowing, feeling, willing and faith to their advantage. Cicero maintained that conscience was a great urge in two directions—those who have done evil dread the threatening judgment, and those who have done no evil have nothing to fear. Cudworth held that the conscience was innate reason.

Calderwood held it was a real, direct consciousness of God and His Will. Sidgwick calls the conscience an advocate; Martineau calls it a judge; Kant, a legislator; Luther likens the conscience to barking hellhounds; McCosh, to a striking clock, needing regulation by the Word of God; a good Biblical concordance refers to a score or more kinds or types, such as the natural conscience, a defiled, an evil, a convicting, a purged, a good, a pacified, a pure, a witnessing, a void of offence, a weak, a seared, an abandoned conscience, and so forth.

Martineau classifies the springs of action in relation to conscience into a prudential and a moral series—prudence implying self-surrender to the strongest impulse, and duty self-surrender to the highest impulse. The prudential scale is variable, individual, egoistic; the moral is identical and constant for all men. Thus Martineau shows that conscience is more than myself, has its seat in the eternal, its reality in God: a revelation of authority to one person, it is valid for all. The reverence which conscience inspires is identical with devotion to God, and is the apex or crown of human character. Three objections are given to Martineau's scale: (1) Palmer thinks it would abolish all moral insight; (2) another objection is that it is based on an incorrect psychological division, since the mind is an organic unity in modern psychology, and (3) it does not sufficiently settle problems where there are conflicts of values.

We have thus presented the various urges to human behavior and very nearly in the order of their significance. Nearly all persons would admit that the appetites are of lower order in this respect than the desires, and that the latter are inferior to the affec-

tions, and conscience must always have the right of way, and be the supreme and dominant impulse in the soul. But conscience may demand that the indulgence of appetite be suppressed, that the gratification of desire be refused, that not only the malevolent affections but also some inordinate benevolent affections be restrained because threatening to eventuate in unrighteousness. Conscience must rule all along the line.

This supreme authority of conscience is further evident. (1) Man's highest welfare is secured by yielding to its authority, knowing that he has done the manlier and more fitting thing. (2) The man who obeys conscience is always sure that he is actuated by the highest possible principle, and is building up a worthy and righteous character. Nearly all persons will concede the moral superiority of actions done because they are right over the same actions done because they will increase our personal enjoyment.

References for Further Study

Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics,* page 317.
Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics,* pages 117, 182, 264.
Martineau: *Types of Ethical Theory,* Book I, Chapter V.
Roop: *General Psychology,* Chapter 35.
Stephen: *Science of Ethics,* pages 306ff.

Review Questions

1. Distinguish between the good as the motive object in action and as the active cause of man's self-active nature.
2. Why is there much confusion among ethical writers as to the characteristics of conscience?

3. Distinguish between conscience and consciousness.
4. What are the four-fold conditions for the exercise of conscience?
5. Mention the two general classes of thinkers and their views as to the origin of conscience.
6. Tell the views of those who put the urge in something external to the mind; of those who put it within the mind or soul itself.
7. Mention the various classifications made of conscience.
8. Tell of the significance of conscience.
9. Make a list of twenty different types of conscience.
10. Why must conscience be the supreme urge in Christian living?

Problems for Discussion

1. Is conscience inborn or produced?
2. Was conscience originally in the race, or has it been evolved by hereditary transmission and accumulation of emotional experiences?
3. Tell of conscience in children.
4. Can personal feeling possess authority in ethics?
5. Critically examine the following: "As each man's reason may err, and thus lead him to false opinions, so each man's conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral standard."
6. If conscience be represented as a power of reflection, can its supremacy be completely maintained?
7. Does the philosophical doctrine of an unerring conscience imply infallibility of judgment in morals?
8. When sovereignty is attributed to conscience, what is the nature and measure of this sovereignty?
9. When ought conscience to be active in our lives? What would be the result of having conscience steadily active?

10. New Englanders are often told that they are too conscientious. If conscience is our guiding light, can we have too much of it? What does over-conscientiousness mean?

11. Are there any cases when conscience is in doubt? Try to think of a case.

12. Think over your answers to the questions above and say what you mean by conscience as the most important urge to action. Is conscience always right? Can it be changed by education?

LESSON XIV

THE WILL AS THE EXECUTOR OF ACTION

SINCE both conscience and moral law distinctly imply the controlling power of the will in man, a right understanding of will as a power and function of the soul is indispensable to an understanding of the morality of human actions, and of virtue as a state of personal being.

I. *Definition and analysis.* The will is the native energy of self to make intentional effort; it is the determining factor in human behavior; it is the soul's power to determine the extent and kind of its own action; it is the soul in movement. It enters into every mental and moral act. Were you to analyze any of your acts, what would you find? You would find that attention conditions knowing; ideas occasion emotions; ideas and emotions occasion choices, and choices occasion actions.

While definitions of the will differ, yet all writers agree in regarding will as the determining power in human action. Its specific function is to control in all those activities to which the other powers are ever spontaneously impelling it; to control the appetites, and to bring the desires and affections under the guidance of the moral intelligence.

The *will unfolds itself in three stages.* First. The will manifests itself as an *impulse which follows the natural appetency.* In this stage it is one with desire, or appetite, and instinct is its ruling principle. There is prompting, inner urging, and we carry it out. There

is nothing moral in this stage. It shows itself in little children. Even here there are inward tendencies at work produced by outward circumstances, but nevertheless prompted from within.

The *second stage or process is higher.* The natural appetite or impulse is subordinated to an intelligent purpose or action. *Intelligence intervenes between it and impulse or appetite.* Passion may point in one direction and the reason in another. The will may act according to reason or not; it may be good or bad. This will depend upon which seems preferable at the time; this again will depend upon which exerts the greater influence at the time—Reason or Passion. Here is an apple which I wish to eat, but there are reasons why I should not eat it. The will is determined by a reason. Here the thought is being exercised to see whether the particular action will subserve the purpose in mind. This is not yet properly morality, because the will is still *selfish.*

The *third stage or process in the normal development of the will is moral freedom.* Here the controlling principle of the action is not selfish, but altruistic. It is inspired by the idea of the Good, which then takes possession of the will. I wish the apple. Is it good for me? Is it right for me to eat it? This question inspires and stimulates the will. An inner inspiration from the good causes the will to act. It acts according to what is right. This completes the conception of the moral, and when enthroned in the mind, transcends all orders below it. The question arises, Ought I to eat this apple? Is it right or wrong? Here action becomes moral. The *will is controlled by a moral idea.*

The *energies and susceptibilities of the soul* are:

The *intellect,* which is the mind perceiving, judging, reasoning, knowing; the *sensibilities,* the mind feeling, that is, enjoying, suffering, craving, and impelling; and the *will,* the mind choosing, determining, putting forth effort. The will is the arbiter, the executive power of the soul, and acts only when some desire or emotion is present in the soul. There must be some impulse, urge, or motive, some reason for acting.

There are two functions of the will, namely: Choice and Volition. (1) Choice presupposes two or more acts or courses of action before the mind when the will is called into exercise, and it must determine between them. The mind must choose. Having chosen which of the several acts it will perform, Volition naturally follows. (2) Volition is the effort of will to carry its choice into effect. The former involves only the choosing of what we desire; the latter, the putting forth of energy for the attainment of that which we choose. The Volition is not always, but generally, immediate upon the action of choice, if the means are possessed for attaining the end chosen. If not, the choice will stand alone, and bide its time.

The Elements of Choice. The will may appear as spontaneous choice, or as rational preference. A large part of human action is spontaneous. It is provided for in the giving and craving tendencies of the feelings. When there is nothing in the way, these affections and desires lead on to choice and action. All the rational feelings may be truly voluntary in the sense of being spontaneous, since the will accompanies them as consent.

In rational preference, man refers the whole matter of choice to reason, the authorized guide to action and the deliberate conclusion regarding what is to be

chosen is reached in this way. It is voluntary and rational in a higher sense than the other.

The Grounds of Choice. In all rational action, man determines his own action, or course of action, as a rational being must; as seems to him on the whole best; or in accordance with the greatest apparent good; or in accordance with the strongest motive.

Power of Volition. This is the second element of will, and is concerned with the execution or carrying out of the action or course of action decided upon by the agent.

The Elements of Volition are: (1) Preliminary effort to design the plan by which the end may be reached. The intellect is the planning power. (2) The exertion of the powers to reach the end. Every volition must have an object, conceived to be in our power to be realized in the future through the exertion of our active powers. Consciousness testifies that when we have formed a volition or purpose, we make an effort to execute it.

II. *Significance.* The will as the executor of action is thus seen to be the highest and most complete expression of the self, or of human personality. By the action of the will, man commits himself to the course decided upon and pursued, so as to become fully responsible for it. Hence the consequent importance of the will, since it gives man's endorsement to good or evil. Will can never be anything else than an expression of the actually existing self at the moment of the volition. The impulses, feelings, and desires are states of the personal self which are more or less directly under the control of the will, and which through the aid of external objects, and even of ideas, self can at will bring into being and at will bring to an end.

References for Further Study

Dewey: *Human Nature and Conduct,* Chapters 2, 3, 7.
Johnston, G. A.: *An Introduction to Ethics,* Chapter 7.
Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics,* Book I, Chapter 6.
Roop: *General Psychology,* Chapters 36, 37.
Seth, J.: *Ethical Principles,* Introduction, page 38.

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why is a right understanding of the will in man indispensable to an understanding of the morality of human action?
2. Give the definitions of the will.
3. On what do all writers agree concerning the will?
4. Explain the three stages in the unfolding of the will.
5. What are the energies and susceptibilities of the soul?
6. What are the two functions of the Will?
7. Distinguish between the Elements of Choice and the Grounds of Choice.
8. What is meant by the power of volition?
9. What are the elements of volition?
10. In what sense is will the completest expression of human personality?
11. Why can the will never be anything else than an expression of the existing self at the moment of the volition?
12. In what sense is the will limited in its control of the lower powers?

Problems for Discussion

1. Interpret the statements: (1) No will without a personal self that wills; (2) One cannot will to will.

2. Evaluate Jonathan Edwards' conception of the will: "The faculty of the will is that faculty, or power, or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing; an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice."
3. Distinguish between knowledge voluntarily acquired, and that acquired involuntarily.
4. Can will originate an exercise of affection?
5. How can there be various degrees of force belonging to volitions? Give examples and interpret them so as to discover the law or laws which determine volitional force.
6. Explain the statement: Will is essential to personality.
7. Neither Desire, Affection, nor Emotion is capable of its own direction, or adequate to the task of governing the life. Why not?
8. Given the notion of Duty; given manifold natural impulses rising spontaneously, is the intelligent life capable of self-direction in accordance with the governing notion of "Oughtness"? Why or why not?
9. The difficulty, in many cases, of judging whether any one is responsible or not should teach us to be charitable. Why?
10. If we were made to act the right mechanically, we should not be ourselves, for it is moral life that makes us ourselves and moral life is the life of choice. Interpret this statement.

LESSON XV

THE GUIDES TO ACTION

IN recent lessons we have considered: (1) Man as an active being—self-active, constantly active, progressively active, and immortally active; (2) Man as spirit-embodied—the connections of spirit and body; (3) Man as consciously linked with God—in his origin, activities, and destiny; (4) Man as urged, stimulated to action by certain impulses and incentives which are a part of his constitution, among them being the appetites, the desires, the affections, and conscience; (5) That man himself, as the efficient cause of his own action, determines upon that action in the exercise of his will—choice and volition being the essential elements of will.

In this lesson we shall consider—THE GUIDES TO ACTION. Man needs not only active powers and urges to action and an executor of action, but also guides of action toward those ends which a rational being must will to reach. Among the various urges to action there is no subordination and government. Each in its turn prompts to its own particular end or gratification, and is satisfied for a time with what has been gained; and not until it has been gained. A creature with no other principles of action but such as have been denominated *urges* would be hurried impulsively from one thing to another, without any scheme of life or plan of conduct, and without being able to resist or control the impulse which was strongest at the time. Reason or the intelligence, and conscience directing

the conduct with a regard to what is right, or prescribed by God in the moral law, have been given man as the supreme guides of his action in the fulfilment of his high creative task.

In one man the conduct may be controlled with a constant reference to that which is agreeable or advantageous, giving rise to a sense of prudence; in another the aim may be to control it so as to realize some ideal of perfection in the manhood or the work, giving rise to a sense of the ideal, or perfect; in a third the aim may be to conform the conduct to the law of right, giving rise to conscience or a sense of duty. In most men, all three of these principles have more or less directing influence.

Reason as prudence is an important guide of human action. Prudence involves foresight, and can therefore exist only in a being naturally having desires for happiness. The purpose of placing rational beings in such a world as this,—where they are liable to feel pleasure and pain, and to experience good and evil,—is to lead them to seek the one and to shun the other. Associated with early life is thoughtlessness; but with age and larger experience, man learns to pause and to deliberate, to weigh actions and their consequences, and to adopt that course of conduct which promises on the whole to be productive of the greatest advantage to him.

But reason, acting only as prudence, is considered too low in its nature and too narrow in its range to be the supreme guide of human action. Man becomes utterly selfish. Hence the sense of prudence as a guide needs large supplementation and control by the higher principles given by the perfect and the right.

An ideal is an imaginary exponent of perfection.

Only a being possessed of a constructive imagination can have desires for realizing the perfect in himself. Men, from the lowest to the highest, have their ideals. Every man forms his own ideal of manhood. "With one, it may contemplate mere brute enjoyment; with another, rational pleasure; with one, it may contemplate intellectual or æsthetic culture, with another high moral culture; with one, the extraordinary development of some one power, with another the balanced and complete development of all the powers."

It should be remembered that, due to man's fallen nature, man's ideals often become in themselves base and their influence debasing. The good fellow, the sharper, more often than the really good man and the thoroughly honest and energetic man, is made the starting-point of imagination in forming a worthy ideal. In the case of the intelligent and refined, human culture comes in to modify the ideal; in the case of the Christian, the teachings and examples of the Word of God exert a strong modifying influence.

Thus a man's conception of the ideal manhood is a powerful governing principle in deciding the character of his real manhood. "If his conception be low and selfish, the man will be low and selfish; if it be truly noble, if it contemplate self-sacrifice and suffering in the attainment of the true nobility, then the man will be in a measure transformed; if it be the perfect man as seen in Jesus Christ, then he will reach the highest toward the true manhood. The facts correspond with necessity; for in real life the ideal actually exerts this powerful directing influence."

In the case of any apparent conflict between the sense of the perfect and the sense of prudence, reason gives the supremacy to the former as having the

worthier end in view. But even the sense of the ideal or perfect is too narrow in its range of control, too low in its character and too short-sighted in its vision to furnish the supreme guide of human action. It needs supplementation and control by the sense of duty or conscience, a high guiding principle. While prudence and the ideal have a restricted sphere of operation, conscience has as its function—the survey of the entire constitution of man's being and the assigning of limits to the gratification of all his various passions and desires. Hence a course of conduct opposed to it may be described as unnatural, even when in accordance with our most natural appetites; for conscience both judges and restrains all of them, and if given an opportunity, would govern the world. The difference between right and wrong is recognized from the earliest years. Children acknowledge the sense of duty or conscience as the guiding principle even in their sports and amusements by appealing to what is fair, honorable, and right.

Conscience alone has authority to make use of an "ought" in giving its directions. "It is this faculty, distinct from and superior to all appetites, passions and tastes, that makes virtue the supreme law of life, and adds an imperative character to the feeling of attraction it inspires. It is this which was described by Cicero as the God ruling within us; by the Stoics as the sovereignty of reason; by Saint Paul as the law of nature; by Bishop Butler as the supremacy of Conscience." [1]

The supremacy is further evident from the following considerations: Man's highest welfare is secured by yielding to this as the paramount authority. For

[1] *History European Morals,* Lecky.

instance, the Appetites and Passions, when acting in subordination to self-love, clearly produce a larger amount of happiness than when permitted to indulge themselves without restraint. Then, again, the man who obeys conscience is always sure that he is actuated by the highest possible principle and is building up a worthy and righteous character. Conscience is thus the sense of touch for the reality of God and of the souls of men. Conscience begets in man reverence for God and man, the sense that we owe something deep and high to life itself. When conscience is on the throne, the desire for knowledge, place, power, pleasure, approbation, while seemingly strong urges in life, are unreliable. No one of them, indeed not all of them taken together, can take the place of conscience. We are even now through the normal action of conscience in serious intercourse with God. It is often said that the typical Puritan lived under the GREAT TASKMASTER'S eye, that his whole existence was held under moral law, subject to moral judgment, with everlasting moral issues. It was the interpretation of life through conscience. Conscience is the voice of God in the soul of man, the final inspiration upon which man can depend through life in all of its departments.

Our age very much needs a deeper sense of obligation and a keener appreciation of the significance of conscience as a guide of human action. As Gordon says: " For the sense of God in His world and the souls of men, for the consciousness of the eternal moral order upon which human life rests, we must consult our conscience. For the great sentiment of reverence in the presence of man's existence we must ultimately depend not upon sympathy, or love, or the sense of

brotherhood, but upon the sense of obligation. Inspiration with the fullness of the river of God comes not through desire of knowledge or power or place, but through the passion of righteousness." Certainty about the future can never be the fruit of our wishes, our mere capacities for growth, not even of our love; it is the answer to our conscience. When we interpret life through the sense of obligation, when we keep the word "ought" supreme in our speech, when we look upon our pilgrimage here as a moral errand, when we say in our hearts with awe and solemn joy, "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ to give an account of the deeds done in the body," we shall live in the happy certainty of the life with God beyond time.

Seth in his *Ethical Principles,* pages 451–460, gives telling expression to belief in immortality: "The strenuous and idealistic moral temper is rooted in the conviction of the eternal meaning of this life in time, and is willing to stake everything on this great adventure." "Our origin and our destiny are one; it is because we come from God that we must go to Him, and can only rest in fellowship with Him who is the Father of our spirits. That fellowship—the fellowship of will with Will—in the present is our best pledge of its continuance in the future, and the very essence of the moral life. . . . God is the Home of His children's spirits, and He would not be God if He banished any from His presence. Nor would man be man if he could reconcile himself to the thought of such an exile."

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why does man need guides to action?
2. Is Prudence a good guide to action? If so, why? If not, why not?
3. Why is reason, directing the conduct with a regard to the ideal manhood, a higher guide of human action?
4. What is an ideal? In what sense do all men have ideals?
5. Why do man's ideals often become in themselves base and their influence debasing?
6. In what respect does the sense of the perfect have a worthier end in view than the sense of prudence?
7. Is the difference between right and wrong recognized from our earliest years? Give illustrations.
8. Why is conscience the highest guiding principle of action?
9. Comment on, The Puritan felt in his heart of hearts his amenableness to God for the deeds done in the body.
10. Why does our age need a deeper sense of obligation and a keener appreciation of the value of an enlightened conscience as a guide of human action?
11. What is the difference between the universal, the particular, and the sensitive conscience? Give an illustration of each.
12. Interpret these statements: (1) Any conscientious decision takes thought, sympathy, and resolution to get at all the facts; (2) We cannot be too conscientious, but we can be over-scrupulous.

Problems for General Review Discussion

In the light of our discussion of man's moral nature thus far, interpret the following summarizing statements:

1. "Man is a self-active spirit, possessed of an endless existence, capable of limitless development, and embodied in order to bring him into connection with the rest of the universe."
2. "Man is a creature of many wants, which take shape in the feelings, placed in a universe of good, endowed with an intelligence to perceive and appreciate that good, and with a will to choose and lay hold of it and direct his powers in view of it, so as to satisfy and enlarge his being."
3. "Man is a being of varied and ceaseless activities, capable of setting before himself, as objects for his achievement, ends which would embrace, in their ever-widening sweep, the universe of good in happiness, perfection, and righteousness."
4. "Man is a rational being, conscious that he must work out a moral mission and an immortal destiny under God, and acknowledging conscience, or the moral faculty, to be his supreme guide in the fulfilment of his great task."
5. "The idea of the Divine Image in man involves two elements: man's likeness to God, and derivation from God."
6. "Self, like a despot, dominates the whole realm of experience, and, unless mastered by some superior principle, must wage unceasing war against all who would pretend to equal authority."
7. "All persons limit one another, and are one in God. Hence all persons form a COMMUNITY. The End of one is the END of all. The End of the universe is the End of man. The Absolute Good is the true Good for every person."
8. "God is Personal, but He is more than Personal, for He transcends and unites all mere persons in His transcendent unity. As *Person,* He gives possibility to nature; as more than Person, He gives possibility to the multitude of spirits."

PART II

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CHRISTIAN ETHICS

LESSON XVI

TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY: THE STANDARD AS HAPPINESS

AN important part of a treatise on Ethics is its treatment of the various ethical theories concerning the highest good, or the aim of right Christian living. Each theory has contributed some valuable element to the whole of ethical thought. The most diverse writers may assist one to the comprehension of his own theory. Of course, some of the schools of moralists deserve more attention than others. Our review of these theories must be brief, dealing only with the main points of each theory.

As influenced by dominant ideas, the various theories have been classified somewhat as follows: (1) *Happiness Ethics,*—the theories which make welfare and happiness the ultimate end of duty; (2) *Perfection Ethics,*—the theories which teach that virtue consists in seeking an ideal excellence, a certain perfection of character and living; (3) *Motivity Ethics,*—the theories that make the regulation of one's motive tendencies by conscience or reason the all-comprehensive requirement of the law; (4) *Authority Ethics,*—the theory that obedience to the will of a superior, enforced by law or habit is the foundation of morality; (5) *Duty Ethics,*—the theory that the aim of moral desire and action is to realize the right or to perform one's duty. Any life to be called moral must aim, then, either at the promotion and conservation of welfare and happiness, or at the perfection or excellence

of life and character, or at a wise regulation of our affections and desires, or at obedience to authority and to the commands of God, or at the realization of those ends in general which are right and dutiful.

Happiness ethics is often given the name Hedonism, because the crudest form of this doctrine makes ἡδονή, or pleasure, the highest good, the great end of existence. Some writers restrict the term Hedonism to the earliest and least developed form of the Happiness theory, and say that, in addition to this, there are other forms, Eudæmonism and Utilitarianism, its more modern form.

Hedonism appears first in the history of Philosophy as the doctrine of Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. As a pupil of Socrates, he had learned from his master that the true wisdom of living lies in "foresight, or insight into the consequences of our actions, in an accurate calculation of their results, pleasurable or painful, in the distant as well as in the immediate future." The chief and only good of life, then, was pleasure, the end of desire. Pleasure with Aristippus means not happiness in general, but mere sensation, the pleasure of the moment. With him, the good is purely sensuous, *e. g.*, self-control is to be cultivated but merely as a means of pleasure. All pleasures are alike in kind; they differ only in degree or intensity. Socrates had taught that the pleasures of the soul are preferable to those of the body; Aristippus finds the latter to be better, that is, intenser than the former. He had also learned from Protagoras, the Sophist, that the sensation of the moment is the only object of knowledge. Reflection upon this idea led him to reject the Socratic principle of calculation as the best method of life. He reasoned

that the present is ours, the future may never be; to sacrifice the present to the future is unwarranted and even perilous—is to miss that pleasure which is essentially a thing of the present. The true rule of life is a careless surrender to present joys; to live only from moment to moment, packing them full ere they pass, with intensest gratification. Such is the Cyrenaic ideal,—a life of feeling, heedless and unthinking, a product of the sunny Pagan spirit. For the Christian, the Cyrenaic ideal would be at best an ideal of despair rather than of hope. It represents the utter subjection of reason to sensibility. Such skepticism has again and again found its way into literature. "Whenever life loses its meaning, or when that meaning shrinks to the experience of the present, when no enduring purpose or permanent value is found in this fleeting earthly life, when in it is discerned no whence or whither, but only a blind process, then the conclusion is drawn, with a fine logical perception, that the interests of the present have a permanent claim, and that present enjoyment and unconcern is the only good in life."

Democritus and Leucippus, who were called Atomists, and lived in Ionia in the fifth century before Christ, taught that pleasure is the proper aim of rational beings. In asserting that the universe and all objects contained in it result from the interaction of exceedingly minute and indivisible particles, they were the forerunners of our modern materialists and evolutionists, for they have done little more than to elaborate the ideas of the ancient Atomists. Since personal experience terminates when body and brain are resolved into their chemical constituents, the dictate of Atomistic wisdom is, "Let us eat and drink, for

to-morrow we die." But no honest and earnest thinker ever suggested that the Hedonistic philosophers advocated low sensuality. For Aristippus (B. C. 400), and after him Epicurus (B. C. 300) taught that refined pleasures, the principal of which were to be intellectual and social, were the wisest aims of human pursuit. We read that they approved of bountiful repasts at which guests were crowned with flowers and cheered with sweet music, dismissed the cares of life and engaged in songs and gaiety. But the later Cyrenaics began to realize that in order to construct an ideal some reference to reason is necessary; that even a successful sentient life implies the guidance and operation of thought. Hence they admitted with the Socratic master that virtue of prudence was essential to the attainment of pleasure. "A man must be master of himself as a rider is of his horse; he must be able to say of his pleasures that he is their possessor, not they his. Such self-mastery and self-possession is the work of reason, and a life which is not thus rationally ordered must soon be wrecked on the shoals of appetite and passion."

In the philosophy of Epicurus, Hedonism was given a new definition of pleasure—a larger grasp of life. The object of life is no longer the pleasure of the moment. It is the enduring condition of tranquil enjoyment made possible only for the man who possesses self-control and moderation. Happiness is found in a life according to nature, and not in luxury and extravagance. Pleasure is the highest good, pain the greatest evil, not, however, the positive or active pleasure of the Cyrenaics, pleasure in motion, but quiet pleasure, repose of spirit, freedom from pain. These Pleasures Epicurus calls the pleasures of the soul.

They are greater than those of the body, for the flesh is sensible to present joy and affection only, while the soul feels the past, the present, and the future.

To reach the chief good, we must exercise our judgment, must have prudence or insight to guide us in our choice of pleasures and in our avoidance of pains. "The wise man, therefore, the man of foresight, understands the causes of things, and will be free from prejudice, superstition, fear of death, all of which render one unhappy and hinder the attainment of peace of mind." To be happy, then, one must be prudent, honest, and just. The ethical philosophy of Epicurus is a refined egoism and nothing more. Pleasure has value only to the man who feels it. Even friendship is merely a means to private happiness. While Epicurus advocated the end of conduct as pleasure, yet he recognized that this end could not be attained without the guidance of reason; that is, feeling would be only a blind and perilous guide to its own satisfaction. While the task of life is discovered and tested by sensibility, yet the execution of the task is the work of reason. Reason is thus the handmaid of sensibility. Man cannot shut out the past and the future, and surrender himself carelessly to the momentary *now*. That which gives tone to man's present experience is the outlook, the horizon, the prospect and the retrospect. Man abides, though his experience changes. "Wherefore," says Epicurus, "we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. . . . All pleasure, therefore, because of its kinship with our nature, is a good, but it is not in all

cases our choice; even as every pain is an evil, though pain is not always, and in every case to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these things must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good." [1]

The great maxim of the Epicurean life is, therefore, like that of the Stoic, that we "cultivate a temper of indifference to pleasure and pain, such a tranquillity of soul as no assault of fortune can avail to disturb, such an inner peace of spirit as shall make us independent of fortune's freaks." For the Epicureans have lost the Socratic faith in a Divine Providence, the counterpart of human prudence, which secures that a well-planned life shall be successful in attaining its goal of pleasure. Their gods have retired from the world, and become careless of human affairs. We learn through moderation of desire and tranquillity of soul that our true good is to be sought within rather than without. "Accustom thyself in the belief that death is nothing to us; for good and evil are only where they are felt, and death is the absence of all feeling. . . . Death, therefore, the most awful of evils is nothing to us; seeing that when we are, death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are not." [2]

In the Seventh Satire of the Second Book, Horace gives us a good picture of this Epicurean ideal: "Who, then, is free? He who is wise, over himself true lord, unterrified by want and death and bonds; who can his passion stem, and glory scan; in himself complete, like

[1] See *Letters of Epicurus* (Wallace's *Epicureanism*, pp. 129–131).
[2] *Letters of Epicurus*, loc. cit.

a sphere, perfectly round, so that no external object can rest on the polished surface; against such a one fortune's assault is broken." While it is an ideal of rational self-control and deliverance yet the state of sensibility is still the ethical end and criterion, but the means are rational, not sentient.

Aristotle. Sometimes Hedonism is used to denote only that view which makes the end *sensuous* pleasure, and hence contrasts with Aristotle's *Eudæmonism,* which sometimes is used to denote the theory based upon *intellectual* pleasures. His conception of the summum bonum—the chief good of life—is not that of ease and enjoyment, but of the greatest attainable Eudæmonia, or prosperity. Hence his doctrine has been styled Eudæmonism. His chief part of happiness is to be found in active employments, not in passive experiences. Man's highest good lies in well-being—in the suitable employment of his faculties about their proper objects. Thus employed and properly exercised, activity becomes virtues. The discreet man avoids extremes and follows the middle course. To him virtue consists essentially in that wisdom which chooses and seeks the highest good, and the right is in the good thus chosen.

Aristotle was not a materialist, hence his superiority to the Atomists is evident. While his ideal of life is nobler than that of materialism, yet he fails to distinguish between the pursuit of one's own best interests (prudence) and the loving service of the right for its own sake (virtue). They are not identical, though closely related.

Pleasure may refer to either that of the subject or to that of the object. The pleasure sought may refer to that of the individual himself, or to others

comprising the family, tribe, or society at large. On this basis Hedonism takes two forms according as the pleasure is individualistic or universalistic, egoistic or altruistic. Hence there are two subdivisions of the theory, which we may call Egoism and Altruism, or Individualism (ethical) and Socialism. Utilitarianism is often used to combine both of them. Egoism or Individualism asserts that all conduct must be judged as good or bad according to the consequences to the individual subject. Altruism or Socialism includes the pleasure or happiness of others and may require the sacrifice of some happiness on the part of individuals, perhaps the minority, to that of others, the majority.

Egoism. What is it? Egoism has been defined as "any ethical system in which the happiness or good of the individual is made the main criterion of moral action,"[1] or as "the doing or seeking of that which affords pleasure or advantage to one's self, in distinction to that which affords pleasure or advantage to others."[2] The term Egoism bristles with striking ambiguities.

It may denote (1) exclusive reference to self in conduct, or (2) reference to self while not conflicting with the happiness of others. The former conception would lead to the sacrifice of society or others to the individual; it means that selfishness is the criterion of morality. The second meaning is equally absurd. Egoism, the doctrine of principled selfishness, is not now taught as it was in former times. It is the natural product of materialism or of sensationalism for, according to these doctrines, all human desire arises in

[1] *Encyclopedia Britannica,* 11th edition.
[2] Century Dictionary.

view of pleasant feelings (of agreeable nervous commotions) and seeks a reproduction of them. It has been said that we have a pleasure in seeing others happy and then we seek the happiness of others, not on its own account, but in order to realize that pleasure. In opposition to this, Utilitarianism now holds that, in addition to desiring his own satisfaction, man has a disinterested desire that others should be gratified.

Crass Egoism. The most outstanding example of Crass Egoism is Aristippus, the Cyrenaic and errant disciple of Socrates, to whom reference has already been made. His system falls in holding that "corporeal pleasures are superior to mental ones," and that "a friend is desirable for the use which we can make of him."

Thomas Hobbes (1592–1654), the English philosopher, is the only modern hedonistic writer who dared to make private pleasure the sole end and criterion of conduct. The genius of modern democracy forbids it. Hobbes writes,[1] "Of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself." And again:[2] "No man giveth, but with intention of some good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good." He calls a contract a mutual transference of rights. When one gives in hope to gain thereby friendship, and the reputation of charity or magnanimity this is not contract, but gift, free gift, grace, which words mean the same thing.

Paley, the British clergyman, says: "We can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain

[1] *Leviathan,* Part I, XIV.
[2] *Ibid.,* XV.

or lose something by; for nothing else can be a 'violent motion' to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commandments of God." [1]

Equivocal Egoism. Any one who accepts such an egoistic doctrine must be considered as a self-seeker. Thomas Hill Green writes: "Anything conceived as good in such a way that the agent acts for the sake of it, must be conceived as his own good." [2] He maintains that the motive to action is always some idea of the man's personal good. He calls the human self or the man a self-seeking ego, a self-seeking subject, and a self-seeking person. While Hobbes gave no reference to the social nature of man, Green considers the social nature so essential that the individual cannot disentangle his own good from the good of his fellows. To live " for himself," since that self is a social self, means to live for others.

What Self Means. William James, in his chapter on the Consciousness of Self, writes of the Material Self, the Social Self, and the Spiritual Self. He makes the innermost part of the Material Self our body, and next to it our clothes, our family, our home, and our property. They contribute to our being what we are in our own eyes. He writes that " Our immediate family is a part of ourselves. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is

[1] *Moral Philosophy,* Book II, Chap. II.
[2] *Prolegomena to Ethics,* p. 92.

gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place." [1]

James describes the Social Self as the recognition a man gets from his mates. "We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind." Among men's interests are those of their fame and honor as well as of their home and country.

James meant by the Spiritual Self our qualities of mind and character—"the most enduring and intimate part of the Self, that which we most verily seem to be." He makes clear that he who speaks of the interest of the individual may have in mind any one or all of these aspects of Self, using the term Self broadly or narrowly. A deduction from this would be that all men are, in a sense, self-seeking, but only those reprehensively so who have narrow and scanty selves. Common sense and common usage of speech do not accept such statements.

"Woe betides that man," writes Dewey, "who having entered upon a course of reflection which leads to a clearer conception of his own moral capacities and weaknesses maintains that thought as a distinct mental end, and thereby makes his subsequent acts simply means to improving or perfecting his moral nature." [2] He rightly considers this one of the worst forms of selfishness.

Hobhouse says: "Of the doctrine of self-interest as the primary and only genuine motive, it is sufficient to say that it bears no relation to the facts of human

[1] *Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. X.
[2] *Ethics*, Chap. XVIII, p. 384.

nature, and implies an incorrect view of the origin of instinct." [1]

Forms of Egoism. The typical form is the egoistic Hedonist, as we have already seen—the one who sets his affections upon pleasure; Hobbes made his aim or end self-preservation; Spinoza takes much the same position; Nietzsche makes power that which is aimed at; others wealth, reputation, intellectual or moral attainment. James characterized a baby as "the completest egoist." The man who aims at the greatest amount of pleasure or whose motive to action is always some idea of his personal good is an egoist and is very likely to remain one.

Arguments for Egoism. Briefly, the arguments urged in favor of Egoism are:

(1) Egoism is inevitable; it contributes to the Egoist's own greatest happiness. Psychological Hedonism is the doctrine that "volition is always determined by pleasures or pains actual or prospective," and needs not be thus exaggerated.

(2) Egoism is urged upon us on the ground that it addresses itself to man as natural and reasonable. The Cyrenaics, Paley, Hobbes, and Bentham and Green never think of giving reasons why a man should seek his own good. Bishop Butler, who holds that virtue consists in the pursuit of right and good as such, yet maintains that: "When we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." [2]

(3) It is urged that he who serves his own interests at all intelligently has a comprehensive aim and does

[1] *Morals in Evolution*, p. 16.
[2] Sermon XI.

not live at random. Thus it is that ethicists of very different schools agree in recognizing that self-interest harmonizes and unifies the impulses and desires of the man, and that it is a principle second to none and that it has no rival.

The Arguments Against Egoism are:

(1) Men are actually influenced by motives which cannot be regarded as egoistic, as stated above.

(2) As to the naturalness of Egoism. Only the exceptional man maintains that he should have nothing else in view. The normal man realizes that both his own interests and the interests of one's neighbor are natural and seemingly legitimate objects of regard.

(3) Egoism stands condemned by the moral conviction of organized humanity, as expressed in custom, law, and public opinion. The common good as well as the individual's own particular good is urged upon the individual. Even the very existence of the family, the tribe, the state, is a protest against pure egoism. Neither in the dawn of human history nor in its latest chapters is man encouraged to live exclusively for himself. The enlightened social conscience would not sanction such attitude.

(4) That Egoism is rational deserves little consideration, as any comprehensive end will do the same, even though many such ends may be very trivial.

Altruistic Hedonism. This conception may denote action exclusively in reference to others, and with the sacrifice of self, or in reference to others without any sacrifice of self. The difficulty with these two theories is found in taking either of them in its exclusive sense. The only conception, therefore, which can seemingly satisfy the mind is that of universal Hedonism, which is to be expressed by the theory of Utilitarianism.

References for Further Reading on Different Standards

Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics,* pages 92, 95ff.
James: *Psychology,* Volume I, Chapter X.
Mackensie, J. S.: *Manual of Ethics.*
Martineau, James: *Types of Ethical Theory.*
Sidgwick: *History of Ethics.*
Sidgwick: *Methods of Ethics.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why is it important to deal with the various ethical theories concerning the aim of Christian Living?
2. Mention the different theories.
3. What name is often given to Happiness-ethics and why?
4. Tell of the early history of Hedonism.
5. Why is the Cyrenaic ideal one of despair to the Christian?
6. Who were the Atomists and what did they teach?
7. What contribution did Epicurus make to the doctrine?
8. What was the great maxim of the Epicurean life?
9. What is Horace's picture of this Epicurean ideal?
10. Discuss Aristotle's Eudæmonism.
11. What are the two forms of Hedonism mentioned in the lesson?
12. Define Egoism.
13. Distinguish between Crass Egoism and Equivocal Egoism.
14. Discuss James' conception of the Self.
15. Give the arguments for and against Egoism.
16. Explain Altruistic Hedonism.

Problems for Discussion

1. To what extent should the good opinion of others influence our conduct?
2. Test the following:—The entire education of the individual consists in learning to share with humanity the good things of life.
3. Moral good is something which we feel obligated to seek even when our momentary impulses pull us in a contrary direction. Is this so? If so, why?
4. Distinguish between the happiness of the right-minded man and the debauchee.
5. Why is it so often assumed that one must "give up" important pleasures in order to become a Christian?
6. Distinguish the pleasurable from the right.
7. How do the pleasure of self-approval and the pain of self-condemnation stand related to the ground of moral distinctions given by egoism and altruism?
8. Consider collectively the pleasures of scientific research, of truthfulness, of money-making, and of paying debts, and ascertain how far the moral character of the actions is determined by the quantity and quality of pleasure experienced.
9. Is there any good work done without sacrifice? Is there any good work which is wholly a sacrifice? Give examples.
10. Can we be selfish toward ourselves? Is it selfish to spend large sums of money in giving entertainments when people in our community are starving? If not, why not?

LESSON XVII

THE UTILITARIAN ASPECT OF THIS STANDARD

UTILITARIANISM is Hedonism in modern philosophy; it is Hedonism grown democratic; it is the modern form of the Happiness theory. It teaches that the end of human action is happiness and that the determinate of morality is the pleasure or pain which results from our actions. Happiness, however, need not be conceived as the happiness of any individual.

Definition. Jeremy Bentham, the father of Utilitarianism, taught that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the end by which the rightness of actions is determined. Later the theory was developed by J. S. Mill as a system of universal beneficence. At the present time Sidgwick, another advocate of Utilitarianism, defines it as "the ethical theory that the conduct which, under given circumstances is ethically right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole, that is, taking into account all whose interests are affected by the conduct." [1] Bentham's method is dogmatic and looks toward the application of ethics to legislative and social problems. Mill's method is deductive, being influenced by his psychology. The method of Sidgwick, though using postulates and axioms, is very dialectic, so that often amid his keen discussion of doctrines his own views are obscured.

[1] Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 411.

As Mill points out, "The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned; as between his own happiness and that of others, Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." [1] In his famous work "Utilitarianism," Mill states the essence of his creed in the following telling quotation: "It is the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, and holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." [2]

The Greeks had founded their pleasure theory on a quantitative basis. Modern Hedonism rejected this viewpoint, and Mill introduced the qualitative element into happiness; recognizing that the quality of pleasure may make it more valuable than another pleasure, although the quantity of the two might remain equal. Later Hedonists refused to accept this qualitative distinction, arguing rightly that it did away altogether with the whole concept of pleasure. Sidgwick takes this position, but tries to combine the pleasure criterion of conduct with a logical basis for ethics. His Utilitarianism is, therefore, a rationalistic hedonism as distinct from the psychological hedonism of his predecessors. He recognizes that morality is based upon rea-

[1] Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 24. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

son and that the moral judgment which we express in the categorical imperative is something more than a mere affective state.

Criticism of Hedonism. Hedonism teaches that goodness causes pleasure; evil causes us pain. From this fact, though quite illogically, the conclusion is drawn that we always do that which causes us the greatest amount of happiness. That the gratification of a desire may give us pleasure is true, and it is upon this simple fact that Hedonism bases all its exaggerations. Pleasure does influence and is operative in a great number of our acts, but that it is an exclusive principle and determinant of action is false both psychologically and ethically.[1]

Then again Hedonism is but the sensationalism of Locke translated into ethical terms. Its materialism is basic, and therefore quite unacceptable. The determinist and positivist tone which runs through all the modern constructions of Hedonism is very jarring to any one brought up on Christian principles.

The psychology of Hedonism is only superficially true. Hedonism explains desire in terms of an antecedent pleasure. Pleasure does not precede tendency, end, or good, but depends on *a priori* good or end. "To attempt to justify, on hedonistic principles, the performance of certain acts commonly called moral by their pleasantness, and then to explain their pleasantness by assuming that they are moral and thus sources of conscientious pleasure or means of avoiding conscientious pain, is to argue in a circle."[2]

The whole assumption of Hedonism that pleasure is

[1] For the elements of truth in Hedonism, consult Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* Vol. I, pp. 31–37.

[2] Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* Vol. I, p. 30.

the only source of our actions is false. Yet it is upon this false assumption that Hedonism has constructed the happiness theory. For practical purposes, moreover, the pleasure standard is useless as a sanction of morality.

Finally, no code of morality could exist if it were to receive its sole sanction from the principles of the happiness theory. Pleasure is subjective, and its value as a determinant of action depends upon each man's estimate of what is pleasant and what is painful. No objective standards are possible under such a theory and moral obligation or duty becomes a mere word in the hedonistic psychology. Neither Mill nor Sidgwick could accept it in its purely psychological form. Present-day moral philosophers are unanimous in saying that the construction of a code of morals upon hedonistic and egoistic principles is impossible. As a theory of value, Hedonism is no less false than as a theory of ethics. Happiness and good cannot be identified. Any theory of moral values which hopes to command our allegiance must strive both to be objective and to satisfy the practical needs of conscience. Hedonism does neither.

Argument for Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the theory which makes utility the criterion and end of conduct, while utility is to be measured in terms of pleasure. We here assume that the only utilitarianism that can stand any criticism at all must be that which tries to lay down rules for the good of the whole, and not for the good of the individual at the expense of others, nor for the good of the majority at the expense of the individual. The chief question is whether the hedonistic position, or the pursuit of pleasure can be an adequate determination of morality. Whether

the hedonistic end of conduct is the true one or not. Both sides of it are to be examined briefly.

(1) All men seek pleasure as a good. No matter what our theories concerning happiness are, it is so universally regarded that it would seem to be the one end to which all men subordinate everything else. Happiness and pleasure may be used interchangeably. The Utilitarian fails to distinguish between what he does and between what he ought to do. Rational men pursue wealth, or fame, or honor, not for their own sake, but for the happiness or contentment which they bring, either directly or indirectly. It is only the irrational man who will make wealth an end in itself. Wherever we turn we find all paths of human endeavor leading to the same goal, happiness, and the end does not seem to serve any remote purpose. Hence the utilitarian contends that it must be the highest good and standard of virtue, or of the quality of conduct.

(2) Utilitarianism advocates the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the welfare in general, of all concerned. Hence the general character of the specific measures he has advocated must meet with the approval of intelligent ethicists of very different schools.

(3) Utilitarians recognize moral life to be both egoistic and altruistic, though some would make altruism a development of egoism. In this teaching, the modern happiness ethics far excels the ancient, due chiefly to the enlightenment of the moral faculty under the influence of Christianity. The merit of Utilitarianism is that it insists upon the duty of doing good to man as man. It seeks to elevate that which is essential to man's deepest needs. It seeks happiness as the all-comprehending good and antagonizes misery as the all-

comprehending evil. It aims at the welfare of every sentient being, and therefore should be called "Bonitarianism," or some other name indicative of goodness.

(4) It makes its appeal to the social nature of man, and thus seems to furnish a basis for the exercise of benevolence and justice.

Arguments against Utilitarianism as an Ethical theory: (1) It is said that Utilitarianism sets aside the common and accepted rules of morality and substitutes for these a calculation of results in each particular instance. Doubtless some advocates of this doctrine underestimate the value of the practical moral reason of men, and so leave their statements open to criticism. But J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and other careful Utilitarians allow the authority of the dictates of the moral sense, and assert that the speculative reason does not set these aside, but only confirms and supplements them. Spencer says: "The business of moral science is to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kind of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kind tend to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimate of happiness or misery."

(2) Another argument against Utilitarianism is that it makes no distinction between the seeking of happiness or good for its own sake and the seeking of the right for its own sake. These things seeming to be different, this allegation has some strength. Utilitarians define happiness as the sum of the pleasures of which man is capable, and misery, which is the opposite

of happiness, as the sum of the pains. Concerning these conceptions Mill says: "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Actions, thus, are right or wrong according to their fitness to advance or to retard the happiness of those concerned, quite a different basis for distinguishing the right and the wrong from the desirable and the undesirable. Utilitarianism teaches that the right and the wrong do not differ from the desirable and the undesirable unless we should say that the right and the wrong are the desirable and the undesirable as viewed from a general and impersonal point of view. But the common judgment of mankind distinguishes moral rightness from, and raises it above, desirableness viewed from any point of view. It assigns to the right and to the wrong each a nature and place of its own.

(3) Utilitarianism does not distinguish sufficiently between action as naturally good and bad and as morally good and bad. Concerning most objects, "Good" indicates a fitness to promote comfort and happiness, as when we speak of a good house, a good farm, a good business, a good dog. But when used with reference to persons or personal actions, the words have a moral import, as when we speak of a good deed or a bad one, a good man or a bad one. In this sense, "good" and "bad" mean "right" and "wrong," or possibly "virtuous" and "vicious." Utilitarians scarcely recognize the difference between the kind which may be called natural (which is about the same as the desirable), and the kind which may be called moral (identical with the right). There are two kinds of badness—on the same basis.

(4) Utilitarianism gives an inadequate conception

of moral obligation. The criticism is that, instead of explaining, it really explains away the obligation or "oughtness" of the right. According to this conception, obligation is not an absolute or categorical imperative; it is only that felt liability to loss or evil which attends the misuse of the means of happiness. The constraint of duty is a sense of the pressing importance of that threatened loss or evil.

Bentham, in the opening discussion of his *Deontology,* rejects in toto moral obligation as an ethical idea. He says: "It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive. . . . The talisman of arrogance, indolence and ignorance is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture. . . . It is the word 'ought.' If the use of the word would be admissible at all, it ought to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." He denounces "oughtness" as expressing an imperative, thus rejecting that "categorical imperative" which Kant declares to be an immediate utterance of the reason. Later Bentham does use the word "ought" to indicate that rational demand which happiness and good make upon us to seek them for their own sake. He says, "Every pleasure is a prima facie good, and ought to be pursued; every pain is a prima facie evil, and ought to be avoided." And again, "If there is no ought there is no morality; therefore, no rights of man." With reference only to desirable success, we often say that a poem "ought" to be written, that a speech "ought" to be delivered, that a business "ought" to be conducted, in this or that manner. So Bentham holds that for the best interests of one's self and others, one "ought" to act in accordance with practical wisdom; to abolish moral

obligation as the categorical imperative and even moral principle by making it nothing more than a serious regard for the general welfare.

Deriving all moral relations from the effect of social forces, Bain obtains the idea of obligation from that of external authority and restricts it to "the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment." Bain considers conscience as "an imitation within ourselves of the government about us."

J. S. Mill, Bentham's distinguished disciple, makes the "internal sanction of duty,"—"its binding force"—to be "a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense, attendant on the violation of duty." He says: "The ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our mind." With him the pursuit of happiness comes to be regarded as dutiful, because a contemplation of the contrary conduct produces pain.

Charles Darwin in his *Descent of Man* gives us the weakest possible account of moral obligation. He says: "The imperious word 'ought' seems merely to imply the consciousness of a persistent instinct. . . . We hardly use the word in a metaphysical sense when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and retrievers to retrieve their game." What a very unpsychological discrimination! Careful scrutiny of one's sense of moral obligation convinces one that the authority of duty cannot be explained as the demand of an unreasoning instinct, or of a subjective feeling, or of an external influence, or even of the rational perception of good and happiness in general. It is the demand of good only when and so far as good may have the character of the right.

Sidgwick, who calls himself an Intuitional Utilitarian and who is the strongest exponent of those making

happiness the end of morality, says: " I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive as clearly and as certainly as I see any axiom in arithmetic or geometry that it is right and reasonable and the dictate of reason, and my duty, to treat every man as I should think I myself ought to be treated in precisely similar circumstances." He asserts, along with the teaching that the essential aim of the moral reason is the good or the " felicific," that right, duty and obligation are the objects of a rational intuition, and evidently distinguishes these from lower motive perceptions. This doctrine has considerable merit; at least, it does not explain away the idea of moral obligation.

(5) Another criticism of Utilitarianism is that this system neglects the internal and spiritual, and does not provide high ideals of duty. It is said that the greatest of all duties is the development of virtue and moral character, and that Utilitarianism, neglecting this, demands only the promotion of happiness or welfare. This accusation has some foundation in fact. The best thinkers of this school do recognize virtue as a good, and even as the highest good, the summum bonum. But subordinating this conception of even the highest good to their conception of happiness, which they define as the possible attainable sum of pleasures, they are forced to consider virtue as having value only as the greatest means of enjoyment. This is not very satisfying to the thoughtful student. He demands a doctrine by which the right may be truly differentiated from all other forms of good, and in which virtue or moral excellence shall be set forth as the preëminent aim of rational desire.

References for Further Study

Martineau, James: *Types of Ethical Theory.*
Mill: *Utilitarianism.*
Rashdall: *The Theory of Good and Evil.*
Sidgwick: *Methods of Ethics,* Book II, Chapter II, Par. 2, 4th edition.

Questions and Problems

1. Define Utilitarianism.
2. What difference is there between views of Bentham and Mill?
3. On what had the Greeks founded their theory of pleasure?
4. What is Sidgwick's position?
5. What are the chief criticisms of Hedonism?
6. State the arguments for Utilitarianism.
7. Give the five arguments against Utilitarianism.
8. Give Bentham's reasons for rejecting moral obligation as an ethical idea.
9. What is Bain's conception of moral obligation?
10. Interpret Charles Darwin's idea of moral obligation.
11. Is it, after all, the consensus of human opinion that pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil? Tell why, or why not.
12. Are some pleasures actually regarded as more desirable than others, solely through the application of the standard discussed in this lesson? Explain.
13. Can the pleasure of a malignant act properly be called *morally* good at all? Why not?
14. When we seek to give pleasure, are we doing nothing else than giving recognition to the desire and will of our neighbor? Has not the Greatest Happiness Principle dissolved into the doctrine of the Social Will? Comment on these questions.

15. Test the following: "The common dislike to utility, as the standard, resolves itself into a sentimental preference, amounting to the abnegation of reason in human life."

16. Granting ethical distinctions, how far can the agreeable in experience be shown to coincide with the right in action, and in what respects are they separated?

17. William James says: "Do every day or two something for no other reason than its difficulty." Is this a good rule? Does doing your duty always mean doing what you like?

18. What is the meaning of the words: "He that loseth his life shall find it"? Give an illustration.

19. Ought we to get rid of drudgery just as far as is possible? Does drudgery improve character?

20. What ought any one to consider when choosing his profession between different subjects which interest him?

21. Ought every one to spend a large proportion of his time in doing things for others? Ought women to do this more than men, and if so, why?

22. Since interest is the source of virtue, the choice of interests is central in moral life. What interests shall we choose?

23. Discuss: Men think of life as a race for money, fame, power. They do not think of it as an opportunity to grow, to serve, or to live in joyful fellowship with God and man.

24. Some one said modern young people have as their motto: "I don't know where I'm going, but I'm on my way." What should be the goal of one's education? of living itself?

LESSON XVIII

THE STANDARD AS PERFECTION

IT is our purpose now to turn our attention to a school of thinkers who deny that pleasure or happiness is the end of life and the standard of morality. They set up what they believe to be a different goal. It makes perfection, or rational completeness of being, the highest good of man; the supreme end of virtuous action. That course of conduct which seeks to secure it is virtuous, and virtuous because it seeks to secure it.

I. *Definition.* Perfectionism may thus be defined as the doctrine that excellence of spiritual character is the essential of morality; the doctrine that it is the whole duty of man to strive to attain to perfection. Of course that goal cannot mean for each man simply the developing to the utmost of all the capacities which he possesses. There are men rich in the possibilities of sloth, of indifference to future good, of egoism, even of malignant feeling. The average man does not furnish the pattern of perfection. The perfectionist does not regard the average man as the embodiment of his ideal. He seeks to improve him.

II. *Analysis. Socrates.* Anciently, this doctrine was held by Socrates and others. Socrates[1] opposed the hedonist teachings of the Sophists. He declared virtue to be the highest good. To him virtue is knowledge. For example, to be a successful general

[1] 469–399 B. C. See Xenophon's *Memorabilia,* trns. by Bohn's library, Plato's *Protagoras, Apology, Crito, Symposium,* Jowett's translation.

presupposes a knowledge of military affairs; a successful statesman, an insight into the nature and purpose of the state. What, then, is knowledge? To know means to have correct concepts of things, to know their purposes, aims, or ends, what they are good for. The man who knows what things are good for him will do those things, and he alone will be able to realize his desires, his welfare and happiness. Hence knowledge or wisdom, without which a man cannot attain to happiness, is the highest good. Virtue is the knowledge of good and evil. Hence no man is voluntarily bad nor involuntarily good. Vice is due to ignorance. In answer to the question, What is good for man? or useful to him? Socrates says: "The lawful." To be good or moral is to be in harmony with the laws of human nature and of one's country. Virtue must never be sacrificed to happiness.

Plato.[1] Plato, the pupil and follower of Socrates, also opposed the pleasure theory. He taught that insight, knowledge, the contemplation of beautiful ideas, a life of reason, are the highest good; that we should seek to free ourselves from the body and the senses, for the body is a handicap, the prison-house of the soul,—an evil. "Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can, and to fly away is to become like God."[2] The losing of one's self in the contemplation of ideas, which are the true essence of things, is the real meaning of the philosophy of life. The highest good must be something perfect, something desirable and complete in itself, the possession of which makes other things unnecessary. The

[1] 427–347 B. C. See *Dialogues of Plato,* especially *Theaetetus, Phaedo, Philebus, Gorgias, Republic.*

[2] *Theaetetus,* 176.

end is a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure. Neither of them as such is a good. The pleasure must be controlled by wisdom, which produces harmony, order, symmetry, law. The best life is one in which reason commands, and the lower soul-forces, the impulses and animal desires, obey.

The Cynics. Antisthenes, a devoted follower of Socrates and founder of the Cynic school, also opposed the hedonism then prevalent and strikingly exaggerated certain phases of Socratic teaching. He maintained that pleasure is not the highest good; indeed, it is no good at all, but an evil. He once said: "I would rather go mad than feel pleasure." [1] The good is privation, exertion, work, struggle with passion,—the very opposite of pleasure. To desire nothing is the greatest wealth. Virtue is the highest and only good. It is not necessary to be very learned to be virtuous. Virtue consists in action and conduces to happiness.

Aristotle.[2] All human activity has sole end in view. The highest good consists for some in wealth, for others in pleasure, honor, wisdom, or virtue. Each of these may be a good, but not *the* good. These are striven after for the sake of something else, which is sought after for its own sake. That end is eudæmonia or happiness. But the highest good of human existence is the exercise of reason. He finds the good of man in "well-being," and points out that this is something relative to man's nature. To Aristotle, the well-being of a man is, in large part, "well-doing," and well-doing he defines as "performing the proper functions of man." What every being is in its completed state, that certainly is the nature of that thing, whether

[1] *Diogenes Laertius,* p. 291.
[2] *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book I, chapter 4, p. 8.

it be a man, a house, or a horse. He conceives man's nature as that which it is in man to become. Man strives toward this end, and it is this which furnishes him with the law of his action. But this appeal to the nature of man helps us little unless we can agree upon a pattern of some sort, divergence from which may be called unnatural, and is to be reprobated.

Virtue is acquired, but based on preëxisting dispositions of the soul. It is the rationalization of impulses. An impulse is rationalized when it keeps the mean between two extremes, says Aristotle. Virtue is a disposition involving deliberate purpose, or choice, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it. Virtuous activity, then, in a complete or full life is the highest good. The pleasure depends upon the activity, and only such pleasure as follows virtuous activity is good or moral. Certain external goods, however, are indispensable to eudæmonia, namely, health, freedom, honor; certain capacities and talents, wealth, and so forth. Neither a slave nor a child can be happy.

The Stoics. The Stoics taught that the chief good of man was to live according to nature—his nature, that is, according to reason—"that universal right reason which pervades everything." We live according to nature or reason, when we live according to virtue. There are four fundamental passions: pain, fear, desire, pleasure. Virtuous action demands that man conquer these passions, for they are the irrational element in him. The wise man is not affected by any of these passions; indeed, he is without passion, apathetic. Virtue is, therefore, identical with apathy. The passionless sage is the Stoic ideal,—knowing what

to do and what to avoid. Virtue is the highest and only good; vice the only evil. Everything else is indifferent. The Stoic Ethics greatly influenced Roman thought and action, as evidenced by the teachings of such men as Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

The Neo-Platonists. These later Platonists taught that the universe is an emanation from God, the absolute spirit who transcends everything that can be conceived or said. All the way from intelligence to formless matter the emanations become more and more perfect. Man is the mirror of the universe, the microcosm, mind and matter, good and bad. The highest good is the pure intellectual existence of the soul, "in which the soul has no community with the body, and is wholly turned toward reason, and restored to the likeness of God." Plotinus, the chief representative of the school, seemed to be ashamed of having a body. The highest aim of man is to become one with God, to lose himself in the absolute. Primitive Christianity had much in common with these ascetic tendencies in Plato and his successors. For a long time Christianity was an ascetic religion and preached the crucifixion of the flesh, and that this world was a vale of tears, a grave, and heaven as the soul's true home. For the Christian conception of life, see Paulsen's *Ethics,* Book I, Chapter II.

Thus we have seen that, in ancient times, there existed various ideals of perfection and many modifications of the general theory. Some of them have reference to the individual himself, and others to some public reaching beyond himself. Hence we have *private* and *public* perfectionism. In the former, the perfection of the individual himself is regarded as the su-

preme end of virtuous action; in the latter, the perfection of more than the individual.

Private Perfectionism includes various subordinate views:

(1) *Perfection of Honor.* This view designates that idea of perfection which appeared so prominently in the darkness of the Middle Ages, as embodied in Chivalry. Its law was the law of honor. It stimulated man to seek his supreme good in perfecting his active physical courage, his truth, generosity, and courtesy.

(2) *Perfection of Culture.* This is the view of those who style themselves the "advanced thinkers" of the present age. The culturists recommend culture —chiefly intellectual—"the one panecea for the ills of humanity"—as the supreme end of virtuous action advocated by Huxley, Matthew Arnold, and Herbert Spencer.

(3) *Perfection of the Spiritual Being.* This is the view which makes the perfection of man's own spiritual being the supreme end of virtuous action. Whatever action aims at, this is virtuous, and virtuous because it aims at this. No action with any other aim can be virtuous.

Public Perfectionism may place the supreme end in the perfection of honor, of culture, or of spiritual being. Under the latter may be found the Christian form of the disinterested benevolence scheme. This scheme subordinates the happiness or advantage of mankind, and of being in general, to their perfection, and also the perfection of the individual to the general perfection of mankind, or of the universe.

During the early days of modern philosophy, Perfectionism was advocated by Leibnitz and by his dis-

ciple Christian Wolff. Through the latter's writings, it became widely current during the first half of the eighteenth century. Following that, it suffered a decline for about one hundred years, being vigorously antagonized by the teachings of Kant, Bentham, and others. It again became prevalent during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It is especially attractive to two classes of thinkers: Those who cannot accept pleasure or happiness as the end of duty; and those who are dissatisfied with dogmatic statements concerning the right, and the obligatory.

In his *History of Morals,* Paul Janet says: "According to my view moral obligation is based upon the following principles: Every being owes it to himself that he should attain to the highest degree of excellence and of perfection of which his nature is capable." J. S. Mackensie, in his *Manual of Ethics,* says about the same thing: "We see, in fact, that the end must consist in some form of self-realization, that is, in some form of the development of character; that the end, in short, ought to be described rather as perfection than as happiness." This was his conclusion after having discussed "the standard as law" and then "the standard as happiness." Hickok, in his *System of Moral Science,* teaches the same doctrine: "We may call this (the objective Rule of Right) the imperative of reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within; but by whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellence. "The motive to this is not any gratification of a want, not any satisfying of a craving, and thus to be done for a price in happiness; it is solely that one may be just

what the excellency of his own spirit demands that he should be. . . . The highest good, the summum bonum, is worthiness of spiritual approbation. That this is ultimate intuitively appears in many ways."

These views of Janet, Mackensie, and Hickok are closely connected with the Hegelian teaching of the immanence of God in all men. They represent all duty as calling for the recognition and development of the indwelling of the Divine nature. T. H. Green, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* and F. H. Bradley, in *Ethical Studies,* two distinguished Hegelians, also advocate this principle.

A composite doctrine is advocated by B. T. Bowne in his chapter on Subjective Ethics. He claims that the objective rule of conduct requires the good-will (that is, goodness), and is insufficient without another drawn from within. He says: "The impossibility of solving by general notions about the good, pleasure and happiness, has abundantly appeared. When we make any of these basal, we at once find ourselves compelled to appeal to some ideal conception or inner law, which shall interpret to us the permissible meaning to our terms. . . . If, then, we are told that the law of love is the only basal moral law, we assent to this extent: the law of love is the only . . . social law for human beings, but it presupposes a law for the human being himself which determines the form of its application. A complete law of duty for us must include both a human ideal and also a law of social interaction. There is, then, in human morality, even supposing it perfect, a double element. One is a universal factor which we must view as valid for all moral beings whatever; the other is related to humanity and has reference to human perfection."

Bowne teaches that the rule of perfection given by the human reason is not an infallible guide, but is subject to variation and growth, and is derived from a study of human nature. He says: "Our morality involves not merely the law of love, but also an ideal of humanity. If we desire to make either primary, the ideal is basal, and the law of love is the implication. In morals, being is deeper than doing."

While H. Spencer is not a true perfectionist, he does teach a kind of perfectionism. He says: "The moral law, properly so-called, is the law of the perfect man—is the formula of ideal conduct." Spencer's definition of life "as the continuous adjustment of internal relations," or as the self-adaptation of an organism to its environment, is closely related to the formula of ideal conduct. To the best of his ability, every man should conform to his ideal of man, namely, "An ideal man as existing in the social state." Other evolutionists, such as Alexander, in *Moral Order and Progress,* and Leslie Stephens, in his *Science of Ethics,* explain moral ideals as relating not to an ideal state, but to the existing condition of things. With them the ideal plan is that according to which "society, in the conditions in which it is placed, can, with the ideal, so live that no part of it shall encroach upon the rest." A changing social state may make necessary a change in the ideal.

Summarizing the thought of perfection proper, we find that the perfection aimed at is subjective; the ideal is that of the perfect man or being; conduct is right or wrong only as it is in accord with or opposed to this inward excellence; that what renders a desire virtuous or dutiful is that it seeks perfection and excellence of character and that conduct is desired as right only as

connected with and consequent upon the effort after spiritual perfection.

The Perfection authorities quoted make internal excellence the primary aim. They "base duty upon the dignity of the moral personality and upon the worth of man regarded as an end unto himself," while Mill, Spencer, and their associates would make the perfect man consequent upon that of perfect conduct. Perfectionism thus shuts out Utilitarian hedonism by proposing excellence of being as the proper object of moral volition. This excellence means the perfection of every function of man's nature which is necessary to an orderly and ideal world, and thus describes an objective end, while utilitarianism seems rational and plausible only when the end is subjective, since we found objective happiness as an end to be absurd. But Perfectionists propose excellence which may be either subjective or objective or both, and thus present a high moral ideal worthy of attainment.

Merits of Perfectionism. (1) Personal perfection is one of the highest moral ends—purity of value and a worth which may be more than individual and personal interest. No one can object to perfection as an unworthy end to pursue as can be asserted against pleasure without qualification. It stands as an unquestioned ideal, ultimate, and not a mere means to some other end. Those who advocate spiritual development as the end of rational existence remind us that being as well as doing is obligatory upon us and that being is the more vital obligation. Their teachings agree with that Scriptural injunction: "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," and with that command of God: "Be ye perfect, for I, the Lord your God, am perfect."

(2) Another merit of Perfectionism is that it does not prescribe for us and expect from us an impossibility. No man can attain Divine perfection. The human mind can neither form an absolutely faultless spiritual ideal nor fully comprehend it should it be presented. While perfectionists speak of "an absolute ideal type," they add "perhaps such a type can never be perfectly understood by humanity." Hence Janet and others prefer to use the term excellence,—meaning that the end proposed is that of the highest excellence conceivable by man. However, the standard must be the nearest approach to perfection within our power.

(3) Perfectionism teaches that moral rightness belongs to external conduct not as being excellent in itself but only as the expression of spiritual excellence. Hence Janet says: "The idea of Perfection involves not only the idea of activity, but also that of order, of harmony, of regular and proportionate relations." He means by this statement that it shows itself in an orderly, harmonious and well proportioned activity. In the following statement, he emphasizes the fact that perfectionism is an inward state set forth as the essential end: "Each one of us according to his circumstances, and according to the different conditions in which he is placed, is under obligation to raise himself to the highest possible degree of perfection and to be a saint or a hero according as the nature of things may require." Accomplishment apart from personality is meritless, yet being reaches its perfection only in activity. In a similar vein Mackensie says we must endeavor "to understand completely the world in which we live and our relations to it and to act con-

stantly in the light of that understanding. . . . So to live is to be truly ourselves."

(4) Another merit of Perfectionism is that it teaches an inward excellence which shows itself in outward disposals and doings. For instance, when a man is a good neighbor, he not only does those things which an honest friendship suggests, but also has a heart in which faithful kindness dwells. "He who is virtuous is not only rightly related to others but is also rightly disposed within."

(5) Perfectionism as an ultimate end is not necessarily simple and indefinable. Hickok holds that this ultimate or explanatory end of moral life is simple. He says: "In all possible cases of obligation the ultimate right rests in the excellency of rational spirit itself. . . . With this precise intuition of the ultimate right, it is important that we apprehend some of the attributes which it possesses. First, it is simple. By this is meant that it is uncompounded and thus incapable of any analysis." Then he adds that it is immutable and universal. Janet uses the following vague language: "While I admit that perfection, like every other primitive idea, is very difficult to define, it may be explained and analyzed in such a way as to remove some of the indefiniteness which it has at first." He then describes perfection as composed of two elements: "(1) an activity whose excellence is in proportion to its intensity; (2) the harmony, or agreement, of the elements or parts of which the being is composed."

Mackensie is somewhat simpler in his definition of perfection, but holds the same view. He calls it self-realization,—the self to be realized is the "rational or higher self." Bowne also speaks of the need as self-realization. He says: "If the moral ideal were clearly

defined or sharply conceived, the ethical problem would be a simple one; and it is conceivable that there should be moral beings for whom this should be the case. . . . Unfortunately this is not the case with men. . . . The ideal exists in any given circumstances chiefly in a perception of the direction in which human worth and dignity lie. . . . For the authority of this ideal there is no warrant but the soul itself." While these definitions are rather complex, yet absolute simplicity is not necessary to an ultimate end, though it is to an ultimate idea.

(6) Perfectionism is not a selfish doctrine—neither egoistic nor altruistic. Bearing on this point, Aristotle raises the following question: "If a man should seek only to acquire justice, wisdom or some other virtue . . . it would be impossible to call him an egoist and to blame him. Nevertheless, is he not, in a certain sense, more egotistical than other men, since he desires for himself the best and most beautiful things, and since he enjoys the most exalted part of his being? . . . But this noble egotism is as far superior to common egoism as reason is to passion, or as the good is to the merely useful." In the same spirit, Janet says: "If we understand by happiness, not pleasure in general, but, like Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz, regard it as the feeling of our own perfection and excellence, it is clear that it may be an end for us. For why should it not be an end to seek our own perfection? And how, if we have attained it, could we help enjoying it?" While these statements seemed tinged with the idea that virtue consists in seeking our own excellence for the sake of our own happiness, yet that is not a just inference, especially not as it pertains to Janet. His theory is that moral excellence and true

happiness are indissolubly united, are two inseparable developments of the one virtuous life. To him a good man seeks justice, wisdom, temperance, charity and all other forms of moral perfection, simply for their own sake, for their own excellence, and that then, after that, finding true happiness to arise from these virtues, he may properly desire them on that account.

The Weakness of Perfectionism as a Standard.

(1) Its fundamental assertion is inconsistent with fact, and even contains within itself an element of self-contradiction. What is the end sought for in all dutiful desire? is the question. The Perfectionists say that the end is excellence of being or of character. Opponents of the theory maintain that there are aims or ends, such as benevolence and beneficence, honesty, veracity, fidelity and justice; that these should be cultivated as excellencies of character. But do not they themselves have right ends of their own, such as helping the needy wisely, paying one's debts, speaking the truth, and giving to every man his due, each of which may be exercised without any thought of one's spiritual improvement.

(2) Virtue implies the existence of other and more primary ends, because the promotion of virtue is conditioned on the direct operation of specific virtues, and because the promoter of virtue immediately seeks not primary ends but only those dispositions which immediately seek them. There are other forms of material wealth than money. The making of money is sometimes identified with the acquisition of wealth. There are other and more directly enjoyable valuables than money. In a somewhat similar manner, moral excellence is not the only right end, it is claimed.

(3) Then again it is argued that Perfectionism does

not identify perfection with virtue; that it can give no satisfactory definition of perfection. Hickok's definition as worthiness of spiritual approbation is considered the best, because nothing but moral excellence has spiritual worthiness. He forbids the following conception of freedom,—that it is the nature of the perfect man to desire and to do those things that are right and good. He says: "In all possible cases, obligation vests in the excellency of the rational spirit itself."

(4) Another weakness consists in the identifying of the sense of right and duty with the sense of moral worth and dignity. Janet says: "The Scotch philosopher, Hutcheson, who maintained the doctrine of the moral sense recognized also another sense which he called the sense of dignity, and which he distinguished from the former. It is this sense according to him by which we recognize the decency or dignity of actions. In my view the moral sense is identical with the sense of dignity." If this be true, then the sense of dignity or worthiness is not the same as the sense of the morally right; it is rather a kind of adjunct to that which is commonly known as the moral sense.

We may further ask whether such an appeal: (1) can prescribe to the individual in what measure his various capacities should be realized; (2) can show that it is reasonable to awaken dormant capacities, and thus multiply desires; and (3) can justify social acts which certainly appear to be self-sacrificing, and which the moral judgments of men generally do not hesitate to approve.

Summarizing, it may be said that spiritual perfection is a moral end, but not the ultimate moral end because any satisfactory definition of it presupposes

other moral ends on which it is conditioned. Yet that comprehensive virtue is the supreme good of rational existence. For, as Descartes says: "The supreme good consists in the exercise of virtue, or, what is equivalent to the same thing, in the possession of all the perfections whose acquisition depends on our free-will. Honesty, veracity, beneficence, charity, justice, temperance, industry, prudence, purity, loyalty, reverence, piety, are all moral perfections, each of which has for its immediate and proper aim the realization of some form of right and duty." Thus virtue becomes in general that disposition which seeks and loves every form of the right and good. This, however, presupposes right ends as the conditions of virtue which thereafter becomes the supreme right end. This may be conceded. But spiritual perfection is not the essential and universal end of morality.

References for Further Study

Alexander: *Moral Order and Progress.*
Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics.*
Bowne: *Ethics.*
Bradley: *Ethical Studies.*
Fite: *An Introductory Study of Ethics,* Chapter 12.
Janet: *History of Morals.*
Mackensie: *Manual of Ethics.*
Paulsen: *Ethics.*
Plato: *Dialogues,* Jowett's trans.
Stephens: *Science of Ethics.*

Questions and Problems

1. Give various definitions of Perfectionism.
2. What is the viewpoint of Socrates? of Plato? of the Cynics?

3. What is the Aristotelian Conception?
4. What did the Stoics teach as the chief good of man? Evaluate it.
5. Distinguish between Private and Public Perfectionism.
6. What did each form include?
7. Give the views advocated on this subject by Leibnitz and Christian Wolff.
8. Upon what principle did Janet base his view of moral obligation? Criticize the view.
9. What is Hickok's view?
10. Give your estimate of Bowne's view.
11. What does Herbert Spencer teach on this subject?
12. State the Merits of Perfectionism.
13. Prove that Perfectionism is not a selfish doctrine.
14. What are the weaknesses of Perfectionism as a standard?
15. Is the true self the rational self? Give reasons for your answer.
16. In what sense is the moral life a growth or development? Explain.
17. Ruskin says: "What we think or what we know or what we believe is of little consequence, the only thing of consequence is what we do." Is this true or false, and why?
18. Interpret Shakespeare's lines:

"This, above all, to thine own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

Why is this so?

19. Critically examine: The self-realizationist realizes that man's nature is in the making, and he is not blind to the difficulty of the task of determining just what the real demands of human nature are.

20. Is it reasonable to awaken dormant capacities and thus multiply desires?

21. To men generally it appears that Peter's love to Paul is not identical with Peter's love to Peter; and that Peter may act in such a way that, on the whole, he loses, while Paul gains. Explain.

22. When we speak of a thing as more or less perfect, what do we commonly mean?

23. In what sense does man's true good include the good of others?

24. Explain: A selfish act is partial, private-spirited and prejudiced, while an unselfish act is impartial, public-spirited, and open-minded.

25. If I love my father more than myself, is it selfish or unselfish on my part to give up my pleasure to his?

LESSON XIX

THE STANDARD AS MOTIVITY

THE word " motivity " is used to avoid an ambiguity in the term motive, and hence to designate the desire, or motive feeling, or inward principle of action, alone. Every earnest student of philosophical questions finds something of value in every ethical theory. A constructive attitude is more commendable and more profitable than a destructive one. A controversial spirit whose sole effort is to discover defects and inconsistencies makes a very small contribution to philosophical progress.

Both perfection and motivity ethics are subjective systems, because both direct moral effort toward something in the agent himself, while utilitarianism and the systems which make either obedience to authority or devotion to right and duty the essence of morality, might be called objective since part of their aim, at least, is outside of the subject, or moral agent. In a way Perfection ethics is more subjective than motivity ethics, inasmuch as stated in a previous lesson, it asserts that the end is the realization of a character which is to find expression in active duty, while motivity ethics asserts that the end is the regulated exercise of the desires, and that the office of conscience or the moral reason is to provide that regulation. Motivity ethics also regards our internal dispositions not simply as perfections to be cherished on their own account, but as activities seeking ends external to the agent. Hopkins says: " Man was not made to find out the ulti-

mate ground of his action in any subjective state of his own of whatever kind. He was made to promote the good of others as well as his own; and the apprehension of that good furnishes an immediate ground of obligation to promote it." Hopkins' system is subjective. He makes the immediate end of all duty to be the subjection of one's affections and desires to the control of "rational love."

Analysis. Motivity ethics is of two forms: The first of these is conscience, the leading exponent being Bishop Butler. The second prominent and formative element of moral life is Love, brought into prominence by Jonathan Edwards, the distinguished New England preacher. In certain sermons and essays, Butler, the author of *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature,* asserts the legal supremacy of conscience over all our other motive principles. In his day, a low Epicurean morality prevailed; man was considered an essentially selfish being. Butler taught that man has "an inward frame . . . a system or constitution, whose several parts are united, not by a physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have to each other, the chief of which is the subjection which the appetites, passions, and particular affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience." By this principle every man "distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions. This principle, by which we survey and either approve or disapprove our own heart temper and actions, is not only to be considered as what is, in its turn, to have some influence (which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites) but likewise as being superior, as, from its very nature,

manifestly claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it has right—had it power as it has manifest authority—it would absolutely govern the world" (Sermon II). Thus Butler propounds dogmatically or intuitionally the supremacy of conscience over all passions and affections, as the first of morality.

More recently James Martineau in *Types of Ethical Theory* carefully developed the doctrine of a subjectively directed moral aim, basing it upon several characteristic premises.

First, he says: "As men, we have an irresistible tendency to approve and disapprove, to pass judgment of right and wrong. What we judge is always the inner spring of action as distinguished from its outer operation. . . . That in which we discern the moral quality is the inner spring of action." And, at the close of his explanations, he sums up as follows: "This completes what I have to say about the objects of our moral judgment. They are originally our own inner principles of self-conscious activity as freely preferred or excluded by our will." Martineau rejects the opinion of Sidgwick that "both in the individual and in the race, moral judgments are first passed on the outward acts, and that motives do not come to be considered till later; just as external perceptions of physical objects precede introspection." Whewell, in contrast with Martineau's doctrine, says: "Rightness and wrongness are the moral qualities of actions."

Second, Martineau taught that reason obtains the law of moral conduct by intuitively apprehending the relative worth of "the springs of action." "Immediately on the juxtaposition of impulses," he says, "we intuitively discern the higher quality of one than another, giving it a Divine and authoritative preference. . . . We are now prepared for an exact definition of right and wrong: every action is RIGHT *which in presence of a lower principle follows a higher; every action is* WRONG *which in the presence of a higher principle follows a lower.*" Thus the act of Peter in denying Christ was *wrong,* because the fear to which he yielded was lower than the personal affection and reverence for truth which he disobeyed.

Third, Martineau tabulates principles of action according to the order of their excellence, and claims that our moral judgments naturally support such an arrangement. He declares: "The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this: that we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles, quite distinct from the order of their intensity and irrespective of the range of their external effects." The following is his table of springs of action, from the lowest to the highest: (1) Censoriousness, vindictiveness, suspiciousness; (2) Love of ease and sensual pleasure; (3) Appetites; (4) Spontaneous (animal) activity; (5) Love of gain; (6) Sentimentally sympathetic feelings; (7) Antipathy, fear, resentment; (8) Love of liberty; Love of power, or ambition; (9) Love of culture; (10) Wonder and admiration; (11) Parental and social affections; generosity; gratitude; (12) Compassion; (13) Reverence.

Fourth, Martineau also holds that moral judgment and action cannot take place till at least two springs of

action compete with each other. For then only the conscience can decide that one principle is superior to another. Moral rightness lies in that superiority as appealing to the rational agent; moral wrongness in the opposition of the lower to the higher principle. Two terms must always be present as the objects of comparison. Their moral valuation results from their simultaneous appearance.

Fifth, The function of reason, or conscience, as understood by Martineau, is partly presented in his assertion, "I do not admit reason to be a spring of action at all." To understand this denial, however, we must consider the following explanation: "By springs of action (in the exact sense as required for theory) I mean an impulse toward any unselected form of activity, that is, any which might instinctively arise though there were no other possible to the same nature, or, at all events, present at the same time." So conscience or the moral reason, according to Martineau, is not an original spring of action, although it urges the person to choose the better motivity and its end. The actual doctrine of Martineau is that conscience is not an independent, but only a preferential, spring of action. The choice of one mode of activity in preference to another is determined by the personality, or the will. The springs of action occupy places in front of the will, as it were, each with its own solicitation or insistence; reason stands behind the will, and gives counsel; but the determination to one course or to another comes from the "personality." Martineau says: "Moral judgment postulates moral freedom. . . . Either free-will is a fact or moral judgment is a delusion." Such a teaching regarding freedom is not peculiar to motivity ethics; indeed the

doctrine of the voluntary self-determination, or free-agency, of rational beings belongs to all ethics. But the limitation of the function of reason to that of a judge between contending motivities is a distinctive characteristic of the system now considered.

Sixth, The motivity school also identifies the rightness of an action with its moral worth or dignity. On this point Martineau says: "In treating as ultimate and essential the attribute which these words designate —dutifulness, rightness, morality—I support myself on the judgment of Professor Sidgwick, who regards it 'as a clear result of reflection that the notions of right and wrong, as peculiar to moral cognition, are unique and unanalyzable';" then he adds: "Of the several words available for naming this quality, MORAL WORTH seems the most eligible." No distinction is made in Martineau's writings between a right action and a virtuous one, or between a wrong action and one that is wicked and blameworthy. According to him an action is right or wrong, worthy or unworthy, as proceeding from a virtuous or from a vicious animus in the personal agent.

Love is the all-controlling duty in the second phase of motivity ethics. As already stated, Jonathan Edwards brought it into prominence. His *Treatise on the Nature of Virtue* teaches that the essence of virtue and duty consists in the love of Being according to the degree of its capacity and worthiness of good. This love, however, is more than sentimental goodwill or affection; it is wisely exercised desire for the happiness of sentient existences. It also includes desire for one's own happiness as well as for that of others. He says: "A man may love himself as much as one can, and may be in the exercise of a high de-

gree of love to his own happiness, ceaselessly longing for it, and yet he may so place that happiness that, in the very act of seeking for it, he may be in the highest exercise of love to God; as, for example, when the happiness that he longs for is to glorify God or to behold His glory or to hold communion with Him." Edwards also teaches that, because God is the greatest and best of spirits, "the Divine virtue, or the virtue of the Divine mind, must consist principally of love to Himself." This self-love of God is consistent with an infinite love for His creatures, and with an especial love for those who, like Himself, are rational and righteous. Only hopeless and perverse depravity forfeits the Divine good-will.

The ideas of Edwards have widely influenced New England thought. Mark Hopkins afterward developed them. In his treatise, *The Law of Love and Love as a Law,* Hopkins says: "The law of love and of obligation or duty are coincident. The reason is that love is that which the law requires and with which, if love be perfect, it is satisfied." The first part of the book presents a theory of morals as "the law of love"; the second part, "love as a law," discusses the rules of morality under love as the universal principle. Love is the principle by which all motive life is to be regulated. Of course, we are to obey reason and duty, but reason affirms that the fundamental and all-pervading duty is to conform ourselves to the law of love. The only moral quality of actions comes from the animus in which they originate and is identical with the righteousness or unrighteousness of the agent.

These two thinkers, Hopkins and Martineau, are evidently advocates of motivity ethics. Hopkins allows that duty may take the form of obligation to

choose the higher *good* instead of the form of obligation to choose the higher principle of action, with more decision than Martineau. In the closing part of his discussion, in a chapter on "Alternatives and Law" Hopkins gives a table of active principles like that of Martineau and places all duty in choosing between such principles. The only important difference between these authors relates to the law according to which reason seeks to regulate the action of our motivities. Martineau derives it from an immediate intuition of their relative worth as compared with each other; Hopkins from an intuition of their worthiness as related to love, the supreme principle. This love is that mentioned by Edwards, and is more intellectually comprehensive than intelligent affection, or even than ordinary benevolence. It is "the choice of the good of conscious being impartially and for its own sake." As such it "includes self-love as well as love to others." The argument is this: wise love calls upon each motivity to operate only in the service of "the good of conscious being"; thus it becomes the supreme law of morals.

Martineau gives reverence the same position that Hopkins gives to love. He defines reverence as "the love of right or of virtue," highly developed; and he places it at "the very apex of human motives." At first the action of the reason, in deciding between two motivities, is "judicial, not dynamic, not executive; to find the motive (*i. e.*, the motivity) you must go to the impulses on which the conscience pronounces; to find the determining agent you must go to the subsequent will." Martineau says: "Reverence is nothing but the supreme form of the love of right."

III. *Evaluation of Motivity Ethics.* As a result of comparing motivity ethics with perfectionism, we

are led to conclude (1) that the statements of the former concerning the moral end are more intelligible and more in accord with ordinary thought and speech; (2) that such language indicates how practical duty may lose its place in a theory of morals. Frequently we are told not to act honestly, but to be honest; not to speak the truth, but to be truthful; not to obey, but to be obedient; not to do right and seek the welfare of others, but to be virtuous and good. Then again, self-regulation is a most comprehensive requirement of the moral law, and that this regulation is often effected by making goodness, often by making righteousness, supreme over other motive tendencies.

Motivity ethics also calls attention to the importance of the inner life and to the duty of caring for that life, and also furnishes a basis not only for self-culture but also for the general direction of conduct. The advocates of this theory seem to show much moral insight; they develop views of a pure and lofty excellence. They also give wise instructions concerning every phase of human living.

Some Weaknesses of Motivity Ethics. (1) This system, as a philosophy, fails to give a sufficiently objective conception of duty. Hopkins insists that whatever is right and good to seek is so sought because it either is, or causes, or conditions, some form of sentient experience. This teaching has been accepted as describing correctly every end of motivity, whether moral or unmoral. All the activities which aim at such things as the doing of good, the telling of truth, the payment of debts, the instruction of the ignorant, the relief of the suffering, the strengthening of the weak, have their moral character because the things aimed at are in themselves right and

obligatory. Hence the regulation of motivity is not the only, nor even the primary, end of morality.

(2) A second objection to motivity ethics is that it does not recognize the moral reason as an original spring of action. The end aimed at by the moral nature cannot be identified with any specific end nor with all specific ends collectively; it has a nature and constitution of its own. So the idea of right, formed by the moral reason, is distinct and *sui generis*. If this be so, conscience, in seeking the right, primarily pursues its own ends and not those of other motivities. But the motivity school says that the idea of rightness offers no object of rational pursuit—that it is "empty of Content," because rightness is nothing but conformity to a rule, and because conformity to a rule can give no direction unless we can know what that is which the rule requires. But moral rightness is not mere conformity to a rule; it is that quality in an action or end on which conformity to the rule depends. It is an excellence inhering in the action or end. Conformity to rule is only a property of rightness and not the essence. Hence reason seeks right things directly and simply because they are right.

(3) Another shortcoming of motivity ethics is its inadequate account of the function of reason in her attempt to regulate our other motivities. We are told that, just as soon as two impulses come into conflict with each other, they are intuitively distinguished as "higher and lower," or as more or less "worthy," and that then conscience affirms, "follow the one; disregard the other." But the judgment of reason must govern in the inner as well as in the outer life. This is the rule followed in the actual experience of good men; and it works as follows: (1) reason favors those

exercises of motivity which harmonize and coöperate with her own conception and pursuit of right ends and actions; and she condemns those by which these are antagonized; (2) reason finds given exercises of natural feeling to be things right and good in themselves —simply as matters of immediate internal experience —and so dutifully cultivates them on their own account, each in its proper sphere.

(4) This standard of ethics shows both confusion and error concerning the nature of moral rightness. Rational conduct has two modes of morality, one of which in thought conditions the other, yet which are so related that the one can exist without the other. A man may do a right action as such—that is, intentionally, and knowing it to be right—but if he does not do it for its own sake it is not virtuous; it may even be vicious. And, though one cannot virtuously do a wrong action intentionally—knowing it to be wrong—he may do it virtuously with an erroneous intelligence, supposing it to be right; in which case the action is wrong, not as intended, but only as *intentionable,* that is, as it must appear if fully understood. This distinction which opposes the right and the wrong on the one hand to the virtuous and the vicious on the other, has eluded the motivity ethicists. They identify the rightness of an action with its virtuousness or its merit, and the wrongness of an action with its wickedness or its demerit. The consequent result is that they are compelled to say that rightness attaches only to "the inner spring of action." This school fails to note that a proposed action or end may be related to a person in two ways: (1) as suitable or unsuitable for his adoption and pursuit; and (2) as desideratively accepted and attempted by him. Rightness

belongs to the first of these relations; virtuousness, or righteousness, to the other.

We conclude then, that motivity ethics gives high instruction, but is theoretically unsatisfactory, because (1) it does not perceive that outward actions and aims are in themselves right and obligatory upon us; (2) it denies that reason, as motive, pursues ends originally its own; (3) it gives no usable law or rule for the regulation of the inner life; and (4) it confounds the rightness of actions and ends with the virtuousness, or worthiness, which belongs to the animus with which duty is performed or to the person as loving and doing what is right. See Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics,* Book III, Chapter XII, for additional criticism of the motivity school.

Questions and Problems

1. What is meant by motivity ethics?
2. In what sense may motivity and perfection ethics be classed together, and why?
3. What are the two forms of motivity ethics?
4. Tell all you can of Bishop Butler and his views.
5. What did James Martineau teach concerning conscience?
6. State his table of principles of action.
7. Tell of Jonathan Edwards and of his conception of love as the all-controlling duty.
8. What was Mark Hopkins' "pet" theory?
9. Mention the strong points in motivity ethics.
10. State the leading objections to motivity ethics.
11. Hopkins says: "Obligation is primarily obligation to choose, and choice must always be between

two objects regarded as good, or between two principles of action regarded as productive of a good." Is this true? If so, why?

12. Distinguish between the rightness of an action and the approbation of the action.

13. Can the moral quality of an action be distinguished from obligation to do it or not to do it?

14. Distinguish between the rightness of an action and the merit of an agent.

15. Interpret: Every moral agent has reason to set large account on a true mastery over himself, for its value is unspeakably beyond all possible pecuniary gain.

16. Critically examine: As each man's reason may err, and thus lead him to false opinions, so each man's conscience may err, and lead him to false moral standards.

17. In what sense is obligation common to all moral creatures, and in what sense is it different?

18. Distinguish between the knowledge of the fact of obligation, and the scientific explanation of this knowledge.

19. How far is a performance of duty compatible with uncertainty as to which of two lines of action is the preferable?

20. Name all the motives you can think of which lead people to falsehood in speech and in action.

21. Do you agree with Stevenson that it is hard to speak the truth? Why, or why not?

22. Do the occasions in which we are tempted to deceive diminish or increase as we gain in character and in experience? Why?

23. To be virtuous is to be open-minded, considerate and resolute in the choice and execution of that purpose for which you believe yourself to be most fitted. Explain.

LESSON XX

THE STANDARD AS AUTHORITY

THIS theory of ethics relates primarily to the obligatoriness of the right. Each of the other theories is more concerned with the nature of that which is obligatory, whether it be the pursuit of happiness, or the realization of self, or the regulation of one's motivities, or simply the right as undefined and as dogmatically conceived and asserted.

The question now asked is, "Does authority ethics have a conception of the right peculiar to itself, or does it simply attach its own explanation of obligation now to this and now to that conception borrowed from one of the other theories?" Of these alternatives, the second seems to state the truth.

In this lesson we are to think of ethics as the science of duty, or of what ought to be done. The literal meaning of the word signifies that which is owed or due; it applies to desire and conduct as obligated. When the law is conceived of as demanding from us conduct corresponding to its own contents this conception appears. But when this conduct is conceived as ideals to be realized, that is, as the contents of the law, the term duty may signify that form of conduct which *obligates,* or is *obligatory.* A double use attaches to the verb "*ought.*" "The truth ought to be told" may signify two things: Either that truth-telling is due as the realization of an ideal, or that truth-telling as an ideal is obligatory upon us.

To most ethical writers "the science of duty" and

" the science of the obligatory " signify the same thing, the only difference being that in the former the obligatory power of rightness is made prominent and is given an essential place. To do good and to act justly are obligatory, but they are obligatory because they are right.

As has been said, the peculiar teachings of authority ethics is related immediately to moral obligation rather than to moral rightness, and may be divided into the *human* and the *theistic*. Some treat obligation as a sort of relation to an authority external to the moral agent and make it mostly human, while others make the authority mostly divine. There is a variety of opinion between these two extremes. Such materialistic philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, who identify the sense of obligation with the sense of authority, contends in his *Leviathan* (A. D. 1651) that the presocial state of mankind was one of war in which every man fought for his own interests, and that this state of things was terminated by a compact or covenant where civil government was instituted to care for the welfare of all. The rules of morality are those of the sovereign power. They are excellent in themselves but are obligatory only as enacted and enforced by governmental authority. " Before the names of just and unjust can have place," says Hobbes, " there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefits they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon. And such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth." Hobbes much influ-

enced Bentham and others. The former doctrine is advocated chiefly by that materialistic and sensationalistic school who call themselves *agnostics*. They hold that the Universe and its forms have self-evolved from an infinity of atoms without any creative interference or superintendency. Charles Darwin, the founder of Evolutionism, accounts for conscience as the outgrowth of a social instinct whereby one seeks the society and good-will of his fellows, and of a natural sympathy whereby he desires their comfort and satisfaction.

Herbert Spencer believes that the only really moral motive is the advancement of happiness and the prevention of misery. He maintains that the sense of duty or obligation is transitory and will diminish and even disappear after men have become more enlightened. See his *Data of Ethics*, Chapter VII. While Spencer agrees with Darwin, yet perhaps he gives external authority a larger share than Darwin does in the production of the sense of obligation.

Janet quotes a German author by the name of Kirchmann, who states the authority theory succinctly, thus: "Morality originates in the sentiment of respect (Achtung) which man feels in the presence of a power which he feels to be immeasurably stronger than himself. This power becomes for him an authority whose commands constitute the moral law. These authorities may be reduced to four—that of God, of the prince, of the people, and of the father of the family. All morality is positive, and is based on the will of some authority." (*Die Grundbegriffe des Rechts*, 1869.)

Janet rejects the doctrine which derives moral obligation from the constraint exercised by parental, tribal, civil, and religious authority, but he very clearly states

that moral laws do not present themselves merely as general and speculative truth, but as commands, and they always emanate from some will either sacred or secular. "We understand very well to-day what power the association of impressions and of ideas has over human beliefs. These rules, always accompanied by orders, assumed the character of necessary and obligatory laws. Now that we have forgotten the wills which at first commanded them, we still continue to regard them as commands; and it is quite natural that we should regard them as having been dictated *a priori* by reason itself—as the work of an internal legislation without any legislator." These words of Janet may be taken as a fair statement of the doctrine of Paulsen of Berlin, who defines conscience as the inherited consciousness of customs enforced by the authority of parents, teachers and magistrates, and by the fear of the gods. Thus all the ethicists of this school acknowledge that conscience and the right are seemingly obligatory of themselves, but they explain this as a delusion consequent upon an association of ideas in a prehistoric experience.

Christian theologians, especially, have maintained the theistic theory of obligation. They supposed it to be involved in the absolute sovereignty of the Divine Being. William of Occam, the Nominalist schoolman, said: "No act is evil except so far as it is forbidden of God; and there is no act which cannot be made good if it be enjoined by God. The nature of good and evil is such that after it has been made obligatory and definite by the most free will of God, it can easily be altered in its status and relation so that, by a change in that will, what is obligated and just can become unjust."

Cumberland and some others who have based morality on "the nature of things," have, at the same time, taught that it depends on the will of God, because the nature of things depends on God's will. Warburton held that law implies a lawgiver, "obligation an obliger." He says that Shaftesbury, Clarke and Wollaston are "wrong in making obligation arise from this or that property of virtue, such as its beauty, its fitness, or its truth . . . in making it arise from an abstract idea at all, or, indeed, from anything but personality and the will of another different and distinct from the person obliged" (*Letters,* p. 57). Paley, who is sometimes denounced as an egoistic utilitarian, really taught that the Divine will is the foundation of right and duty. He says: "Since moral obligation depends on the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, must depend on the same. Right, therefore, signifies consistency with the will of God" (*Moral and Political Philosophy,* Book I, Chapter IX). Other notable English theologians have dissented from these views. Richard Hooker writes: "They err who think that of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides His own will. . . . The being of God is a kind of law to His working; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that He doeth" (*Eccle. Politics,* Book I, section 2). Stephen Charnock (*On the Being and Attributes of God*) says: "The moral law is not properly a mere act of God's will considered in itself, or a tyrannical edict like those of which it may be said, 'Stat pro ratione voluntas.' But it commands those things which are good in their own nature and prohibits those things which are in their nature evil."

Locke's teaching on this subject is peculiar. He

says: "*Moral* good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary action to some law whereby good and evil are chosen as from the will and power of the lawmaker; which good or evil, attending our observance or breach of the Law by the decree of the lawmaker, is what we call reward or punishment" (*Essay,* Book II, Chapter 26). He says further that there are three laws to which men refer their actions, the Divine law, the civil law, and the law of opinion or reputation, and that the first of these "is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." He also says that there is a law or light of nature distinct from the three laws above mentioned. By "moral good and evil," as opposed to good and evil in the general, Locke means virtue and vice.

Charles Hodge, in his *Systematic Theology* (Vol. I, p. 406), states the present-day Christian ethics viewpoint, as follows: "The common doctrine of Christians is that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures. No higher reason can be assigned why anything is right than that God commands it. This means (1) that the Divine will is the only rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong; (2) that His will is that which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed." Then he adds, "By the word will is not meant any arbitrary purpose or that it were conceivable that God should will right to be wrong or wrong right. The will of God is the expression or revelation of His nature or is determined by it; so that His will as revealed makes known to us what infinite wisdom and goodness demand. Sometimes things are right simply because God has commanded them; as circumcision and other ritual institutions were to the

Jews. Other things are right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained; such as the duties relating to property and the permanent relations of society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the immutable excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is His will that binds us and constitutes the difference between right and wrong; His will, that is, as the expression of His infinite perfection. So that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God."

Moral obligation, then, in no sense arises from subjective authority. Not even all non-moral obligation has this origin, but only that which results from governmental compulsion. Moral obligation is founded on the inherent excellence and superiority of the right.

The word "authority" is used in two senses: (1) the generic and primary, and (2) the specific and secondary. Of the former, it signifies the power of one person to place another under coercive, or legal, obligation. This authority includes that of decrees, ordinances and statutes, for these are the expression of the authority of persons. The authority to place others under coercive inducement is not necessarily a thing right and obligatory. It is simply the function of issuing commands, disobedience to which renders one liable to threatened penalty. For example, the leader of a predatory band who levies tribute from some village or district exercises this kind of authority. So does the political boss, in a city or in a state, who compels office-holders and office-seekers to pay their party assessments. In such cases the demand is met, not because it is rightful, but because it is compulsory—because compliance is essential to one's interests.

But in such cases as the payment of taxes or of military service, obedience is rendered not simply because of the compulsory authority, but in recognition of the rightfulness of the demand, and, it may be, because of the rightfulness of the authority. This brings before us the secondary sense of the word. In this sense the word authority means rightful authority —the right of one person to have and exercise the power of placing another under coercive obligation. The assumption here is that human beings need to be compelled and constrained continually to do that which is right. Thus certain modes of government, whose prevalent operation is to promote the right and to suppress the wrong, become themselves right and obligatory. Hence the duty of obedience to parents, to civil rulers, to official superiors, and to all properly constituted authorities. "Frequently, in ordinary speech, our thoughts confine themselves to this rightful authority, and so we condemn disobedience to authority, and we conceive of an illegal act as unlawful, as illegitimate, as wrong—which it commonly is."

Just authority exists in order to maintain and promote the right, and derives its own authority from that end. But while fulfilling this, it sometimes confers a new rightness on things commanded by it. The commands of even rightful rulers, however, in certain cases are to be disobeyed and fought against. Mary, Queen of Scots, reprimanded John Knox because he rejected her authority in religious matters. Referring to the primitive Christians, she said: "None of these men raised the sword against their princes." Knox answered, "God, Madam, gave them not the power and the means." "Think you," said the Queen, "that subjects having the power may resist their princes?"

The reformer replied, "If princes exceed their bounds, Madam, they may be resisted, even by power." Even properly constituted authority should be disobeyed if it requires what is contrary to right and conscience. It is our duty to disregard any authority whatever that commands wrong-doing.

Just authority presupposes moral rightness and moral obligation. It is not the first foundation of these things. Even God who is subject to no authority recognizes the supremacy of the right over every other possible aim. The closing words of Luther's speech before Charles the Fifth expressed loyalty to truth and principle in opposition to the requirements of authority—"Hier stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders." Moral obligation, therefore, is a relation between the rational agent and the right; it is not a relation between the rational agent and authority.

Herbert Spencer says: "I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications which by continued transmission and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility." The urgent question with us is,—"Does Spencer's theory harmonize with the consciousness of those rational beings who are now alive?" We say no. From this point of view it is defective in two respects: (1) its conception of the right as composed of "Consolidated experiences of utility," is very low and inadequate and (2) its conception of moral obligation fails to note that the right is obligatory of itself, apart from authority, and indeed that the obligatori-

ness of authority, so far as it is moral, arises from the obligatoriness of the right. Spencer holds that spiritual life is identical with nervous energy and that thought and feeling are the refinement and reproduction of nervous activity. He derives the sentient from the insentient, the immaterial from the material, and the moral from the unmoral. We know of no good reason to believe that man is the product of molecular evolution or even that he was changed in some prehistoric period from an unmoral to a moral being. His conclusions are so repugnant to the analysis of consciousness as to suggest that the hypotheses with which they are connected should be abandoned.

The Sacred Scriptures, revered as the expression of the Divine will, urge men to pursue virtue according to their own perceptions of what is right and dutiful, and not merely as being what God's will requires. The Apostle Paul expresses the general teaching of the prophets and apostles in the following words: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." Even should we adopt that extreme view which regards reason as God's voice and law within us, this would not make the inward instruction the origin of duty but only our guide to the knowledge of it. The Divine will is not the only external authority absolutely determining questions of duty for the conscience. Men are bound by their own convictions of right. The common knowledge of duty is a law to all. God's will must be implicitly obeyed. This is the only external rule which is of absolute moral obligation.

The supremacy of the Divine authority arises from its complete identification with what is right and good. No ethical system is complete without a reverent recognition of the Supreme Being. The principles of right dwell eternally in the Divine bosom, and our relations to God, the creator and preserver of all, the loving Father of spirits, the righteous ruler of the universe, enter as necessary elements into the perfected moral life. While morality may exist without religion, yet the complete development of ethical experience includes loving, sympathetic loyalty to that Spirit in whom we live and move and have our being. At the beginning of his *Christian Ethics*, Bishop Martensen says: "Morality and religion are not all one and the same thing, but they are indissolubly associated; and, so long as man remains in this temporal sphere, so long must he live his life under these two forms. . . . A godliness from which the ethical factor is in every respect excluded can only become a mystic absorption in God. . . . A morality, on the other hand, without religion is a false self-dependence, a free-will lacking foundation, and therefore, also, resting on an inner self-contradiction."

Questions on the Lesson

1. How does this theory of ethics differ from those previously considered?
2. How is the word "authority" used in this lesson?
3. What is the division of authority ethics?
4. What is Hobbes' view?
5. What is the view of Darwin? Spencer? Kirchmann?

6. Distinguish between the views of Janet and William of Occam.
7. On what do Cumberland, Paley, Hooker, and Charnock base morality?
8. Explain Locke's teaching on this subject.
9. Give Charles Hodge's viewpoint.
10. Distinguish between the primary and secondary uses of the word authority.
11. Why should properly constituted authority be disobeyed if it require what is contrary to right and conscience?
12. For what purpose does just authority exist?
13. What is your estimate of Luther's loyalty to truth?
14. What is your conception of moral obligation?
15. What is Bishop Martensen's conception?

Problems for Discussion

1. What is the proper end of authority in government?
2. Who has the right to govern?
3. What is the difference between the duty to govern and the power to govern? Illustrate.
4. Critically examine the following statements:

   (*a*) The Divine government includes as its subjects all finite moral beings, and the authority of the government extends to all their moral conduct. The head of the government is God, who in His own person exercises all the functions of government.

   (*b*) The law which God proclaims and enforces is the moral law, the law of nature and reason. The great principle of obligation He does not create. It exists as eternal, is affirmed in His own reason, and reaffirmed in every finite reason.

   (*c*) As thus existing in the reason infinite and finite, it is law—subjective law, a real expression of obligation; and conformity to it would be

virtue. God adds to this original principle of obligation the authority of His own will, and publishes and enforces it throughout the moral universe.

5. Where do we find the revealed law and what does it express?
6. Why is the authority of the Church and of the State insufficient as a standard?
7. Would it be possible to settle all questions by quoting what Jesus said? How could an authoritative decision be reached on questions which Jesus did not discuss at all?
8. According to the Catholic conception, what gives the Church a right to demand the obedience of Christians? State the doctrine of apostolic authority.
9. Distinguish between the functions of self-government and civil government.
10. Hobbes says: "Where no covenant hath preceded, every man has a right to every thing." Critically examine.
11. Discuss the reasons for lawlessness. Tell of the forms of lawlessness you find in your community.
12. How can we overcome the spirit of lawlessness? Is it during idle times that evil has the best chance in our lives? Explain.
13. Is it true that the children are the bosses in the home? What should be the right way of ruling or governing the home?

LESSON XXI

THE STANDARD AS DUTY

THE ethical problem is to determine what character is common to every right action and to every right end. Many solutions have been sought and offered. Some writers, like Mackensie, profess to seek a standard to which all conduct should conform. As already pointed out, Utilitarianism makes the pursuit of happiness, and Perfectionism the pursuit of excellence, necessary to any virtue at all.

The words "law" and "rule" are names applicable to the fundamental ethical idea. Whewell says: "With regard to the supreme rule the question 'why' admits of no further answer." For the supreme rule must set forth the ultimate end of right conduct. Every moral theory can be characterized by the law which it makes fundamental—as, Do Good, Be Perfect, Regulate Your Affections, Obey Authority, Realize the Right. But this law is always the ultimate law. *The standard of Christian living is the entire moral law, to every part of which we must conform.* The end of morality is the supreme rule only. Even this law prescribes the seeking of the end of duty. It does not merely state the end. In Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics,* he uses the phrase to signify methods of judgment instead of modes of investigation. He discusses the principles which different systems assume as the basis of moral assertion, and says little concerning processes of inquiry. We need to remember that actions are often conceived as including ends and

as being ends themselves. We believe that an action may be right and obligatory *per se*.

This general school of doctrine contains a greater variety of authors and of views than any of the schools already considered. It includes all who, either directly or indirectly, without analyzing the right, teach that the obligation of right is inherently obligatory. By some ethicists it has been called the Intuitional school. Some writers hold the right to be simple and incapable of analysis, but not one defines it. All of them teach that the "standard" (the moral end) is "law." There is a sense in which every theory of morals is a theory of law. The supreme law of Utilitarianism requires the seeking of good; that of Perfectionism, the seeking of perfection. Both also mention other laws subordinate to these. But Mackensie, who excludes these systems, limits his thought to those which present moral rules without any explanation of that rightness which makes them moral. He also refers to a law which binds by reason of its own nature rather than to one which founds morality on eternal authority. He gives very little consideration to the governmental view of moral obligation.

When the terms "right" and "duty" are used interchangeably and as equivalent to each other, as they frequently are, the right signifies the dutiful and the dutiful the right. When ethics is defined as "The science of duty," and when, as now, those teachings which hold the right, considered without analysis, to be the aim of virtue, are classed as "Duty Ethics," then duty signifies the right as the end of moral purpose and desire. For moral rightness rather than moral obligation is the basic idea of ethical science.

Some characterize duty ethics as the teaching of

"duty for duty's sake." This formula belongs to the duty school only "par eminence." The aim of theoretical ethics is to render the habitual ethical judgment more informed and accurate. Hence those who consider the practical reason as our only source of understanding concerning the right, teach duty ethics in a special sense.

Plato and His Followers. *Plato* and his followers taught duty ethics. As a perfectionist, he sought participation in the Divine, but, along with this, as a more immediate aim, he sought conformity to ideals of conduct which constituted for him a moral law. He advocates wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice without defining the nature common to them all. They are all virtues; each of them in a specific way pursues the right. Plato teaches that every virtue seeks what is right and good. One finds in his philosophy the unity of lofty sentiment but not the unity of analytic thought.

The Stoics. The *Stoics* inculcated duty ethics with some indirectness. "Live according to Nature," was their essential rule. Nature meant chiefly the nature within us, and which is of Divine origin. Conduct conformed to reason they called the right, the correct, the recte factum. Cicero, the Stoic philosopher of the Romans, in his *De Finibus,* does not treat of the right, but of virtue as the summum bonum—the supreme good. In his other ethical treatise, the *De Officiis,* Cicero discusses the general forms of duty rather than its generic nature. The officium seeks what is right and what is useful—the "honestum" and "utile." He makes the fourfold division of duty common among the ancients. He then advocates (1) the search for truth and the love of truth, (2) the ob-

servance of justice or social duty, including beneficentia, (3) the maintenance of moderation in desires and deeds, and (4) the exercise of courage and magnanimity in every exigency and under every variation of fortune. He closes the treatise with questions arising from the conflict of duties.

The Schoolmen. Their only contributions to the ethics of the ancients was a more theological slant. Saint Thomas of Aquin in his *Summa Theologica* (Quæstio LV) defines virtue as a good quality or habit by which one lives rightly and ill-uses no one, and which is operated in us by the power of God. With him the four principal or "cardinal" virtues are the same as those discussed by Plato and by Cicero—viz., wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage. Those who view morality from the subjective more than from the objective point of view are satisfied with an analysis of virtue and with the doctrine that virtue is the *summum bonum.* They seldom attempt an analysis of the moral end.

Among the modern advocates of duty ethics are Descartes, Malebranche, Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Locke, and Wayland. They seem to agree that man has a power of immediately distinguishing between right and wrong, but give different names to this power and explain the operation of it in different ways. Descartes (1596–1650), who started the modern philosophic movement when he discarded scholastic dogmatism, held that certain truths shine in their own light, which is the light of nature (lumen natræ) and so introduced the doctrine of "innate ideas." He himself dwelt little on the theory of right and wrong, but his disciple, Père Malebranche (1638–1715) founded morality on necessary truths given by the universal rea-

son. Cudworth, who combined Cartesian views with a kind of Platonism, opposed the sensationalism of Hobbes, and contended that the idea of a "natural immutable and eternal justice" arises, not from experience, but from "the innate activity of the mind itself." Clarke (1675–1724), who taught that reason perceives the "eternal and necessary differences of things" including the difference between right and wrong, held that rightness is a "fitness" of the conduct of rational beings to the relations in which they exist, and wrongness an unfitness. Locke (1632–1705) believed that the science of ethics might be developed, like that of mathematics, "from self-evident propositions concerning God and rational beings." Some present-day moralists teach somewhat indefinitely that right and wrong arise from relations of persons to one another and to things, and that the moral qualities of actions are an undefinable fitness and unfitness.

Views of Kant. Kant's ethical views were much influenced by his theory of mind. His "Pure Reason" was a faculty furnishing general forms of thought, the application of which by the judgment to the products of the sensibility result in knowledge or cognition. Kant found this faculty inadequate to support faith in God, immortality and duty, so he devised the "Practical Reason" whose teachings impelled man to believe in the Infinite and to the recognition of the right. While the Kantian system is essentially simple, yet it is the dual dogmatism of one who was unable to make a true and unifying analysis of the workings of the intellect. In ethics, he gives us a formula instead of categories by which we may be guided in the formation or adoption of moral rules. He says: "Act only on that maxim or principle which thou canst at the

same time will to become a universal law." Kant calls this, not a new law of duty, only a formula, a rule of rules, to which every law of duty must conform. He asks: "Who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, just as if the whole world before him were ignorant of what duty was? But whoever knows of what importance a mathematical formula is, will not undervalue my formula." (Preface to *Critique of the Practical Reason.*)

Kant's idea is that innate ideas may be self-evident, but the apprehension and application of them calls for care lest they be mingled with error. That such is his position is evident from his doctrine of the "good will" (der gute wille). He says: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." The "good" which it seeks is not happiness, but the right. It is the will determined by respect for duty. "The preëminent good," says Kant, "which we call moral, can consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself—which certainly is only possible in a rational being in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will." Kant rejects and opposes Eudæmonism.

Arguments against Kant's Position. (1) We reject Kant's dictum because it assumes that every moral rule is binding on all men, whereas many rules of duty apply only to limited classes of men. For example, the duties of the soldier differed from those of the civilian. The poor have anxieties and burdens from which the wealthy are free. The husband and the wife, the father and the child, the aged and the young, has each his peculiar problems and obligations. Hence, we cannot expect to act only

on maxims which we may will to be without exceptions.

(2) A second objection to the dictum is that most moral rules have exceptions even within the sphere of their responsibility. Mackensie says forcibly: "The moral sense of the best men seems to say that there is no commandment, however sacred,—unless it be the commandment of love—that does not under certain circumstances release its claim." Kant interprets the principle that man should always obey his conscience in two ways: (*a*) That conscience never makes a mistake, and (*b*) that the imperatives of conscience are absolutely universal rules. Both of these are extreme positions and cannot be maintained.

(3) We reject his dictum because a call of duty may be so exceptional in character as not naturally to suggest any general rule, not to speak of a universal rule. Not every man should be a preacher, or a foreign missionary, or a political reformer; not every one should head a forlorn hope, or enter a burning building. Such duties fall to few,—who are not expected to follow a rule but to be guided by the requirements of the case.

(4) A fourth objection to the Kantian formula is that it provides no real safeguard against the adoption of an immoral rule. If the agent were a selfish being and careless of the right, might he not wish the law to protect him and his like in their evil practices and ill-gotten gains? In every case, the agent might desire the law to be universal, *i. e.*, to be rigorously carried out, but that would not prove it to be a righteous law. Kant's fundamental error lies in his doctrine that the "practical reason" furnishes an unreasoned rule of right. According to him "the law" has no reference either to motives or to consequences. It is an abso-

lute command—or system of commands—which admits of no explanation beyond its own, "sic jubeo." This law, indeed, is the right, but with Kant it relates to actions rather than to ends. He first identifies right with law, then confuses moral law with law in general, and after that asserts that any rule adopted for universal use must be right. He assumes that the mind cannot formulate clearly any practical law except the law of duty. Such philosophizing is very unsatisfactory, fanciful, very dogmatic and extremely far removed from the patient analysis of facts.

(5) The Kantian dictum is a premature and incorrect generalization. It is a general, practical injunction rather than a fundamental principle. J. S. Mill, after saying: "The Utilitarian criterion is not the happiness of the agent but that of all parties interested," continues, "Utilitarianism requires that, as between his good and that of others, the agent should be as strictly impartial as a benevolent and disinterested spectator would be." This benevolent spectator is the man of principle—the morally wise man. Mere sentimental benevolence does not always judge aright. "Therefore, all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," embodies the same practical law. Divine wisdom directs selfishness to become unselfish and to transform itself into the law of love.

The Duty School of ethics pursue the same style of thought, and are more dogmatic than analytic. The school includes (1) Rationalists or *a priori* intuitionalists, such as Plato, Descartes, Cudworth and Kant, and (2) Common sense, or *a posteriori* intuitionalists, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Reid, Price and Stewart. The latter are less assumptive than the for-

mer, but are lacking in analysis. The former speak of reason as a primary source of ideas and truths—as the mother of principles which are to be received as her gift. The latter dwell on the irresistible conviction with which many of our ordinary perceptions are attended, and they ascribe this conviction to a power of immediate cognition, which they called at first "common sense," and afterward "intuition." Among this second class of writers, who show a willingness to base philosophy on the scrutiny of fact, are Lord Shaftesbury (1670–1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), disciples of Locke, who taught that we perceive the right and the wrong somewhat as the beautiful and the homely, or the agreeable and the disagreeable are seen; and who called the faculty of doing this "the moral sense."

Whewell teaches that the rightness of actions is a supreme rule and an ultimate end intellectually. He says that the end which this rule has in view is the "ultimate or supreme good, the summum bonum;" but this end is not happiness, but "moral good" or the right. Another says: "The term 'right' expresses a simple and ultimate idea. It is, therefore, incapable of analysis and definition. . . . Right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things." Such statements might be multiplied from other writers, but our desire is simply to illustrate a general style of theory.

The Argument for duty ethics.

The strength of duty ethics lies in its appeal to "common sense," that is, to the practical reason of mankind as exercised about matters which fall within the immediate observation and scrutiny of all. Universal convictions which have been formed in this way

are of the utmost authority. But common sense supports duty ethics only in the assertion that explanations which do not adequately explain the moral qualities of actions should be rejected, and that it would be better to leave right and wrong unexplained than to explain them erroneously or to explain them away.

The Argument against.

(1) The weakness of duty ethics is to forget that common sense is only the beginning of philosophy.

(2) Another objection to duty ethics is that it makes an abstraction the end of moral purpose. It asserts correctly that moral rightness is the aim of duty. To say that one is influenced by the rightness of an end or action means only that he is influenced by the action or end as right. It is the quality as existing in the object, or the object as having the quality, that attracts.

(3) Another objection, perhaps the most radical defect, is that duty ethics leaves the fundamental problem of morality unsolved. It neither gives an analytical definition of the morally right nor shows that the morally right is so simple as to be incapable of such a definition. Duty ethics shares the weakness of those systems whose chief reliance is the dogmatic or intuitional method. No one has the right to assert that a nature is simple until after analytic scrutiny of various instances in which that nature is found. The main position of duty ethics is that the idea of right is ultimate and unanalyzable.

Another doctrine often taught in connection with duty ethics is that of an abiding and changeless morality—of principles of duty which always have been and always shall be. This doctrine of immutable and eternal morality, though often extravagantly stated, calls our attention to three permanent necessities: (1)

Rational beings always have existed, and always must exist, under certain fundamental moral laws; (2) morality has an unchangeable support in the nature and will of God. Moral ideas and relations have always been present to his mind, and thus in a very literal sense, there has been an "eternal and immutable morality." So long as man is rational he is bound to the right, for no power can change the radical principles of morality.

(3) Moral life must appear in any developed universe. Morality pertains both to the nature of intelligent beings and to the nature of things in any developed system of being in a complete cosmos. This statement might be dispensed with, but it has some value.

The question naturally arises, how is truth first obtained? What is the philosophical basis of necessary truth?

To answer this question, we must use the words experience and intuition in a somewhat arbitrary and technical way. Each has several meanings.

Experience may signify:

(1) All of man's inward life so far as he is distinctly conscious of it, as when we speak of a long and happy experience; (2) Our perception of present objects and relations, both external and internal, as when we say that memory is a record of experience; (3) Knowledge gained in immediate perception considered as accompanied by inductive judgment,—as when we speak of the lessons of experience.

If we use the word "experience" for the perception of a mere fact, then a single act of this mode of cognition may be called an experiential or empirical judgment.

The term "intuition" also has various meanings and may signify:

(1) Any form of immediate cognition; (2) That power which the mind has of perceiving objects and truths at once and without a process. In this sense, all the modes of experience mentioned above, except one, would be forms of presentative intuition. (3) A process of intellectual apprehension so rapid as to be apparently immediate. In this sense, the "intuition of reason" is opposed to the "discourse of reason."

Hence we mean by "intuition" the immediate perception of the necessary relations of things, or of things as necessarily related. For example, to see that, as a matter of fact and measurement, three angles are equal to one another would be an experimental judgment, but to perceive that two of them being each equal to the third must be equal to each other, would be an intuition.

The chief point of these teachings is that the distinction of right and wrong—or, more simply, the idea of moral rightness—is asserted hypothetically in an intuition of ontological necessity; that wherever and whenever rational beings exist, their conduct must have moral character, and that this necessity is one which no power can alter or destroy. No power could make it other than right that rational beings should love one another; should care for one another's well-being; should observe truth and justice in their dealings, and should cultivate virtue and hate vice. Neither could the opposite of these be made anything else than wrong. Hence the eternal immutability of moral principle means that wherever and whenever rational beings exist, there and at that time the claims of morality must

have existed, too, and further, that right and wrong are not the arbitrary distinctions of custom or of authority.

Some Moral Convictions

I. *As to the Nature of Moral Good.*

(1) The moral quality is not given to the action by the mind contemplating it.

(2) Moral good is moral good to all intelligences so high in the scale of being as to be able to discern it.

(3) Moral good lays an obligation on us to attend to it.

(4) The conscience points to an authority above itself.

(5) This obligation, when we are led to believe in a Supreme Being, takes the form of law.

(6) Moral good is perceived as having desert, as approvable and rewardable.

(7) Moral good lies in the region of the will.

(8) Moral good is a quality of certain activities proceeding from Free Will.

(9) The moral quality of actions cannot be resolved into anything simpler.

II. *As to Sin and Error.*

(1) The conscience declares that sin is a reality.

(2) Sin is a quality of voluntary acts.

(3) Our moral convictions declare that sin is of evil desert, condemnable, punishable.

III. *As to Relation of Moral Good and Happiness.*

(1) The good is good altogether independent of the pleasure it may bring.

(2) Our moral constitution declares that we ought to promote the happiness of all who are susceptible of happiness.

(3) Our moral convictions affirm that moral good should meet with happiness.

(4) Our moral convictions declare that sin merits pain as punishment.

IV. *As to the Freedom of the Will.*

The will is free.

Questions on the Lesson

1. What is the ethical problem?
2. What are the implications of the words "Law" and "Rule," "Right" and "Duty"?
3. Why does this school of doctrine contain a greater variety of authors?
4. What is meant by "duty for duty's sake"?
5. What was the conception of duty ethics taught by Plato? by the Stoics? by the Schoolmen?
6. Who are the leading modern advocates of duty ethics?
7. Tell of Kant's views.
8. Evaluate the arguments against his famous dictum.
9. Mention the leading intuitionalists.
10. What is the strength and weakness of duty ethics?
11. What is meant by the doctrine of immutable and eternal morality?
12. Explain its three permanent necessities.
13. What is the philosophical basis of necessary truth?
14. Give the several meanings of "Experience"; of "Intuition."
15. What is the chief point of these teachings?

Problems for Discussion

1. Even though a man knew the moral law through the objective morality of his community, and through his moral intuitions, and through his reason, and through the Sacred Scriptures, could he be really sure that he was right in a given decision? Explain.
2. Give your conception of a truly virtuous or dutiful action.
3. Does the end or intention solely and wholly decide the character of any action? Was Paul's persecution of the early Christians virtuous?
4. Explain the difference between *materially* right actions and actions *intentionally,* or *formally* right. Illustrate.
5. In what sense is the working out of the complete life of duty impossible except by the complete moral man?
6. How may the discriminating power of the moral judgment be increased by exercise?
7. Critically examine: "That moral action receives its moral character, not from its relation to will merely, but from the relation to moral end and moral rule, into which the will brings it."
8. In what sense must moral action be voluntary? free? How does voluntary and free action become moral?
9. Interpret: "As this present world is a scene of struggle with evil in all its forms, open and insidious, man can only hope to accomplish the perfect moral task, if his will be right and permanently and powerfully right."
10. In what sense is obligation common to all moral creatures, and in what sense is it different to each?
11. From what sources may uncertainty arise as to present duty?

12. How far is a performance of duty compatible with uncertainty as to which of two lines of action is the preferable?
13. In what sense does moral behavior mean the constant quest for the "highest good"?
14. If the task of discovering and comparing values had to be undertaken de novo by each individual or by each generation, why would the task be appalling in its complexity and immensity?
15. In what sense is Christian living a creative task?
16. How does religion reinforce ethics?
17. How does a knowledge of the history of ethics help us to an intelligent valuation of our own duties?
18. Show how self-deceit, selfishness, jealousy, cowardice, laziness, injure every purpose and therefore are always wrong.
19. If conscientiousness is the timely and sensible will to know what is right, can we have too much? Why, or why not?
20. What is every citizen's duty toward the following community enterprises: Schools? Safety for children? Health safeguards? The "spiritual assets" provided through the churches and the Y. M. and Y. W. C. A.'s? How?

LESSON XXII

THE ETHICAL IDEAL AND TEACHING OF JESUS

THE conclusion to which we have come in our discussions is that the right and absolute good are one and the same thing, and for a number of reasons: (1) because men take the right to be good simply in being the right; (2) because no one can improve upon a right end, unless it be by making it more perfectly right; it is absolutely good; and (3) because the attractiveness of the right for us as moral beings seems to be that of absolute good; (4) because it is inherently superior, and therefore, also, preferable to any good which can come into competition with it; (5) it is regally supreme among the ends or aims of life, and therefore also obligatory upon our personal choice and pursuit. Moral obligation, therefore, is the relationship in which a person, as endowed with rationality, stands to the right as supreme in law over one's life and self. It is his being subject or bound, in law, to absolute good as an end.

Hence the fundamental aim of duty and the ethical point of view as advocated in this treatise is the total good of the total self, the rational, volitional and sentient self. The true ethical life must be the life of the whole man, penetrating beneath the dualism of reason and sensibility, of reason and unreason—to their underlying unity. The ethical point of view is reason and sensibility, and will especially, as the expression of

the true and total self. Man is to bring his total self under the idea of the Good.

This theory of the total good of the total self agrees with utilitarianism in asserting that the right is a species of the good and that practical moral goodness is the fundamental virtue. As the gospel of common humanity, utilitarianism advocates the welfare of mankind, but it neglects our inner and higher nature, and subordinates virtue to utility. All its affiliations are materialistic.

Perfectionism emphasizes that side of morals which utilitarianism slights. It seeks spiritual excellence and the development of character, which are dutiful ends. But its conceptions are undefined and its aims too exclusively subjective. It is allied to mysticism in philosophy.

The chief merit of motivity ethics is that it brings before us the connection between moral life and motive life in general; the natural and the moral modes of activity are so closely related that they may unite in one, as they do in every holy being. This doctrine of ethics teaches the weakness of that virtue which does not incorporate with itself all the natural tendencies of the soul, and which endeavors to act from principle alone. But it fails to see that self-regulation is a secondary mode of duty which presupposes a primary and objective perception of things obligatory.

Authority ethics throws little light on the radical nature of moral law. Its basic teaching is that obedience to rightful rule is an important form of duty. Not all theories consider this sufficiently. But the hypothesis that authority is the ultimate ground of duty is entirely untenable.

Duty ethics gives due prominence to moral law and

moral obligation. In doing so it appeals to common sense, and is better than any system which conflicts with common sense. But it is devoid of philosophical analysis, and gives no answer to legitimate inquiry. However dogmatic adherence to truth is better than a reasoned adoption of error.

In view of the diverse developments and relations of absolute good as an end made prominent by the different systems, it is evident that the science of Christian living calls for a comprehensive grasp of mind and a clear understanding of the moral law as a central element of a system. Hence to appreciate the essential aim of virtue, absolute good must be viewed in its fullest and most complete realization; our thought should comprehend every aspect of the moral life and every department of the moral law.

The Absolute Good is the true Good for every man. The connection among persons arises out of their connection with God, who is the source from which all persons derive their being and nature. The personality of God carries with it the existence of an Absolute End to which the whole course of Nature is relative. This End is the Absolute Good, the dominating principle of the whole process and of the world, and to the attainment of which all our powers should be directed.

The religious consciousness of mankind traces duty to a source higher than man, and bows to the authority of the moral law with a reverence far deeper than could ever be given to self-legislation. Nor is this produced by the mere thought of God's superior power. Power can command fear, not reverence. While self is ultimate for thought in the sphere of action as well as in that of knowledge, yet man cannot help postu-

lating his own derivation from some transcendent source. He must trace himself and all that is essentially his to God. Though the sense of duty owes its very existence to the fact that man is ultimate for himself, yet because he traces himself to God, that which is the essential consequence of his own essential nature must also be traced to God, the common origin and bond of union of all persons. Such expressions as "The law of God written in men's hearts," and "The voice of God speaking through the human conscience," give utterance to the very deepest truth of moral obligation. They refer the idea of duty to its origin in man's own nature, and again trace that nature, with all that is essential to it, to its origin in God. Hence the Christian view of morality regards the moral law as God's law, and the voice of duty as the voice of God; not a great power, like a physical force, external to man, influencing man's life by pressure from without, but "the ONE" who touches man within the depths of his own being, who is in man and in whom man is. This unique and practical view teaches that the good is the good for God and is therefore absolutely worthy. This view of morality answers the question, Why man should sacrifice his desires for the sake of the common good? thus: Because all are one in God, and the common good is the true good of every individual.

The Kingdom Conception of Jesus. The only ethical doctrine, therefore, which includes the best of all the moral systems is that presented in the kingdom conception of Jesus as set forth in the Sermon on the Mount. As there presented, the kingdom is at once inner and outer, individual and social. Seeking the good in the heart of man, it teaches the reality of

conscience and makes appeal to it, and at the same time lays the foundation of the Christian doctrine of virtue and the virtues. As it brings this inner goodness into relation with a great supreme aim or purpose in life, it connects the inner with the outer and sets before man a great Ideal of a perfect moral and social order in which they are to find their perfection and happiness. By means of the ruling principle of love, it also eliminates selfishness and establishes the social nature of the Good. The kingdom is the rule of God in the heart of the individual to be realized here and now in every action of life as well as in the universe. "The kingdom of God is within you." As a consequence of this illumination of the inner being, the right determination of the will takes place. Faith in God lifts the soul out of the sordid struggle for existence and glorifies the commonest duties. Jesus teaches: Trust in God, trust Him utterly, and you can perform the commonest duties with the highest aim. In the mind of Jesus, goodness doubtless is essentially a condition of the heart, an attitude of the will, and in order to be *real* must be from the heart outward.

The whole aim of Jesus is to reach the *autonomous moral center of men,* not to fix attention upon a single virtue or characteristic line of action. He is always trying to awaken an independent attitude within the individual which shall be more authoritative than any external command that can be given and which shall be wiser than any precept or counsel. *The cultivation of this inner moral mastery of life is the goal of His teaching.*

It follows that in studying Christian Ethics we are trying to understand this inner moral attitude; trying to analyze its contents and find its principles of pro-

cedure and growth. We take Jesus as the supreme instance of this higher ethical mastery of life, and seek to understand Him, in order that we may bring our own lives into conformity to Him; and in order that we may cultivate the same moral ideal and method in society.

It seems necessary to emphasize the unique and radical nature of Christian Ethics, both as contrasted with the ethical ideals of His own times and as contrasted with the typical ideals of our day. Jesus' ethical method was at variance with the legalism and perfectionism of His own day. He rebuked the scrupulously conscientious orthodoxy of His day, and demanded the "fulfillment" of the commandment method, by the transfer of the ethical motive and insight to the individual heart. He sought to cultivate "the heart," on the assumption that the ethical issues of life were determined there. On the other hand, the utilitarian and strictly empirical ethics so much affected in our own day are not keyed to the Jesus-emphasis. Much of the ethical teaching of to-day is wholly oblivious to the inner place of control, and is concerned to show that outer shaping forces determine all ethical problems. Thus all "good ethics" and systems of calculation are to be criticized first of all for their shallowness, their failure to see that *the ethical life must unfold from within* and not be put together from without.

It needs also to be said that the Jesus conception of ethics rests upon an estimate of personality which is lacking in the psychological assumptions that lie behind popular ethical programs. The Jesus estimate of the worth and sacredness of person and His reverence for the spiritual or personal values of life is rationally

supported only by a psychological analysis which sees personality as resting upon a unique, unitary principle of life, *the self or soul.* This *self is free, active, creative with powers of self-mastery,* and of achievement and of original, self-direction service in society. The self is not a mere creature of environment and of causal laws; but is a true actor or agent, a self-directing, conscious power which is always reconstructing both its inner and its outer world,—building new heavens and new earths. This estimate of the self is a scandal to the ethical methods which conform to natural science ideals and try to make the law of things also the law of Persons. Nevertheless this high estimate of personality as free creative agency is the only one consistent with the facts and the only one that rationally supports the ethical teaching of Jesus.

When we try now, with this background, to gain the ethical ideal of Jesus and construct its realities, we see the fallacy of laying emphasis upon types or of giving undue attention to characteristic emphases in Jesus' teaching. For these things only express to us how the spirit of Jesus has been given expression under given circumstances. Moreover, these specific situations afford no unity of outlook but the broadest contrasts. For example, Jesus' teaching of non-resistance is upset by much contradictory teaching. It is a mistake to seek first of all for a definite "type" or code, or rule or ethical program. That would be to begin with the second step and not the first. We must study "*the spirit of Jesus,*" meaning thereby *the great controlling ideals that dominated His autonomous mastery of life.* For though He was indeed a "child of His times," subject to all of the shaping forces of environment and heredity which determine our lives, He

left the deep marks of His creative stamp and control upon the life in which He lived. It is precisely *this creative fact* and *the principles by which it worked,* that we are seeking in studying Christian Ethics. We would see Jesus and we would reënact His realities. What were those realities?

We can only *understand personality from within,* for it is a true unity, not an addition of "selves" or a complex of parts. It is this fact that makes so many ethical attempts abortive, and which brings so many scientific ethical schemes into conflict with the spiritual outlook of Christianity. For spiritual reality and power depend upon this intrinsic, interior unity of the soul-life which the scientific psychologies of the empirical type are always trying to break up into a naturalistic scheme and assimilate to the law of things!

Practically, then, the unity of life is one of the first outstanding assumptions that face one who tries to understand Jesus. He, of course, teaches no psychological theory. But His assumption of the individual place of control in the spiritual world, His unquestioning acceptance of individual responsibility, His constant appeal to the inner autonomous response in every man, and His unexampled estimate of individual worth and His reverence for the personal,—all of these imply *the spiritual unity* to which we have already referred. And all of His social teachings, too, deal with a Kingdom in which the true units are the individual citizens who are to come into harmonious social relations through the voluntary growth of the individuals in terms of spiritual ideals. *"The Kingdom of Heaven is within men,"*—it must root and grow from within, not from without.

The deepest principle of action is that this voluntary spirit shall be saturated with *social good-will.* That must be its essential quality. The great sins are self-sufficiency, self-esteem, selfishness in all of its forms. The great ideal is *self-devotion, self-denial, self-sacrifice, service for love's sake.* This fundamental spirit is the beginning of "life" for Jesus. Love is the fulfillment of all laws for Him. But this is not something that comes by fulfilling all laws. This is the mistake of all externalism and perfectionism in Christian Ethics. It cannot be thrust upon any man from without. It springs up from within and grows. It must be original and spontaneous and free, not a compulsion or a resultant of forces. It awakens in the soul as intention, and becomes purpose and character and passion and utter devotion to another. Love cannot be put together or successfully counterfeited. It is an original growth of the heart, the highest criterion of Christian ethics. As a voluntary disposition it is the touchstone of spiritual values.

The supreme task of Christian Ethics is to sow this seed in society and to have it function in Christian living. To cherish it and keep it free from selfish or "calculation" ethics is a task that taxes Christian leadership.

The student of Christian Ethics who is under the spell of the Jesus-insistence upon good-will or love as the highest spiritual value, and who sees the inner unity of the spiritual, must study in terms of principles the unfolding nature of Christian Ethics. He must not let the demand for codes, laws, programs or other concrete rules of action rob him of the insight that spirit can never be exhausted in these forms. The ideal is that the individual shall be so equipped with

the power of ethical insight and sympathy that every ethical situation shall be solved, not by any rule or objective example, but by the interpretation of the situations in the light of his moral intelligence. This does not preclude rules and examples as aids; but these can never be finalities. The final court of spiritual appeal is always within. *The ethical life is always a creative task, a spiritual adventure along an unsurveyed highway.*

To keep alive the spirit at the growing roots of life is a greater concern than the pruning of the growth or the appropriating of the fruit. Normal growth is a truer test than completeness. If the root of the ethical dies within us, or if it is not brought to life in the people whom we serve, we have not the Jesus-basis for Christian living or Christian teaching.

The Significance of Jesus for Modern Life. The significance of Jesus for life lies largely in His bringing a sense of proportion in which we see the spiritual and moral forces of life as aspects of reality. The study of Christian Ethics ought to result in a better sense of proportion and truth and a better sense of human values.

The philosophy of personality that lies behind this course sees each man as an intelligent member of society having a growing power of freedom, of creating character, of achievement of new relations and new goals. The whole method and emphasis of Jesus in His teaching was based upon the assumption that men are capable of developing free, creative natures with a growing power of self-determination and self-control that was His chief concern. The Characteristic Remedy for human problems (Salvation through Jesus Christ) is its inwardness and its power of achiev-

ing the higher experiences and higher relationships. It was from this inner standpoint that Jesus prescribed all of the radical remedies for human life. The transformation of individual lives and the achieving of stable moral characters was His sovereign remedy for saving society.

The content of the Gospel of Jesus was the call to *learn to love,* and this is a matter of will and character, and not primarily of reorganization or outward laws. He bade all men to clean out the "heart" as the source of all spiritual good as well as all moral evil. His assumption always is that the heart is the place of control and that the higher salvation must be directed to this inner source of life. The significance of Jesus was rather in the realm of the powers and controls of personal life than in the realm of processes. He challenged and instructed the will and aroused new ideals in the heart. In His own religion, Jesus had a dramatic sense of the Living Fatherhood of God and of the Brotherhood of all men. In the fellowship of the human family and of the common Father, He found the chief motives and inspirations of life. This ideal of a Kingdom of God as a living experience for His followers is an outstanding significance of Jesus for Christian living. The Gospel of Jesus must be made operative in individual, social, industrial, national, and international life. It calls for the mobilization of Christians who are tremendously in earnest, as was Jesus. All the Christian forces must be aggressive in every community, and in all the world, if the ideals and teachings of Jesus are to dominate all the relationships of life.

The Ethical Ideal and Teaching of Jesus, therefore, sets before us a concrete moral order, a universe in

which every individual is to find his place and to do his duty in relation to God in him and above him and to his fellows near him and far away from him, and it bids us make the attainment of that end the supreme purpose of our lives. The end of all moral activities is the kingdom of Love. In that end all the potentialities of man are to find their realization. In it also, humanity is to attain its perfection, and the will of God to be fully accomplished. "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven."

References for Further Reading

Burton, E. D.: *The Teachings of Jesus.*
Cadoux, C. G.: *The Guidance of Jesus for To-day.*
Clarke, W. N.: *The Ideal of Jesus.*
King, H. C.: *The Ethics of Jesus.*
Peabody, F. G.: *Jesus Christ and the Christian Character.*
Wendt, H. H.: *The Teaching of Jesus.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why are the right and absolute good the same thing?
2. What is meant by the total good of the total self?
3. How does the total good agree with utilitarianism?
4. Evaluate perfectionism; motivity ethics.
5. What is the chief merit of authority ethics?
6. Why is duty ethics better than any of the preceding systems?
7. For what does the science of Christian living call, and why?
8. What does the personality of God carry with it?
9. To what does the religious consciousness of mankind trace duty?

10. Why does the kingdom conception of Jesus include the best of all the ethical systems?
11. Upon what does the Jesus conception of ethics rest?
12. Why is it that we can understand personality only from within?
13. What is the supreme task of Christian ethics?
14. What is the characteristic of the Christian remedy for human problems (salvation)?
15. What was the significance of Jesus for modern life?
16. What does the ethical ideal and teaching of Jesus set before us?

Problems for Discussion

1. Why is a right understanding of Jesus all important?
2. Why is it that every Christian reads the teachings of Jesus with the feeling that Jesus will sanction what the reader believes?
3. Why is it the primary duty of every man to become a citizen of the Kingdom of God? What does it presuppose?
4. Why is it the supreme duty of those who love and trust God to live the Kingdom life here and now, regardless of immediate consequences?
5. Why did Jesus leave no system of ethics? What was His chief concern?
6. List the virtues most stressed by Jesus.
7. Would a tabulation of the teachings of Jesus give us a complete Christian ethics? If not, why not?
8. Evaluate the Jesus-picture of the relation between the Kingdom of God and the present age. How does modern thought picture it?
9. Why did not Jesus leave a social or political or industrial program to His followers?

10. What are the supreme values in the Kingdom?
11. Can the Kingdom-life be more perfectly lived within the brotherhood of disciples than outside? If so, why?
12. Can the teachings of Jesus be properly understood without an acquaintance with the spirit of Jesus Himself? If not, why not?
13. How does the attitude of loyalty to the Kingdom of God prevent one from yielding to other loyalties if these are injurious to human welfare?
14. Characterize the religious brotherhood of the Kingdom.
15. Why was it that only a few faithful followers caught the deep spiritual import of the message of Jesus and recognized Him as the Saviour of the world?
16. Interpret: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." To what does obedience to such a test lead?
17. Many people believe that the heart of the teaching of Jesus is to be found in Luke 6:27–38; 10:25–37. What do you think about it?
18. If Jesus came to your community, what would He do? What do you think of Jesus in terms of Acts 10:38?

PART III

PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO CHRISTIAN LIVING

LESSON XXIII

THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL

OUR purpose in this part of the treatise on "The Science of Christian Living" is to apply the principles already developed to the regulation of man's conduct in the position and relations in which God has placed him. We have already shown that the duties which constitute man's ethical task appear in germinal form in the intuitive moral judgments or principles, previously discussed. All duties are, therefore, simply unfoldings and applications of the three great moral requirements toward self, toward mankind, and toward God. Strictly speaking, all duties are due to God only as our creator, but in consequence of the three great relations of the moral agent in which he is to accomplish his mission, duties to God may be distributed, as shown above, the order of experience furnishing the more convenient order of study.

We find a marked difference between what philosophers commonly call morality and Christian morality. Pagan ethics teaches that goodness exists, and that man must conform to it; Christian ethics teaches that God's will is goodness, and when a man does God's will because he loves God, then he has attained or is on his way to attain the highest and only goodness.

Every human being is under obligation to bring himself to pass—to become all that is possible to him, in excellence, efficiency, and capacity for good. The

great end of all duty to self is that of acquiring a perfectly worthy Christian character. To have a pure, strong, symmetrical, and attractive, Christlike character is immeasurably superior to all other wealth and to all other good. The chief forms into which the good life differentiates itself are called by the ancient moralists the cardinal virtues; by the modern moralists the table of duties. These two terms, "virtue" and "duty," are two modes of describing the same thing. The former emphasizes the inner character and its fundamental excellences, and the latter the expression of character in conduct and the primary forms of that expression. The individual cannot be true to his own personality without being true to the personality of all whom his Christian living affects. To stand in true relationship to myself is to stand in true relation to others; to realize my own true self is to help all others to the same self-realization.

Hence personality is a fundamental assumption of moral life. The term comes from "personare"—to sound through or forth. Originally, the "*persona*" was the mask through which the actor sounded forth the words of his part. Then it came to designate the fictitious personage represented. After that it was applied to existing individuals as having each a character of his own.

> All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players.
> —*As You Like It, II, 7.*

The word sets forth motive character more than any other attribute of rational beings. A person, then, is an enduring spiritual being, individual, rational, self-

conscious, and endowed with motive dispositions. In this statement are also set forth the essential characteristics of personality. The peculiarities of this spirit endowed with reason arise from the possession of this power. Personality signifies, then, the concentration and issuing forth from a centre all the powers in an individual—the moral and spiritual, the intellectual, the emotional, the æsthetic, and the physical. The demand in these various directions is more or less pressing, according to the bearing upon our welfare or our usefulness. The aim of every one must be to walk in the path of duty, and to pursue that form and degree of culture which lies in the line of duty. He must meet his obligation. The moral life is most important to the Christian because he cannot make any progress unless he does what is right and because his love for God cannot be real unless he really tries to do God's will.

The religious susceptibilities and powers stand first in their claim upon our attention, requiring *spiritual culture*. The great truths of the spiritual world, truths pertaining to God and our own immortal being, are the great truths of the universe, and should have their due place in the soul. This condition of experience and of life begins with a right state of heart, and extends to the intelligence and the affections. It is not attained by mere exercise of the will. It is a matter of real culture and of growth, like every permanent habit of the soul. It is a work of time and culture—of contemplation of spiritual realities, of confession of sins, of regeneration, and communion with God in prayer, and in the ordinances of religion. Spiritual culture, like all culture, is a progressive work, requiring time and faithful endeavor, but the result is

worth the cost. This growth must continue until, as the Apostle expresses it, "we all come in the unity of faith, and the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." It is every man's duty to "get right with God," and to illustrate the Jesus way of living. The true Christian finds in his experience that Jesus by His teaching and His inspiring example wonderfully quickens his life and aids him in determining what he ought to do. Christian ethics strongly emphasizes the test of Christlikeness, because in the Christ-like spirit we have the best possible equipment for genuine spiritual culture and for the appreciation and realization of those human values and loyalties so necessary to the really worth-while life.

Duty to the Intellect. Intellectual culture is a condition of self-satisfaction, and power for good; it is so obviously a want and a duty as scarcely to require much discussion. The laws of the mind are just as real and just as inexorable as those of the body. The conditions of mental health and growth are so clearly revealed in every human experience that no educated man, however unobserving, can fail to have some knowledge of them thrust upon his attention. The mind is that which manifests itself in the processes of knowing, feeling and willing. These are not different parts of the mind; they are only different phases or forms of activity of one and the same mind. In order to the achievement of great mental strength, there must be an harmonious, rather than a one-sided, development of these several powers.

It is the business of the intellect to perceive, to reason, to imagine, to investigate, and finally to know. It is a duty to secure knowledge, for

ignorance would imply a very great imperfection. Not all men have much time to devote to intellectual culture, but all have the means of securing a certain amount of knowledge, and by using diligently such means as they have, by keeping the windows of consciousness open, by improving all opportunities to gain information, they will prove that ignorance is not a necessity. But the end of duty is not knowledge, nor learning alone; it is wisdom. "Wisdom is the principal thing." Wisdom is the highest form of character. It is that form which the will always puts before itself in the actualization of the good. Wisdom has to do with ends; prudence with means. Wisdom is nearly synonymous with good judgment. When found among the uneducated, as it is not infrequently, it is called *common sense.* To be without a fair share of the qualities implied in this ability implies a certain moral as well as intellectual poverty, and a lack of energy and enterprise that is not justifiable.

It is man's duty to get power as well as practical knowledge and rational wisdom. Some men have natural ability for the pursuit of chemistry, or biology; another may be adapted to mathematics, and one to philosophy, or to literature, or history, or oratory; still others find interesting fields in business, or exploration, or in politics. It is for each to bring himself to pass, to cultivate the gift that is in him. Only thus will each one fulfil his own calling and attain to the wealth of character which he owes himself, and make as large a contribution as possible to the common good.

Our Duty to the Sensibilities. It is in the region of man's sensibilities that the great urges of character are found. If these are properly regulated and subjected

to the law of Righteousness, all other powers are likely to order themselves rightly. Man is the embodiment of self-developing instincts, appetites, desires, impulses, capacities, and powers. Some of these are to serve and others are to rule. Each has its appropriate function, and should be held to its appointed office; kept within its normal limits; and at the same time in its full vigor.

The great characteristic of ethical disorder in the sensibilities is the fact of antagonistic desires and impulses. There are cravings for things which are incompatible with one another; to gratify one is to refuse gratification to another. The child wishes to eat his apple to-day, and also wishes to keep it until to-morrow. A young man wishes to drink with his companions, and also wishes to be regarded as a sober, temperate and respectable person. He knows he cannot gratify both desires. The problem is to harmonize these two or three sets of conflicting desires in the same mind at the same time. When we come to desire only what is right and proper,—to desire only things that we ought to have,—then our desires will have conflict no longer,—then we shall have whatever we desire, and we shall have nothing we do not desire. This is the state of perfect freedom.

Our Æsthetic Feelings. It is our duty to cultivate these feelings; to cultivate a taste which shall be acute, correct, and catholic. Not all can be great artists any more than all can be great scholars, or possess great wealth, or be geniuses, but all can cultivate a love for the beautiful. Good taste is wholly compatible with good sense. To discover, to exhibit, and to create what is beautiful is to glorify God, to enrich self, and to serve the highest interests of mankind.

A Cheerful Disposition is a Great Possession. One

may be frivolous and trifling, and so become superficial and thoughtless. But a genuinely cheerful disposition, looking upon the pleasant side of even the ills of life instead of upon the dark things, always thankful for something, is not only compatible with a sober, sensible, and deeply earnest character, but it is something to be sought for and cherished with great diligence.

A Sensitive Conscience. Another duty to the sensibilities is the cultivation of a quick and sensitive conscience. Conscience is the silent monitor of the soul which says, "Do Right." It always impels us to do what we judge to be right, and restrains us from what we judge to be wrong. While this is true, it may become weak and inefficient through neglect and inattention. It is a lamentable loss when the voice of this inward monitor becomes deadened even in a moderate degree; how much more when it becomes altogether silent. To keep the conscience quick and tender, to treat its slightest warning with attention, to obey its every behest, is the only way to have a healthy moral character and a steady defence against all practical evils.

Duties to the Will as the Great Character-Creating Force of the Soul. It is man's duty to cultivate his will to the greatest degree, that he may be able to direct all his being steadily and powerfully to the accomplishment of his mission. It is, therefore, his duty to avoid all repression, perversion, or improper development of the will, as seen in servility and independence, fickleness and obstinacy, and to cultivate the constituents of a healthy will, such as a paramount purpose, decision of character, fixedness of purpose, a genuine independence, courage, fortitude, patience, manliness.

These qualities just mentioned, taken in connection with truth, honor, honesty and integrity, constitute what is called *manliness*,—a characteristic of the grandest and loftiest kind.

Some of the vices which a firm, steady, well-educated will seeks to suppress are pride, self-conceit, vanity, ambition, and a general selfishness, including the pursuit of pleasure for mere sense gratification, inordinate desire for great riches, honors, offices, and applause, dishonorably secured.

It is man's duty to live for worthy ends—ends which ennoble the pursuer and at the same time benefit mankind. Such ends prove their worthiness and rightful demands on us. It is a moral law as well as a religious truth that whoever will lose himself for the benefit of others will unexpectedly find himself, and himself clothed "with garments of praise," the blessings of the thankful. Every one owes it to himself to contribute his full share to the common possessions of men,—material, intellectual, and moral. Society always is what the individuals composing it make it. Society owes no man a living who has not first earned his living by contributing to the common store. If any one would make the world his debtor, he must make it the richer for his having been in it.

Physical Powers. Our physical powers are given us to improve and to use, and the general duty of self-culture extends to these. The bodily life must be preserved. The body is the instrument and organ of the mind, the home and working-place of the spirit and its medium of communication. The complete man is the man who has a whole body and a whole soul. Hence a sacred regard for the body becomes a high and holy duty, and he who neglects his bodily life puts

his mission in peril; he who destroys his life brings his mission to a premature end. A sound mind comes with a sound body. Every disturbance of the physical condition produces a reaction upon our highest and noblest powers. Duty to the soul involves duty to the body. Our physical powers are all to be employed in the service of God and man. Hence to neglect, or abuse, or pervert them, is to fail in the trust committed to us.

Duty to the body implies subsistence and proper attention to health, which is the effective condition of helpful action in all the walks of life. Any course which undermines the health, or fails to supply its conditions, is wrong, and if unnecessarily pursued, is a sin. Excessive exertion of body or mind, neglect of bodily exercise and relaxation, harmful indulgence of appetite, are among the ordinary forms of transgression.

The Regularity of Habit tends wonderfully to physical welfare. To have our hours for work, for sleep, for exercise, for society, for meditation, for eating and for resting; to order our lives on some well-organized plan tends powerfully to sound health and the prolongation of life. Of course, it is possible to go to an extreme in this attempt to live by rule. But in a man of healthy soul and body, the action of his instinctive impulses is likely to coincide with the decision of sound reason.

Manual Skill Desirable. It was a wise provision of the ancients that every man, whatever his calling or condition in life, should acquire skill in some handicraft. This wholesome practice has unfortunately and wrongly fallen into disuse.

Personal Manners. Each person should give proper

attention to form, and bearing, and manners; should try to get full possession of his own powers, and be at home with himself. These personal accomplishments are pleasing in themselves, and add to the influence which it is every one's privilege and duty to exert.

All will agree that certain physical virtues can be cultivated. Among these are neatness, good taste, skillful management of the body, a certain dignity and self-respect, a sense of propriety, and a mingling of gentleness and manliness. These are elements of inestimable value.

Chastity pertains to both the welfare of the body and the health of the soul. Its violation is among the secret vices into which so many are liable to fall. The consequences of incontinence to the body are very damaging and to the mind still more disastrous. Nothing is more destructive of mental vigor, or refined and delicate sensibilities, and of spiritual vitality, than sensual conduct and the indulgence of the imagination in impure conceptions. The mind under such perverted culture becomes a nest of filthy abomination from which at last the wretched victim would fly if it were possible to escape. If generally indulged, its influence on the community would be appalling. Homes there would be none, families would be broken up, children would be cared for only by the public, and the whole moral structure of society would tend to utter dissolution. To disregard the obligations of chastity is more palpable rebellion against the Divine authority and the Divine government than is found in almost any other sin. All considerations—moral, religious, social, personal, prudential,—cry out with a loud voice to every young person—"Keep thyself pure."

Two Mistaken Tendencies. (1) The exploiting of

mere physical strength and prowess, which is possessing the popular mind, and even invading our schools of learning, is a retrograde tendency in our civilization; and (2) It is a grave mistake, in the question of physical culture, to overlook the predominance of the moral element in human nature. Man is a complex being, and must be studied in the completeness of his nature. The effect of moral motives upon human power and endurance must be justly considered. Many of the benefactors of the race in the fields of literature and of moral progress generally, have wrought under a constant struggle with some physical infirmity. Pain has often proved the necessary stimulus to exertion. It is one of the compensations by which Divine Wisdom balances the advantages and disadvantages, the joys and sorrows of life. Those deprived of full physical vigor may still labor with good courage and hope. Hence the great duty of self-improvement ends only with life, and perhaps not then.

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that a Christian cannot too carefully realize his own possibilities—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, moral and religious. In morality, he must avoid the insensible, erroneous, and uncertain conscience. In religion, he must avoid cherishing indifference, skepticism, superstition, atheism, and godlessness, in his views; and must guard against evincing hypocrisy, cant, bigotry, and fanaticism, in his life. The highest training of his powers, the most complete understanding of the world and of the outlying universe, the most delicate sensibility to the beauty which is displayed or secreted everywhere, are encouraged and demanded by the fundamental principles of Christian character, namely, love to God, love to mankind, and self-love.

Questions on the Lesson

1. What is the purpose of Part III of this treatise?
2. In what sense are all duties duties to God?
3. What is the difference between Pagan and Christian ethics?
4. Why is every individual under obligation to make the most of himself?
5. Tell of the word personality, its etymology and change in meaning.
6. What are the essential characteristics of personality?
7. Why is the moral life so important to the Christian?
8. Why do the religious powers stand first in their claim upon our attention? What is implied in "getting right with God"?
9. What are the duties we owe to our minds?
10. State the implications in the words: Knowledge, Wisdom, and Prudence.
11. Distinguish between practical knowledge and rational wisdom.
12. What are our duties to the sensibilities?
13. Why cultivate the æsthetic feelings?
14. Why cultivate a cheerful disposition? a Sensitive Conscience?
15. Discuss the duties to the will.
16. Mention some worthy ends for which man should live, and some vices he should avoid.
17. Tell of the care of the physical powers; of regularity of habits, also of the importance of good manners, and of chastity.
18. What are the two mistaken tendencies in physical training referred to in the lesson? Evaluate.

Problems for Discussion

1. Is it enough to define the Christian life by saying that one must "follow Jesus"? If not, why not?
2. Examine critically Gandhi's answer to the question how India might be Christianized, namely: (1) "I would suggest that all you Christians ought to live more like Jesus Christ. (2) That you must practise your religion without adulterating it or toning it down. (3) That you make love central in your lives, for love is central in Christianity."
3. Discuss: What does it mean to "accept Christ"? Is it primarily a matter of belief, or a matter of service, or a changed way of living?
4. If Christianity means as much to us as our clubs do, why is it that so few people speak to others about becoming Christians, whereas a club or lodge member is almost always trying to get his friends into his organization?
5. Interpret the following statements:
   (1) "We are losing our Christianity mainly because Christianity is a creed of heroes, and we are harmless, good-natured little people who want everybody to have a good time." (Dean Inge.)

   (2) "It seems to us that the Church has made its own the three pharisaical virtues of comfort, popularity, and success, and that seems strange to us who read the Gospels."
6. What is demanded of the Christian with respect: to his spiritual culture? to his mental and physical life? to good-will toward all men? to readiness to forgive injustice and unkindness? to methods of settling differences?
7. What are some of the things that ought to be present in the daily habits of the Christian? What ought to be absent?

8. To what extent do you think the average business man asks the question, What would Jesus have me do? before closing a big deal? A politician before deciding how he is going to vote? a Christian student before planning what he is going to do on Sunday? Why should they?
9. Evaluate the following suggestions as to what good amusement is: (*a*) It is the kind you not only enjoy while you play, but which helps you after you are through. (*b*) It completely breaks routine activities and rests the nerves, brain, and muscles. (*c*) It must have the element of surprise. (*d*) There must be absolute freedom from worry, etc., during recreation.
10. Distinguish between moral character and Christian character.
11. How do the definitions of *conversion* as given by a psychologist differ from those given by an evangelist?
12. Show by charts the external forces leading to conversion in the case of a child of Christian parents; of non-Christian parents.

LESSON XXIV

THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY

THE family is the primary unit of society. It is founded on biological and ethical laws conjointly, for both apply throughout family life just as in individual life.

The family is the first in time of the great social institutions—first in the life of the individual, and first in the life of the race. It antedates both historically and logically the other forms of social life. It is older than man's school, older than occupation, or state, or Church. It also antedates Christianity, for it existed in non-Christian lands as well as in Christian lands. It is the outcome of constant social experiment. Through the family the race has achieved civilization, and the individual finds his way into the complex world of the present. It is the only self-perpetuating institution, and hence should be most carefully safeguarded. Man's basic instincts drive him into some sort of family relationship, where familiarity and intimacy make possible an unusual frankness in relations. For this reason the family is considered the most important realm for social education. It has also furnished the pattern for the expression of our highest ethical and religious conceptions. About the family cluster the tenderest of human sentiments.

The family has been called "the social microcosmos," the world in miniature, since in it one enters into practically all the relationships that characterize social life in general. (Show why.) In the patri-

archal family of our early ancestors, the father was *ex officio,* the priest, the governor, the warrior, and the hunter, while the mother was the nurse, the teacher, the agriculturalist and the manufacturer; and the children, as they gained strength, assumed the tasks appropriate to their sex. In the great days of Roman history, the family had an equally important place, and among our European progenitors of the mediæval and modern periods, though supplemented by the Church, the family continued as the great molding factor in life. It was the religious centre, the economic unit, the school of moral character, and the supreme developing factor in nearly all vital ways.

The Social Unit. The family is the elementary unit of society; the most important and the most inevitable social group. It provides the most intimate and personal contacts. Here the relations of husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, constitute a true unity, in the moral significance of which it becomes apparent how strong and how great is this central though smallest type of social organization. The unit of society, therefore, is not the individual, who receives and transmits his life from and to others; nor the school, which receives pupils and keeps them only through the maturing period of their lives; nor the state, nor business, nor is it the Church, as illustrated by the Shakers, a religious sect which sacrificed the home. The home, then, is the centre about which all the interests of man are organized,—such interests as the school, vocation, state, and the Church. Of all the social institutions, it is perhaps the nearest to self-sufficiency.

Elements of Man-Making. In the family centre all the elements of man-making,—heredity, environment,

will, and Christian training. Every child has the inalienable right to be well-born, and also to be well-reared. Here is where and how the family can make its chief contribution to society. The family is the only institution that has legitimate control of the great element of heredity. The influence of the family life during the most susceptible years of childhood is incalculable. The place of the will in fashioning good habits in youth cannot be overestimated. Every child has the right also to be taught that there is a Supreme Being and that Christianity presents the best standard of consistent Christian living. It is by means of the Christian family that religion is made hereditary, each generation being linked with that which went before and that which comes after. It is the privilege of parents to instil the first principles of the Christian faith, and to nurture the first growth of Christian character; it is theirs to guard against the inroads of evil, to give the first teachings in prayer and duty, to be watchful of themselves out of respect to the young. In fulfilling these obligations, the parents are endeavoring to acquaint their children with a noble heritage and are securing the maintenance of the Christian faith in the next generation.

Parental Duties. The duties of the parent to the child, other than the religious training alluded to, are maintenance in his own condition in life, care for his education, advice, restraint when needed, punishment when deserved and needed, pure example and wholesome influence, aid in the formation of correct habits and aptitudes suited to his probable calling or state in his adult years, provision for his favorable entrance on his future career. The judicious parent will train him gradually to self-help and self-dependence, and

will concede to him, as he approaches years of maturity, such freedom of choice and action as is consistent with his permanent well-being.

Children's Duties. The child's duty is unqualified submission to the parent's authority, obedience to his commands, and compliance with his wishes, in all things not morally wrong, and this, not only for the years of minority, but so long as he remains a member of his parent's family, or dependent on him for subsistence. Subsequently, it is surely his duty to consult the reasonable wishes of his parent, to hold him in respect and reverence, to minister faithfully to his comfort and happiness, and if need be, to sustain him in his years of decline and infirmity.

Love Exalts Home. The Christian home is the temple of man's love. The apostle declares, "God is love. He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and He in him." Some one has said that the home, especially in the procreative function, concretes God's life in the world; it is a call to man to exercise Divine gifts; it is a true Shekinah; it is a shelter of the Eternal in the heart of the temporal. Even when there is no room for God in the busy marts and inns of life, the home is still His dwelling place. All love is of God. All the externals of life are laid aside in the home. Here, if at all, man meets God face to face.

Marriage. Hence it is that the family is Divine in its origin, and that marriage is both a religious and a civic rite. God made man male and female and ordained marriage as the indispensable condition of the continuance of the race. God has made known the nature of marriage, the prerequisites to the marriage compact, the ground of its dissolution, and the end and duties of the marriage relation. The husband and

wife acknowledge its Divine origin by making their vow of mutual fidelity to God. Marriage has, however, a natural basis in the social affections and desires of man, and thus becomes, in a sense, a civil institution from its practical connection with civil society. Its proper limits are to be found in the will of God as revealed in the nature of man and in the Scriptures.

Obligation to Purity. The obligation to physical, intellectual, and moral purity is the same for all; and family life becomes the watchful guardian of social purity. The law of purity applies to man as to woman, —to woman as to man,—with no trace in reason for making the slightest difference in our judgments. Take away the sacredness of the family relation and the whole fabric of civilization must topple and fall.

The Teaching of Jesus on Marriage. Our Lord's teaching in relation to marriage is that marriage creates a perfect and permanent union between one man and one woman, a union which is not to be broken by human act, and that this principle expresses God's will for man and was involved in man's nature from the beginning. Though the law of monogamy is not expressly laid down in the New Testament, it is implied in this teaching, and the Christian consciousness has always discerned the fact.

Paul's Teaching. Paul gives the following charge, basing his teaching upon the authority of the Christ: "Unto the married I give charge, yea, not I, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband (but and if she depart let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband); and that the husband leave not his wife" (1 Cor. 7: 10–11). These clear and strong statements or words are easily understood. They guard well the central fortress of Christian pu-

rity. These great principles mentioned here form an atmosphere of purity and holy love, in which no evil word can be spoken, no impure action can be done. From such surroundings come forth strong and pure souls,—such as inspire men with the noblest enthusiasms and are a perpetual witness to Christ as generation succeeds generation.

Trend of the Modern Family. But the most superficial observation of the family situation to-day reveals the fact that in the United States the family is undergoing a process of reorganization, if not of disintegration. It is clearly no longer the fixed and stable institution of a few generations ago. All sociologists have noted pronounced tendencies toward family disruption. They tell that it began with the individualism and freedom of thought of the Protestant Reformation; that it took more definite shape in the great movement of the eighteenth century toward human equality with its new emphasis on the rights of women, and accentuated by the industrial revolution, with its very significant economic readjustments. These forces have made marriage less stable and have greatly weakened the influence of family life upon the children.

Forces Changing Family Life. (1) *Lax marriage, and inadequate divorce laws,* causing the disintegration of the marriage relation. The iniquitous divorce laws which now deface the statute books of almost all the states have already wrought fearful moral ruin. In the proportion of marriages thus dissolved the United States, having passed Japan, its only competitor, during the last decade, exceeds to-day not only the Christian world, but the non-Christian world as well. In some communities the number of divorces in a single year approximate the number of marriages.

(2) *The Prevalence and Peril of Social Evil.* Of a still worse character is the *licentious project of legalizing the so-called social evil.* 25% of asylum inmates, 50% of major operations on women, 95% of babies born blind, and 90% of babies born deaf are due directly or indirectly to some form of social disease. If carried out in this country as it has been in France, such a project would be the equivalent of signing the death warrant of social and national purity, virtue, and stability.

(3) Increasing percentage of people living in cities, especially in apartment houses, is another cause. (Why?)

(4) The home is being forsaken too much by our women and too much neglected by the men. Some women do not live up to their home privileges; most men do not. Too many women are only traveling companions instead of home makers. What is the result? They have very little influence in molding the lives of their children.

(5) Good-natured indifference of parents is largely responsible for the unsocial actions of many young people to-day.

(6) The coming of the factory system, in which woman can earn her own living, either before marriage or after separation from an undesirable husband, has done much to destroy the family as an economic unit.

(7) The home is being made ridiculous by the comic press and the pleasantry columns of too many newspapers. To laugh *with* the home is one thing, to laugh *at* it is quite another. The result is, they cannot bring to their own future homes a whole-hearted respect and devotion.

(8) By our most praiseworthy charities we are undermining the family. We heal defective souls and bodies and rescue the perishing generally, but we insist upon suppressing the function of the family. The father is unfit, the mother is incompetent, the environment is unattractive, hence children are taken away to some huge bleak institution where they can be herded scientifically with other children. The family is more important than the individual, hence rational helpfulness should aid the delinquent individual by aiding the family. The family is the first spiritual unit, the real Church, " and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

(9) The widespread desecration of the Lord's Day.

(10) *The Decline of Family Religion.* All these tendencies combined lead to the most ominous of all, namely, the *decadence of family religion.* A generation ago the father of a Christian family was expected to maintain regular religious exercises in the home. It was so in the writer's boyhood home. No matter how pressing the farm duties, the reading of the Bible, followed by family prayers, was a regular morning practice. Parents and children attended Sunday school and church services regularly. To-day countless men and women in middle life gratefully acknowledge the stimulating influence of such distinctly religious training. But in most modern homes to-day family worship has been abandoned. The father is no longer the teacher, nor the priest nor even the lawgiver. Children are growing up without knowledge of the Bible and the way of salvation and unaccustomed to hearing their father's voice in prayer, or in giving of thanks in the breaking of bread. While the religious spirit is not dead in home life, for it is universal and can never

die, yet its old family forms are going, and many parents are uncertain and even confused as to what should be done, or taught, or required, and are seeking a remedy for these grave dangers. These are some of the outstanding tendencies that threaten the American home.

Safeguard and Remedy. Education in the home based upon the teachings of Jesus is our safeguard and remedy. This kind of education is proposed, for, when true, it brings God our Saviour and Christ His Revealer into the thought and life of family and nation. No reality less than God is the ultimate solution of our human problems. As already indicated, the family altar is practically in ruins. Church altars are not filled because home altars are deserted. The Sioux Indians of the great Northwest, about forty thousand of them, believe in the family altar and the church altar. The old Indian father gathers his family together in a circle (nobody excused), reads the Bible, and they sing and pray fervently. This is done daily. All Indian families are connected with some church and are regular attendants. Among them is found such faith as is seldom equalled in the white man's home. The Indian thinks too highly of God to take His name in vain. What an example! Every child should have three altars: the mother's arms, the mother's knees, and the family altar with the father as priest. A family altar in every home; a family pew in every church; the Scriptures and other choice literature read and practised in every household: these would produce evangelized homes. Twenty-seven million children in America are receiving no religious training at all. They are growing up as spiritual illiterates.

The family is the most effective teacher of religion and cannot justly throw off this burden upon the public school, though the public has its distinct duty to religion; nor can the burden be thrown upon the Sunday school, though the Sunday school has done very well and represents one of the most beneficent social forces set free in the nineteenth century. But without home foundations, the Sunday school cannot be effective alone, for the time at its disposal is inadequate for that systematic and continuous religious instruction needed by growing children. After all, the parents are the natural and most influential religious teachers of the children, as before stated. The Sunday school must *supplement*, but not *supplant* the home in religious instruction.

Neither can this burden of Christian education be thrown by the home upon the pulpit and the Church. Without the background of the home, the pulpit and Church can do but little. Christian parents cannot evade their duty. They ought to be identified with Sunday school and church; they ought to discuss Christian ideals and all the members of the family enjoy the rewards of such precious experiences. The American home must bear its own burden, improve its own opportunity of religious education, however its burden or opportunity may be shared by other educational agencies. The home must go forward to better new things. The wave of lawlessness, of immorality, of irresponsibility sweeping our country to-day must be checked. God's solution is given in 2 Chronicles 7: 14 and in Proverbs 14: 34.

New Forces. Intelligent Choice of Life-Partners. Among the new things or forces which the modern Christian home must increasingly represent are: A

more enlightened choice of *life-partners.* Here is where the permanent happiness of the home and the most rapid improvement of the human race rests. Heredity, one of the greatest forces in life, represents the natural expression of the Divine law of visiting the iniquities of the fathers unto the third and fourth generation and showing mercy unto thousands. Then also, an adequate program must provide for *habit formation,* the acquiring of information concerning *correct sex habits,* and the development of *attitudes, interests,* and *ideals.* Most children desire knowledge of the way in which they come into the world. Such knowledge is sought generally before they have any particular sex consciousness, and should be given them by parents frankly and reverently so that their first knowledge of sex relations and the forces of human reproduction shall be wholesome. No parent should allow such knowledge to be acquired first from lips of evil-minded or flippant persons. To be well-born is an essential first thing, which parents must instil into the minds and hearts of their growing children.

New Religion in Home. A New Form of Life. The well-born child grows up in a religious atmosphere in the home and breathes it every moment of the day. Children have a right to be brought up by their parents in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. While they are to be fed, clothed, sent to school and to be loved, they are also to be instructed in righteousness. The words spoken, the deeds done, as well as the hymns sung and the prayers offered, and the Scriptures read, must be in the spirit of the Christ. The new religion in the home must be a new form of life. It must cultivate the *habit of religion in life;* it

must give the disposition of the child that acquaintanceship with religious life which later will control the man and further the growth of children in God toward God. Such instruction and example will become the guaranty of the value of the family as a social institution, and a remedy for its present imminent perils. This is the needed message of the hour. "To Adam, Paradise was home. To the good among his descendants, home is Paradise."

References for Further Reading

Adler, Felix: *Marriage and Divorce.*

Bushnell, H.: *Christian Nurture.*

Coe, G. A.: *Education in Religion and Morals,* pp. 271–285.

Cooley, C. H.: *The Social Process,* Chapter XXI.

Cope, H. F.: *Religious Education in the Family.*

Dealy, J. Q.: *The Family.*

Ellwood, C. A.: *Sociology and Modern Social Problems,* Chapters 6, 7, and 8.

Goodsell, W.: *The Family as a Social and Educational Institution.*

Gray, A. Herbert: *Men, Women, and God.*

Guyer, Michael F.: *Being Well Born.*

Lichtenberger, J. B.: *The Problem of Divorce.*

Moore, M. E.: *Parent, Teacher, and School,* Part I.

Royden, Maude: *Sex and Common Sense.*

Thwing, C. F., and Carrie F.: *The Family : an Historical and Social Study,* Chapter XI, especially.

Todd, A. J.: *The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency.*

Trumbull, H. C.: *The Yale Lectures.*

Westermarck, E.: *The History of Human Marriage.*

The publications of associations like the National Child Welfare Association, the American Social Hygiene Association, and the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work are very valuable for information on important family problems.

Questions on the Lesson

1. Define the family.
2. Tell of the primary importance of the family.
3. Why has the family been called the Social microcosmos?
4. Explain the elements of man-making in the family.
5. List the duties of parents to children and of children to parents.
6. In what sense is the family of Divine origin?
7. Explain the term "marriage" and its implications.
8. Why are the obligations to physical, intellectual and moral purity the same for husband and wife?
9. What is our Lord's Teaching concerning marriage? Paul's teaching?
10. Discuss the forces at work changing family life.
11. Compare the United States with other countries on the subject of divorce and present practice.
12. Why should a fixed abode, perhaps the family home for several generations, affect the character of the members of a household?
13. Discuss the decay of family religion.
14. What is the safeguard and remedy suggested?
15. Why is the family the most effective teacher of religion?
16. Why cannot the burden of religious education be shifted to public school? to the Sunday school? to the Church?
17. What should be the attitude of the family toward a more enlightened choice of life-partners?
18. Why should parents give information concerning correct sex habits?
19. What is meant by cultivating the habit of religion in life? How?
20. Tell of the religious habits of the American Indian.

Problems for Discussion

1. In what respects are the ideals of Christian living patterned after the relationships in the family? Why is the family such an important institution?
2. Contrast parental authority of a generation ago with that of to-day.
3. What moral purpose should be present in a true marriage? Does marriage ennoble sex attractions? If so, how?
4. Point out wherein the conception of the rights of the husband and wife have changed during the last twenty-five years.
5. Portray a happy married life. Cite its essentials.
6. What reasons are usually given for divorce? Is there a justifiable reason? Why should it be considered a disgrace?
7. Critically discuss the present status of the family as an educational force; as a religious agency.
8. Why is it the right of every child to be well-born and well-reared?
9. Is parental prestige equal in all families? Cite the factors that strengthen or weaken it.
10. Illustrate the difficulty of overcoming the bad influence of the home in respect to language, economic and moral attitudes. Are these attitudes inherited or acquired? Give reasons for your answer.
11. Interpret the statement that in these days parents obey their children instead of children obeying their parents.
12. In what respects is it true that the old time authority of parents is to-day "split up among the teacher, truant officer, priest, judge, factory inspector, play leader, shop foreman, or union business agent"?
13. How is the integrity of the home threatened by modern industrial and social practices?

14. In what sense is it true that the young people of to-day confront a world that was unknown to the youth of a generation ago? This being true, how should parents assist in this difficult and dangerous adjustment?

15. Why is the basis of permanent happiness in marriage companionship? Why should husband and wife be comrades and confidants?

16. Why should the older generation draw nearer to the younger helpfully, sympathetically, wisely?

17. In what sense is every nation a reflection of its homes?

18. In what sense should the term "homemaker" include the fathers as well as the mothers?

19. Make a list of the character and faith destroying influences that beset the young people of our homes to-day? What should be the Christian's attitude toward them?

20. Evaluate: "The raw materials for a new renaissance lie all about us, waiting for spiritual leadership to touch them into life. It is men we need—men with creative minds, with the wit, the wisdom and the technique to extract the real values from these materials."

21. How may the home, the press and the pulpit promote a better understanding of racial equality and a greater tolerance?

LESSON XXV

THE CHRISTIAN AND HIS LIFE-WORK

ONE of the most difficult and delicate things to be done by any man who would succeed in life is to make choice of his peculiar work. Christian ethics assumes that every normal individual will wish to be engaged in some useful work. Society expects every man to do some worth-while work in order to retain his self-respect, even if it is not necessary to gain a livelihood. Idleness is a disgrace as well as a curse. "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread" was intended for the millionaire as well as for the wage-earner. The world's chief citizens are toilers, and Christianity has always recognized the full dignity of the worker. The aristocratic sentiment concerning work is therefore not Christian. We inherited it from ancient class distinctions. It is Pagan. The American Indian has the right conception of work; to him work is one of the Christian fundamentals.

Work a Tonic. Work is a wonderful tonic; it is a requisite of health. Every organ of the body has work to perform. When it fails to work it is ill. Bodily activity maintains life. Death is inactivity. Work is an evidence of vitality. Do you react promptly to the demands of your vocation and interests? Or are you hesitant, dilatory, unwilling? Are you alive to the benefits of labor? Do you enjoy the sensations of business, manual work, mental occupation, spiritual refreshment? The Christian should put thought, effort, soul into wisely ordered action. The

work of his hands and mind and heart are his image —his likeness, and should reveal system, foresight, thrift, strength, determination, coördination, endurance, optimism; his habits of thought, his judgment, his physical and spiritual states are expressed in his application to his daily work. "By the work one knows the workman." When a Christian is lacking in interest, enthusiasm, perseverance, enjoyment, the best results cannot be achieved. Idleness, procrastination, indolence, indecision, wastefulness, inaccuracy, slovenliness, laziness, warrant investigation. Industry and physical and spiritual health act reciprocally. Often the Christian's trouble is in himself, not in his work. Sometimes he is improperly placed in the work of the world, maladjusted. For example, he may be a lawyer, when his interests are in medicine; he may be a carpenter, when his zeal and devotion counsel the ministry. When the trouble is with himself, there is then afforded an opportunity to think, to reason, to investigate, to prevent.

The Christian a Steward. The Christian must know himself and his limitations. He must also recognize his stewardship. In its simplest meaning a steward is one who has received something from another with instructions to use it, ever keeping in mind that it belongs to the owner and that he will be called to a reckoning as to how he meets his obligation. It includes time, talent, means. The Christian belongs to God through creation and redemption. Christ must be accepted as Lord, as the first essential to liberty, joy, and service. In measuring our abilities, it is foolish to talk about what we have not. We are responsible for using what we have. Every ability is to be converted into serviceability. The stewardship of self and serv-

ice is implied. It is not enough to render back to the Master what we have received, even though uninjured and undiminished. We must add something by our faithful efforts. In other words, Christians must be stewards of self, which means more than not doing any harm. Christians must be *good for something;* must recognize God's ownership of their lives, and that they give Him the best service possible.

To-day there is a firm call to Christians, especially to young Christians, to make Christ Lord in their lives. It is a call to new fellowship with Him in the study of the Word, in prayer, and in Kingdom building. It is indeed a movement which seeks to get every Christian to be faithful in his stewardship—the stewardship of life—the stewardship of the infinite resources and power of God which are released only in answer to prayer. When this is acknowledged and practised, the Kingdom of God will come with power.

The Manhood Vocation. The life of Jesus was a life with a conscious mission. He came to do the will of God; to seek and to save the lost. He did not move about in uncertainty; He did not drift among unknown currents to an unknown end; did not spend His life prospecting for a purpose and just hit upon it at the close. No energy is wasted in feverish and futile quest. His calling was appointed to Him. He knew it and accepted it. His consciousness was possessed by a sense of a sovereign mission: " The will of Him that sent Me."

Christ's vocation was a new kind of business among men. This seeking and saving as a mission is still so new that we are just beginning to figure at the outer edges of it. Most men, in choosing their life's work, plan for what they can get and gain by it; it is the

accumulation of wealth or comfort or distinction or learning that they have at heart.

It was a spiritual conservation of forces, a Divine efficiency system, that Christ had at heart; not for Himself, but for manhood, for the whole race of men. Here we touch modern ground. Men are studying much nowadays on the problem of efficiency in their business and industries; studying how to stop the leakage, redeem the waste and reduce the shrinkage in the complex applications of human energy. They are just waking to the idea that it is not our whole business to create and accumulate values; that even in the material values that we seemingly prize so highly there is enormous waste and loss; that we must turn our thoughts to seeking and saving. It is in seeking and saving that efficiency lies.

Seek the Lost Values. It is the values that get lost in the hardened heart and the heedless crowd that need the Christian's wisdom, faith, and care. They hide in the mines and factories and counting-rooms, where the soulless machinery of our civilization is grinding its grist; human hearts are there looking for us to see whether they are to be brother men or mere working tools for our schemes. They lurk in the secret places of our history and philosophy and civics; human hearts are there looking for us to see if, in our search for truth, our scholarship shall be cold and negative, or saving and vital. They are the eyes and hearts of the world's lost values yearning for the light.

We are not in the world chiefly to create; that is God's part. We are here chiefly to save what He has created, to help out to fullness and efficiency what was good in the making, but marred in the world's use and misuse. And our account is made out not with

reference to the past—what we have done or accumulated—but with reference to the present and the future—what in the spirit of the Son of Man we may mend and call to life and save to permanent value.

Manhood Mission. God surely wants man to give Him an opportunity in his life. He wants him to be conscious of his mission—to seek and conserve and to cultivate the best things in life. Too many give God a very meagre opportunity in their lives. They shut Him out by ignorance, by vicious living, by failure to develop their possibilities. Most of their powers are merely potential—asleep,—not living, practical forces. They need to be aroused; need to keep themselves up to standard, always in trim, with all their reserve force drilled, trained, ready. The greatest thing a human being can do is to put himself in a position, by preparation and training, where God can get the most out of him, can make the greatest possible Christian worker of him. God wants man to give Him the opportunity to call out of his thought and energies the great purpose and plan which He implanted in him at birth, the purpose which runs in his blood, the plan that is indicated by the very structure of his brain; He wants him to do the thing he can do most perfectly—his strongest, best thing, cleanest thing—not the weak thing, which appeals only to the smaller part of him. God wants man to do that which will call into play the greatest number of his strongest powers. He wants his vocation to be his self-expression in its entirety, not a mere mockery of his possibilities. It is a sin against self and against the Creator to botch one's whole life by refusing to work to the program which is outlined in his very constitution, and through laziness, indifference, or greed, to substitute an inferior one. It is

the good in man, not the brute; the real man, not the trickster or schemer, that the Infinite wishes to call out in him.

The Choice of a Life-Work. In making the choice of a life-work, Duty requires man to avoid certain errors and to be guided by certain principles.

What Errors to be Avoided? (1) A very common error is for a man to think that a life of ease, having no work and no definite aim, is allowable. As already seen, such lives are destructive to those leading them, since "man's play day is always the devil's working day," and in the highest degree immoral, as casting off allegiance to the law and purpose and plan of God. For a being of such wonderful capacities as man, living in a state of preparation for a future immortal existence, and having such great things set before him to be accomplished in so short a time, to be idle and without a conscious mission is to subject himself to inevitable moral condemnation and misery. Work has great moral value. All able-bodied men wish some definite worth-while work to do. All labor is honorable, and the laborer should seek to experience an inherent value in his labor; should cultivate an inner attitude so as to make work interesting, rewarding, and his best tonic.

(2) Another error, especially prevalent to-day, is that money-getting is the chief end of man. Such worship of mammon is an immorality, and its moral doom is seen in the miser.

(3) A third, and perhaps the most prevalent and pernicious, error of the times is that respectability and honor are to be found only in the few so-called learned professions. To-day many fields furnish opportunity for the choice of a life-work in addition to the min-

istry, law, medicine, dentistry, teaching; such as manufacturing, engineering, construction-work, trades, transportation, salesmanship, advertising, banking, general farming, mining, live stock raising, forestry, and so forth. In Roman Catholicism, there are special vocations, which are in and of themselves peculiarly religious, but not so in Protestantism. God calls men to all kinds of worth-while labor.

Certain Guiding Principles in the Choice of a Work in Life. (1) For what vocation do my talents, temperament and training fit me? Every man has a special fitness for something. Other things being equal, he will succeed best at that. Sometimes it requires time and effort to ascertain things; sometimes the peculiar talent does not show itself early in life; but ordinarily the mission may be discovered by careful, anxious investigation, and then the result is worth all the patience and the labor. He should choose the vocation corresponding to his gifts regardless of where it may take him.

(2) Then, where am I needed most? Some callings are less crowded than others. Some work is more urgently needed. Common sense should be used. The law of supply and demand applies to a vocation as much as to the price of corn and coal. What needs doing is an important question to ask.

(3) Then, which vocation will help me give God His best chance or opportunity in my life and help me to attain the finest and fullest Christian personality?

(4) A fourth question and perhaps the crowning question is, What would God have me do? How may I best glorify God with my life? How may I know I have God's approval and leadership in my choice of this particular vocation, and how may I fit

my life into God's great plan for me? It may be well to remember that any calling which serves mankind may be in the highest sense Christian. Every normal person is a reservoir of power, and what he makes of himself, what he achieves in life, what he does for the world is dependent on the extent to which he draws on his hidden forces, to the extent that he gives God His opportunity in him.

Attitude Toward Work When Found. When one has found his life-work, the wise disposition and devotion of the powers to the work are in line of duty. The Christian should be devoted to his work—on the farm, in the shop, at the desk, behind the counter, in the office, in the teacher's chair, or in the pulpit,—and show an increasing interest in it; he should improve his workmanship as he becomes more experienced and more interested; he should commit his whole life to the task; he should be conscious that God, as well as man, sees what he is doing and knows whether he is doing his best, and making the most of the forces and treasures of the world and time in supplementing his personal powers for the exaltation of his work in life.

Decisive action must follow the decisive purpose, if that purpose is to be of any value. God has placed high honor upon industry by His own ceaseless work. The man who would achieve a noble purpose must bring to the work an activity of corresponding energy. It must be work every stroke of which is in the right place and in which the strokes are constant and ceaseless. Opposition, desertion, and success must be made subservient to the decisive will in pushing on the work of life, and an intense moral enthusiasm must underlie and furnish the most powerful spring of every truly noble life. Half-hearted work can never succeed

where man has all the forces of Nature, and all the adverse forces of his own being and of society, to contend with, master, and turn to account. One who saw Michael Angelo at his work tells us that he wrought with fearful energy and earnestness. He would accomplish many times as much as other men. Every stroke was with all the soul, that, as he saw the huge fragments fly from the rapid blows, the observer trembled lest the statue should be ruined. But the enthusiastic workman held ceaselessly on, cutting and filing, dashing off as incumbrances every particle which hindered the completion of the likeness, until the once shapeless block took shape and polish and beauty, and stood forth the finished work of his hand, his brain, his soul, his life, and the perfect embodiment of his ideal. Any man who would accomplish the true work of life may see in the great sculptor his human model. With the grandest possible mission of seeking and saving, taking hold on God and immortality, with the inspiration of the matchless Christ, his may well be the grandest possible moral enthusiasm; and with the whole being directed ceaselessly to the fulfilment of such a mission under the influence of such a motive and Leader, his may well be the grandest possible success.

References for Further Study

Allen, F. J.: *A Guide to the Study of Occupations.*

Brewster, E. T.: *Vocational Guidance for the Professions.*

Cabot, Richard C.: *What Men Live By.*

Grenfell, W. T.: *The Adventure of Life.*

Weaver, E. M.: *Building a Career.*

Wright, H. B.: *The Will of God and a Man's Life-Work.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why is the choosing of one's peculiar work so difficult and delicate?
2. Is Christian ethics right in assuming that every normal man wishes to be engaged in some useful work? If so, why?
3. Why do society and the world expect every man to do something?
4. Explain: This is a work-world and its chief citizens are toilers.
5. In what sense are our great cities, industries, and transportation systems the result of work?
6. In what sense has Christianity always recognized the full dignity of the worker? Why was a "gentleman" formerly not expected to work?
7. In what sense was the life of Jesus a life with a conscious mission?
8. Discuss the Christian conception of vocation.
9. Define vocation. Do you think of your life-work as a vocation?
10. What motive prompts most men in choosing their life's work?
11. What evidences show that men are beginning to turn their thoughts to seeking and saving in spiritual things as well as in material?
12. Why does God want man to give Him a chance in his life?
13. What would be the result in his life if man became conscious of the great mission God has for his life?
14. How may one's vocation be an expression of his entire self?
15. What errors should man avoid in choosing his life-work? Why?

16. What principles should guide man in choosing his life-work? Why?
17. When once found, what should be his attitude toward his life-work?
18. Why must decisive action follow the decisive purpose?
19. Tell of Michael Angelo's attitude toward his work, and the result. Make the application to your own life-work as a Christian.

Problems for Further Discussion

1. Why is the Christian business man confronted with an exceptionally difficult situation? The Christian lawyer? The Christian physician?
2. Define the duties of a Christian physician; of a Christian lawyer; of a Christian teacher; of a Christian minister.
3. What makes a vocation religious, according to the standards of Catholicism? According to standards of Protestantism?
4. After consulting books and friends, list carefully all the things you believe ought to be considered in choosing a life-work.
5. Should a Christian make his decision on a different basis from that of a person who makes no profession of Christianity? Why?
6. Is it all right for a non-Christian to choose the job which pays the most money? Why? Is it all right for a Christian to choose the work which pays the most money? Why? Does Luke 2:49 give a rule for us?
7. Many young people are making their decisions on the basis of being able to "serve the world" through their particular vocation. How can an engineer be of real Christian service? a science teacher? an editor?

8. Critically examine the following statements: (*a*) One vocation is just as Christian as another; it all depends upon the person who is doing the work. (*b*) Every Christian ought to consider the question of becoming a minister or a missionary before he finally decides upon something else.
9. Interpret the life-work implications in the following passages: Matthew 6:10; 6:19; 6:24; 6:33. What do these verses mean?
10. Is it easier for a minister to be a Christian than for a farmer? a banker? a grocer? a lawyer? a policeman? a politician? Why in each case?
11. In whatever we decide to do, why is it important that we do it according to the Sermon on the Mount, and that we consider the work of the Church as important in our lives as laymen as we expect our minister to consider it in his life?
12. Is Christian service expressed most tellingly in vocations or in avocations? Why?
13. Does the person who always asks the question, "What will I get out of it?" or "What will it cost me?" realize the most and best out of life? If not, why not?
14. Tell of value of a strong imagination in (*a*) the teacher and preacher, (*b*) the missionary, (*c*) the inventor and explorer, (*d*) prophet.
15. Why is it that the less a man works the harder work seems to him? And that the people who do the most good are those who are always willing to take one more hard job?

LESSON XXVI

THE CHRISTIAN AND HIS CHURCH

THE most distinctive, profound, and far-reaching service which the Christian renders to his fellow men is as a member of the Christian Church. The various terms applied to the Church in the Old and New Testament Scriptures number seventy-eight, and the names and titles given to the Head of the Church, the Lord Jesus Christ, number one hundred and ten. The one comprehensive name given to the Body of Christ is the Church.

Varying Conceptions of the Church. (1) At first the term "Church" was applied to a few individuals. Thus in its twofold primitive character, it included Adam and Eve, Abel and Enoch, Noah and Abraham, the apostles and other disciples.

(2) Then the term was applied to many individuals; to the hundreds and thousands of Israel; and in the Acts 8: 1, we read "there was a great persecution against the Church; and they were all scattered abroad."

(3) Then the term was applied to collections of individuals. Thus each tribe was a Church, and the whole twelve tribes was one grand, glorious Church. The early Christians were formed into congregations, and we read of the Church at Antioch, the Church at Corinth, the Church at Jerusalem. But up to that time there were no buildings for worship. The Israelites were worshipping in their own houses, in caves, and wherever they could hide from persecution.

(4) Then the term began to be applied to the building; to the Tabernacle, to the temple; and in the gospel dispensation to buildings like those erected now for worship.

(5) There are yet two other senses in which the term Church is applied:

(*a*) To all persons of whatever nation, class or condition, who are baptized and are professing Christians, —by which we understand the *visible* Church; (*b*) To all persons in every age, from the creation of man to the present time, those who have loved God in sincerity and have savingly believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, and those who do now thus love and believe,— by which we understand the *invisible* Church.

(6) To the Church are further applied the terms *militant* and *triumphant;* the term "militant" referring to the warfare of Christians against sin and Satan in this life;—the term "triumphant" referring to the victorious entry of the spirits of Christians who have been caught up to the paradise of God.

It is in the sense of the Church visible and invisible that we speak when we say, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church,"—as truly comprehending all really Christian Churches. The Holy Catholic Church is the communion of saints.

Definition of Church. By the term "Church," then, in its strictest sense, we understand the "children of God," the called of God, "the assembly of the saints." The "Called" is in fact the meaning of the word (ecclesia) in the language from which it has been translated into our tongue. The Church, then, includes patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors— all saints of every period.

Antiquity of Church. The Church is of great an-

tiquity. Christ has never been without a witness in any age. The Church under some form has always existed. Its life-history may be divided into two periods in its relation to Christ. We have the Church for 4,000 years exercising faith in the Messiah Who was to come; and the Church for nearly 2,000 years exercising faith in the Messiah Who has come. The Messiah is one,—"The same yesterday, to-day, and forever,"—the faith is one.

Its Outward Expression. The Church found outward expression when Christ, its great Head, became incarnate. He established an order of church life different from the Adamic, and the Noahian, and the Patriarchal, and Wilderness forms. Old things passed away; all things became new. The same true and essential life that existed under the old economy was preserved in the new but under a different form. Ceremonialism was at an end. Hierarchy had fulfilled its mission. The great High Priest Himself had come, and rending the veil in twain from the top to the bottom, He became in personal embodiment not only "the truth and the life," but also "the way," the "new and living way," consecrated through the veil, His flesh, "the way into the holy of holies." He ordained preachers, sending them forth with the commission, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature."

At that time was virtually begun, and where, in simplicity and in truth, it has been adhered to since, has been continued to the present time, a new order of church life—the more distinctively Christian Church.

Perpetuity of the Church. The Church in the New Testament is called "the Church of the living God" —not the Church of an idol, or of a Pagan deity, or

of the mythic gods and goddesses of the more cultured Greeks and Romans. All these were but dead, senseless blocks of wood or stone, and the highly wrought fancies of the imagination, and having no life, no power in themselves, could impart no life, no power to the systems named after them. Hence the systems, lacking life, were conceived in death, and though for a while continuing, were in their continuance but monuments of death, and in time crumbled and fell into ruins.

But not so with the Church of the living God. Because He lives the Church has lived, and does live, and will continue to live. The continued life of the Church is a practical exposition of the words of Jesus, "because I live, ye shall live also."

The almighty power of the living God has preserved the life of the Church amid the upheavals of the time, the downfall of empires, the destruction of kingdoms, and will continue to preserve her amid the wreck of matter and crash of worlds. The living God has founded and perpetuated His Church through every age of the world-history for grand and glorious purposes; such as that in the Church His will may be done, that men may become dead unto sin, and alive unto God through our Lord Jesus Christ. The living God, so benevolent in His provisions of the Church, designs and desires the welfare of all men through His Son Jesus Christ. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." And in the workings of God in Christ, the Church has been the way of life, has been a blessing to men in all ages.

The Benefits of the Church and Man's Duty to the Church. Not only has the Church been a blessing to

men in all ages, but it has also been a blessing, a benefit to *all men* in all ages, to all men who in any sense at all dwell within the reach of its influence. It is the one organization whose purpose is to maintain Christian ideals, to inculcate religious and moral convictions and to enlighten and strengthen men in the fulfilment of their duties as Christians and loyal church members.

Recently, a prominent lawyer said to the writer in a conversation concerning the Church: "The Church is the greatest police force in the world." This is true, but truth not often recognized. The Church is the guardian of law and order; the preserver of our liberty and of all things we hold dear. Imagine what would happen if every church in the land were closed for six months and suspended all of its activities. What would be the condition of affairs? The Church must ever be regarded as a Divine institution, but its continued existence and welfare will depend in part upon human sacrifice, loyalty and support. What sacrifices are you making? What loyalty are you manifesting? What kind of support are you giving? How long do you think the Church would last if everybody acted as you do?

The question of going to church and working for it is a personal one, and individual responsibility cannot be escaped. Each member should seek a vision of his obligations to God and to his church and be obedient to it. At church, in the quiet of worship, lives are exposed to the influences of the spiritual and the unseen. There, relieved from the daily round of duty, we are better able to hear what the Lord, our God, would say. There men come to know the principles of Jesus, which knowledge is the most vital the mind of man can hold. Men who have eyes that see and

hearts that feel have been asking in all generations questions akin to the following: How can young life be saved from the influences that disintegrate character? Is the highest type of manhood possible where youth has been ignorant of Christian teaching? Is there any help from Jesus Christ for the man who faces fierce temptation? Can he be set free who is the slave of overmastering passion? Is the bad habit which has prevented success a permanent fixture? Those losses which no earthly insurance can satisfy—the loss of self-respect, of reputation, and honor, of friends, of hope, of character—has Jesus anything to say in the presence of such bankruptcy? Is peace of mind a business asset? Does the elimination of worry contribute to success? What will keep a man from losing his head when success comes? Must every man face the inevitable? Will each man meet his God? Is there anything anywhere that will fortify a soul in such crises as these?

Man's relationship with man raises intricate questions. Why are we interested in children while oriental nations are indifferent to their well-being? What are the forces making for a living wage and a shorter working day? Where did those forces originate? What will destroy suspicion between capital and labor? Who is responsible for the forcing of unwilling victims into lives of shame? How can we get a soul into a corporation? How can a stockholder be made to see that he is responsible for the wrongdoing of his company? How shall we ultimately banish war from the planet?

James Russell Lowell said: "There is enough dynamite in the New Testament to blow every obnoxious institution out of existence." An institution that seeks

to mediate prevention and remedy for the ills suggested by the foregoing questions is an indispensable institution, and is worthy the heartiest support of every man who loves his kind.

Guided by the Holy Scriptures, the Church teaches of God more clearly and more satisfactorily than all the other religions combined. All down through the ages man has tried to find God. The Christian Church, thus guided, rewarded this quest. The Church of the living God is the pillar and ground of truth; not physical truth, nor political truth, but spiritual truth—the truth about God and sin and salvation.

The Church of all religious bodies presents the correct doctrine of man. Man in God's image and after His likeness, man shall act in harmony with this great truth. "What doth Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God." The body, the temple of the Holy Ghost, is holy and must not be abused; life is a trust to be used for God and His Kingdom. All oppression and wrong-doing toward others are forbidden. On the contrary, love and helpfulness are enjoined. The golden rule is represented as the grand ideal of conduct.

The Church is the bulwark of all civilization worthy the name. Her teachings and sacrifices have marked the pathway of human progress. The Church has enlightened the ignorant, clothed the naked, fed the hungry, nursed the sick, comforted the broken-hearted, championed the cause of freedom, strengthened the tempted, raised high standards of living, transformed human lives, opened the gates of heaven to the dying, fought the devil for the redemption of the world and has done all kinds of good to all people gladly without thought of worldly gain or financial remunera-

tion. In her ideas about God, her pure morality, her absolute usefulness and symmetrical development of character, her support of the elevating and her condemnation of the immoral and debasing, the Church stands preëminent among the forces making for temporal and eternal righteousness.

The spirit-guided Church also represents the Kingdom of God on earth. She is the hope of mankind; and the despairing multitudes in all lands and times turn to her as their truest friend and only saviour. We would not dare, without many serious conditions, to face the future without the Church. She will lift Europe out of the smoldering ruins of war and face her toward a better life, and she will meet the problems of our American life with a heart and brain big enough for their solution.

The Church settled forever the question of slavery in our nation. The Church will fight for the welfare of the people. She must do still more to clean society, purify politics, see that decent and competent men are elected to public office and thus bring to pass a government that stands for the interests of all the people.

To-day the battle is on between good and evil as never before. People are taking sides. God is calling Christians to join the forces that are striving for decency and order. If His people are patriotic Christian citizens, they will help the Church in her great work, because of the truth she teaches, the spirit she inculcates, and the good works she promotes. The world's places of pleasure and sin are not solicitous for the welfare of the people, but the true Church has dedicated her life to make the world better.

Man needs the help of the Church more than the Church needs his help. Nothing is more essential for

man's welfare than that he be made vividly aware of God. To be near Him brings happiness, wisdom and strength. Only through such nearness and awareness does he become conscious of his deepest spiritual needs; only thus are born burning thirsts after righteousness, and that spirit of self-effacement which impels him, with unwearied devotion, along the path of duty and triumphant service. Yet multitudes, shall we say it, even of professing Christians, church members, live for days at a time without any compelling sense or thought of God. But let such an one enter the House of worship and immediately the great fact of God becomes tremendously real and transforming. Against the white light of His holiness the "exceeding sinfulness of sin" looms large. With Peter he cries, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." And standing thus in the presence chamber of the Eternal, the great truths of the Gospel search his heart, and a yearning for a better life brings him a suppliant to the cross. Here the vision of the Saviour of men floods his soul; fires that have burned low are rekindled; the lamp of love glows with a pure heart; noble purposes are born, and he goes forth into the world to serve his fellows, living over again the sacrifice of Christ.

The Church is the creation of Jesus Christ. It is the depository of a doctrine and of a life and of a message. The doctrine is His teaching, not presented in its absolute purity and perfection anywhere, but in its vital elements everywhere. The life is His, not working in its full Divine energy in any single branch or member, yet producing in all some gracious and salutary fruits. The Church is one, in spite of its divisions, because of this fundamental unity of doctrine

and life; it is holy, in spite of its shortcomings, for its principle and ideal are entire devotion to God; it is Catholic, in spite of its limits, for its missionary ardor recognizes no bounds. The Church is the body of Christ, quickened, informed and molded by His spirit, —the organ of His will. Its worship consists in the contemplation of God, as He is revealed in Christ, and in fellowship with Him in prayer and sacrament. The Church also teaches its members the truths of the Gospel which are full of motives and calls to the service of mankind. The law of Christ is expounded and enforced in all its fruitful details. The Church also serves as the agent of the Spirit in the propagation of its doctrine and life. Through the teaching and training of children in Christian homes and schools, by its calls to the unconverted, and to fallen young people and neglected waifs, by its missions to the heathen, it is continually making new disciples of Christ. This is the most pregnant form of practical beneficence.

The Church Organized for Public Service. There have been periods in which the organized power and authority of the Church have been the greatest forces in human society making for security, liberty, purity, justice, and charity. And the time is coming when the united forces of the Church will be more thoroughly organized for war on the iniquities and miseries of human life, and for the promotion of all the higher forms of human welfare. The true Church now recognizes the hunger of the stomach and tries to relieve it; the illiteracy of the mind and tries to banish it; the moral taint of evil parentage and tries to minimize it. The Kingdom of God among the hard-pressed multitude must include a loaf of bread, a school book, an American flag, with humane treatment

and a perennial glow of brotherhood. The Church must do everything possible toward developing the Jesus-attitude toward a formal observance of the Sabbath. These Christian attitudes can be reinforced by community meetings, neighborly visiting, good reading and inspiring music, and so on.

Much more should be done toward the elimination of unnecessary work on Sunday, and also toward the elimination of the so-called recreation resorts planned almost solely for the financial gain of the owners. Sabbath industrial slavery and commercialization of Sunday should surely be eliminated, and such abundant opportunities for the cultivation of the higher life provided as will result in rich character development.

Thus the Christian has abundant opportunities to do his part within and without his church. He contributes according to his ability to its energy and resources and activities. By publicly identifying himself with its aims, by regular attendance, by increasing the volume and warmth of its worship, by giving what has cost in toil to the funds which support its great enterprises at home and abroad, he has his personal share, however small, in all that the Church is doing throughout the field of its operations.

Sunshine Needed. And all this must be done in a cheerful manner and spirit. The ascetic and tart types of religious life are out of place. Thunder and lightning do not make the grass grow. The genial in Christianity is an all-powerful expression of what God means by glad tidings.

Ruling Passion of the Church. But all other ideas must be subordinate to the ruling passion for saving souls. The spiritual is supreme. The Word of God should be vitalized. Earnestly seeking and helping

others to attain the highest New Testament standard of experience and life means living Christianity. The Church must be a soul-saving force. The means of grace most helpful are the Study of the Word of God, Holy communion, meditation and prayer. Others must be brought into the joy and fellowship which he has found. The real Church is a body of guides who, having seen the light, shed that light upon the way of others and ask them to follow it.

The Problem of Church Unity is a Great Problem. The moral waste of divisions in Christendom is appalling. To see a half-dozen inefficient, struggling churches in a village where one or two well-equipped churches with strong leaders would suffice, is a common sight. All these smaller loyalties should be merged or included into a larger unity. I believe we are coming nearer to a solution. But the individual Christian can best serve to hasten the answer to his Master's prayer that they all "may be one," by doing all he can in his own household of faith to work and to pray and to serve, meanwhile holding himself as one with all those who confess and call themselves Christians. If the Christian members of the twentieth century Church go forward in faith and spiritual strength, we shall realize what seems now an ideal vision of future triumph—a consecrated army of optimists who keep the skylights clear, believe in the perseverance of the saints, and in the conversion of the world. The characteristics of this ideal are what the Church should be to-day.

References for Further Reading

Athearn, W. S.: *The Indiana Survey of Religious Education.*

Brown, W. A.: *The Church in America.*

Cope, H. F.: *Education for Democracy,* Chapter X.

Ellwood, C. A.: *The Social Problem,* pages 203–19.

Faunce, W. H. P.: *The Educational Ideal in the Ministry.*

Forbush, W. B.: *The Coming Generation,* Chapters XXIX and XXX.

Gladden, Washington: *The Church and Modern Life.*

Parks, Leighton: *The Crisis of the Churches.*

Trumbull, H. C.: *The Yale Lecture,* 1896.

Documents of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

Review Questions and Problems for Discussion

1. What is the most far-reaching service which the Christian renders? Why?
2. Cite the varying conceptions of the Church.
3. Define the Church.
4. Tell of the antiquity of the Church.
5. When did the Church find outward expression? What order of church life did He establish?
6. Explain the perpetuity of the Church.
7. Enumerate the benefits of the Church to the individual and to Society.
8. List a dozen questions which the Church is helping to solve.
9. What does the Church teach concerning God? Man's creation? his body?
10. In what respects does the Church stand preëminent among the forces making for righteousness?
11. Tell of the attitude of the Church on the slavery problem.

12. Is the picture of the Church as the power-house of Christian idealism as it really is or as it ought to be?
13. Mention some social, political, and economic questions that the Church is now helping to solve? Are they being handled wisely?
14. Is there any danger of intolerance toward harmless, or even positively good movements? Cite historical instances.
15. To what extent should the Church function in the organization of a wholesome social and recreational life for the community? Why the Church rather than the school or the state?
16. What should be the attitude of the Church toward Week-day Religious Education? Would there be as good opportunity to introduce progressive methods and improved subject-matter into the Sunday schools as into the week-day work?
17. Do ministers have an amount of training and the type of training that fits them for the work which the Church of the future must do? If not, what changes are needed?
18. How seriously do Sunday school teachers take their work? Why?
19. How effectively are the Sunday schools administered? Compare with public schools. Why should the Sunday school have a child-centered curriculum and specially trained teachers? How provide both? When is a Sunday school well organized and well programmed?
20. How much do we know about legitimate objectives of Sunday school teaching? What should be the definite goals of Sunday school organization and teaching?
21. What are causes and remedies of irregular attendance at Sunday school and church services?
22. To what extent are cities overchurched? Or overchurched in spots, and underchurched in other

spots? Villages? Rural communities? What are the causes and remedies?

23. Of what might the social and recreational activities of the Church consist in the city? In the villiage? In the open country? What administrative machinery would be required and at how much expense?

24. Why is there so much difference between Catholics and Protestants as to church loyalty? What adverse criticisms are most frequently heard?

25. Why are commercialized amusements more harmful on Sunday than on any other day? Why should churches oppose unnecessary labor on Sunday?

26. Evaluate the idea of federation or of coöperation with that of organic church unity. Which puts most emphasis on loyalty or practical morality?

27. Why do people help one another so little?

28. If all people acquired the habit of helpfulness the year around, what would happen in the home, the Church, and in the community?

29. Can a person be a Christian and follow the "Principle of Least Action," according to which everybody does as little as he can? Explain.

30. What makes a good church?

LESSON XXVII

THE CHRISTIAN AND HIS POSSESSIONS

CHRISTIAN teaching has emphasized from the very first that the acquisition of wealth for its proper uses is one of the duties essential to man's well-being. The power of acquisitiveness has been placed in man for a good and noble purpose. Under intelligent control, wealth is a most important and powerful means of extending human influence in every direction.

Wealth may be a power fruitful of evil. There may be an improper seeking of wealth. One of the prevalent vices of all ages has been the seeking of riches for their own sake. It thus becomes a vice of most degrading character, since it lifts a mere inanimate thing above man and God, and begets selfishness and godlessness along with covetousness. It gives rise to the baneful tendency to estimate manhood, not by attainments and character, but by the extent of the bank account. Hence the warning of Jesus against the seductive power of riches and their possession. Jesus said it was easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God.

A second error is that of seeking wealth solely for the pleasure and independence it will give. Such persons find their satisfactions in material comforts and make the interests of the Kingdom secondary. Through all the ages, the wisdom and experience of

mankind prove that "he that getteth silver is not satisfied with silver," and there are no men more wretched and dependent than those who seek riches and use them for selfish ends.

A third error is that of seeking and using money for a mere show of generosity and nobleness. In this sense economy becomes meanness and extravagance. Such miscalled generosity, which seeks to earn in order to waste on pleasant drinks and tobacco, and in sightseeing and dissipation, is no less moral than the covetousness of the miser. It often leaves its victims moral wrecks, and is robbing them of one of the chief means given by God for reaching success in life, in the accomplishment of higher moral and spiritual ends.

Wealth a Blessing. We have shown the moral dangers arising from wealth; we shall now point out the true aim in seeking and using wealth. It is found in connection with and in subordination to man's moral and spiritual mission. It is this which redeems it from the curse and makes it a blessing. The moral value of ownership lies then, (1) in the formation of true habits of economy and charity, by redeeming the former from meanness and the latter from impulse; (2) in securing the valuable discipline of self-denial, industry, and skill, which comes from its pursuit, and which fits man better for his higher moral and spiritual work; (3) in administering wealth in the Christian spirit and for the sake of promoting some enterprise which enriches human life; (4) in bringing a sense of responsibility difficult to secure in any other way; (5) in increasing the means of power and usefulness; and (6) in conditioning the moral right of ownership on the general welfare. Thus every act both of acquisition and use for the sake of man's mission and the general

good, will advance him to a nobler and more complete manhood.

Time, money, and prayer! Who can estimate their influence upon the character of a man and his worth to society, if properly used. In a former lesson, reference was made to the stewardship of life or time and of prayer. We shall now examine more directly the stewardship of possessions.

The Roman Doctrine of Ownership. Roman law following the age-long custom of primitive peoples interpreted ownership to mean not only the right to use or enjoy one's possessions but to have legal power equivalent to absolute authority to hinder anybody else from using or enjoying them. Hence it is that our word "property," which comes from a Latin word meaning "that which belongs to one," one's own, indicates a false notion of the ownership of things we possess. This Pagan, or Roman, doctrine of ownership became part of our common law with practically no change. Ownership, then, is equivalent to dominion or sovereignty.

The Scriptural Doctrine of Ownership. According to this conception, God alone can claim such sovereignty. The earth is the Lord's; to man He has given it for a possession. Man is to subdue and control, but not to own the earth. This brings us at once to the very heart of the matter of stewardship. If God is the owner, then our possessions are a trust which we are to administer in His behalf. A steward is not the owner; he is the trusted administrator. He is not a servant; his is a position of honor and confidence, the highest official place in the household next to the owner himself. This confidential relationship is shown in man's representing the Master in the mak-

ing of contracts, the use of possessions, and in the administration of affairs. Man stands as God's interpreter to make known His attitude and purpose.

Stewardship thus involves a man's attitude toward all the things which he controls. He seeks to do the will of God, whom he acknowledges as his sovereign Lord. In the Christian view of things, we are stewards, not owners. We probably will be faithful as long as we remember this fact; when we forget that we are stewards and assume to be owners, we are in danger of robbing God. The sin of covetousness starts like a cancer but eats into the very vitals of a man's spiritual nature and life until he succumbs. It is not confined to the rich alone. There are many people who do not have a capacity to earn big wages or salaries, whose lives are gripped as tightly by covetousness as is the life of many a millionaire. When a man regards himself as owner he gradually loses consciousness of the real personality of God. God becomes to him a dim, hazy idea—no longer a living reality or person. Hence the things which are God's he misappropriates for himself, deceiving himself with the idea that he may do as he pleases with what he regards his own. No wonder Jesus warned against the deceitfulness of riches which choke the word and it becometh unfruitful (Mark 4: 19) and also in Mark 10: 25. *Mere things* can never satisfy a soul, as every rich man in the world can testify. The soul that attempts to satisfy its God-inspired longings with things is vainly feeding its hunger with the husks of earth. The things of earth, however, may be the ladder by which we climb to God, for faithful stewardship of God's property leads one to know and understand and love God the owner of the property (Luke 16: 9–13).

A Many-Sided Stewardship. The word "stewardship" is not synonymous with "*Giving.*" Giving is only a part of stewardship. There is a stewardship of *earning* as well as of giving. God has placed no premium on idleness neither will He do for man what he can do for himself. The steward who returns the unused talent in a napkin will be deprived of the joy of his lord. There is also a stewardship of *spending.* When we deny ourselves the necessities of life which are meant for our well-being, we are not wise stewards. If any provideth not for his own, and especially his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever (1 Tim. 5: 8). The Christian will faithfully consider God's will in his spending. There is also a stewardship of *saving.* God puts no premium upon improvidence. The Bible plainly teaches the obligation to save. Christ does not condemn the *laying up of* treasure, but the laying them up for *ourselves,* hoarding and keeping idle what ought to be promoting the Master's business.

Thus the stewardship of *earning* protects against idleness; of *spending* against miserliness; of *saving* against waste and improvidence; and of *giving* against selfishness. The faithful steward will earn all that he honestly can for God; he will save all he can; he will administer all he can; he will give all he can. His prayer will be: "Lord, give me a hand to get and a heart to give."

The Doctrine of Tithing. God, the owner of all, named a fixed rate of acknowledgment and called it "holy." This ratio or proportion was never changed by Him, neither in the Old Testament nor in the New Testament, nor by special revelation. This is the rate: Leviticus 27: 30–33, "All the tithe of the land . . .

is the Lord's; it is holy unto the Lord. . . . Concerning the tithe of the herd or flock . . . the tenth shall be holy unto the Lord." No institution in Israel was more solemnly observed than was this, the paying of tithes. Yet it is older than the law, and wider in its observance than the Jewish race. In Israel the tithe of the Lord came first; its purpose was Divine acknowledgment. The Jew paid a second tithe for the maintenance of national and social institutions and every third year he paid an extra tithe for the relief of the poor. Besides all this which was commanded by law, he was enjoined to give free will offerings and alms. The Christian is not under law, but under grace—under constraint of the love of Christ.

Stewardship More than Tithing. Stewardship and tithing must not be confused. The tithe is not the full expression of the principle of stewardship; it is only the minimum expression of that principle. A man does not fulfil his stewardship of responsibility to God by paying the tithe. His tithe, however, is the acknowledgment of his responsibility for the rest of the nine-tenths.

Principles of Stewardship briefly stated: (1) God is absolutely owner of all by right of creation and redemption.

(2) Man does not own anything, but is the trusted steward of his possessions.

(3) God's ownership and man's stewardship require some kind of acknowledgment.

(4) God, the owner, fixed this acknowledgment by claiming the tithe of all men's increase as His own and sanctifying it for the building up of His Kingdom.

(5) Stewardship extends over the whole of man's

possessions, not merely over the tithe. The Christian steward acknowledges this relationship by the payment of the ratio fixed by the owner, namely the tithe of all his increase. The rest he uses as a sacred trust. In giving the tithe we only pay a debt; we make offerings unto the Lord from the nine-tenths. When the Church puts into practice this lesson of stewardship it will demonstrate "the spiritual content of money and rescue it from sordidness and greed." This shall be the saving evangel for our generation. Horace Bushnell, the New England prophet, said: "One more revival, only one more, is needed; the revival of Christian stewardship, the consecration of the money power to God. When this revival comes the Kingdom of God will come in a day."

The question that next naturally arises is, How shall the Christian administer his possessions as a trusted steward of the Divine Owner? The first step to this larger freedom of Christian stewardship is the *tithe.* God fixed a seventh of man's time and a tenth of his income as the proportion to be devoted to Himself and His Kingdom, and called them both holy. This law is God's alphabet for the human family to start men in the Divine lesson of giving. The law is also in this respect our schoolmaster, leading to Christ.

The New Testament Standard. Here we have a higher law than the tithe, which was the rudimentary basis for the stewardship of property. "Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him" (1 Cor. 16: 2). This is the plan of the Holy Spirit concerning the giving of the Christian steward who is not under law but under grace. It is voluntary, systematic, individual, and proportionate. It is based on

love and gratitude and appeals to the honesty and integrity of the steward. No amount of work or pious profession can take the place of the honest accounting of our possessions. See 1 John 3: 17. Just as no man can enjoy the treasures of literature without first learning to read, so the Christian comes to the New Testament "cheerful giving" by practising the elementary tithing.

Who Should Tithe? The answer is, EVERYBODY. Every man, woman and child by virtue of life itself is a steward of God's blessing and gifts. This responsibility or relationship cannot be escaped. No steward can be faithful to his trust without being a Christian, and no Christian can be a faithful steward without acknowledging God's ownership and his own stewardship by paying at least the fixed rate of this acknowledgment, namely, the *tithe*. Every man shall give as he is able. God is not unreasonable. He adds His blessing to our obedience, and we actually accomplish more and better results in six days of labor than in the steady grind of seven days of toil. So, too, our nine-tenths receive His blessing when used as He would have us use them and there is no lack. There is a standing challenge in the Bible to prove God by full obedience to this principle, with the assurance that He will open the windows of heaven and pour down such a rich blessing that there will not be room enough to receive it. No honest tither was ever known to come to want. The universal prosperity of the Jew is a marvel to most men.

How to Tithe. When a Christian has learned to tithe he has learned the first step in giving. The New Testament principle of "proportionate giving" as God has prospered him is the next step in Christian

stewardship of possessions and will mark a new era of spiritual growth in a man's life if accepted and practised. Those whom God blesses with abundance of possessions, He expects to give in proportion to their blessings. Free-will offerings above the tithe allow the rich man to give on as equitable a basis as the poor man's tithe. God wants the Christian to compute his benevolence on the basis of what he keeps rather than what he gives. A man whose income is reckoned by many thousands may be a tither and still be a soul-shriveling giver, because he keeps too much for himself. This second step in Christian stewardship lifts men up to the higher plane of voluntary giving out of gratitude and love.

The Government reports that the present average income for every man, woman and child in the United States is $500 a year. We may be reasonably sure that the church members in the United States get no less than the average. At that rate, estimate the earnings of the members of your denomination last year; calculate what the tithe would be, and then ascertain the amount paid for all purposes, and how much of a balance on the tithe alone would there be? No denomination pays more than a fourth of the tithe to all the departments of its church activities. "Will a man rob God?" When will the Christians of America awaken to the great vision of their opportunities? How long will some churches persist in trying to do the business of the Lord on the left-overs of the purse, bolstered up with ice-cream socials and oyster suppers? Render unto God the things that are God's.

The Stewardship of the Gospel. The Christian has committed to him another trust, namely, the Gospel of salvation through Jesus Christ. The thought of part-

nership with Christ in giving His message of life to others is staggering in its bigness. The Word teaches that redeemed man is a steward of the Gospel. Christ Himself said: "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature." Christ needs every Christian for service as much as the Christian needs Him for life. We are His "ambassadors," His "stewards of the manifold grace of God." Christ has given His life to bring salvation. We must give ours to publish it. Christ has taken us into partnership to carry out His great program for world evangelism. It is a joint, vital, blessed partnership. The stewardship of the Gospel is a fact, an inspiring, challenging fact. If our neighbors, if our country, if the world is to receive the blessings of the Christ, they must be transmitted through men and women who will practise the stewardship of the Gospel.

Next to Christ, we call Paul the greatest man that ever lived. What made him great? It was his sublime sense of stewardship. This it was that made him cry out: "I am debtor both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish." A salvation that made it necessary for Christ to go to Calvary could not be accepted by Paul without a deep sense of obligation. Hence, in the midst of imprisonments, stripes, and perils of all kinds he could say triumphantly, "I am ready"—ready to preach the Gospel, to suffer, to die for Christ's sake. To be a faithful steward is simply to obey Jesus Christ, to seek to publish His Gospel to every creature and to apply His teachings to all relationships. Some things riches cannot buy—they cannot buy salvation, a good name, culture, character, loyal friends. Every Christian at his best may have all of them. The faithful

Christian will seek to use them to further the moral and spiritual life in his own home and in his community. "The field is the world." Paul recognized this and took the Gospel from Asia Minor to Rome; Augustine took it to England; Boniface to Germany; Wesley and others brought it to the United States and the Protestant churches of our country are sending workers into all the world. What a privilege this is!

Incentives. There are three great incentives for every Christian to be a faithful witness and worker and steward of his time, means and effort.

The first is a call from above. Christ has chosen the Christian to be a co-worker with Himself. To be a loyal Christian he must obey his marching orders.

The second is the call from without. Millions are crying, with inarticulate voices, for the bread of life—calling to the Church, "Come over and help us." It is the great call of humanity for *light.*

The third is the call from within. The Christian has received the light. He has the love of God shed abroad in his heart. How shall his soul live, deaf to their starving call?

There are wonderful possibilities for good or for evil ahead. The conflict is between God and mammon. The Gospel of Christ must be the controlling principle in the lives of the people or the rule of mammon will spread and drive the nations "over the precipice of greater wars into the abyss of barbarism." What a day of opportunity for Christians to make Christ more than conqueror the world over! If it is to be done, every man and woman, with Christ as partner, must gladly say:

"I can devote myself,
I have a life to give."

References for Further Study

Agar, F. A.: *The Stewardship of Life.*
Babson, R. W.: *Religion and Business.*
King, W. I.: *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States.*
Leavell, F. H.: *Training in Stewardship.*
McConnell, F. J.: *Church Finance and Social Ethics.*
Tawney, R. H.: *The Acquisitive Society.*
Versteeg, J. M.: *The Deeper Meaning of Stewardship.*
Macmillan Publication, 1922, *Property: Its Rights and Duties.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. Why is the acquisition of wealth for its proper uses one of the duties essential to man's well-being?
2. What are the moral dangers arising from the improper seeking of wealth?
3. What are the true aims in seeking and using wealth? The moral values of ownership?
4. Explain the Roman doctrine of ownership. Why does our word "property" indicate a false notion of the ownership of things we possess?
5. Discuss the Scriptural doctrine of ownership.
6. Why is it so important that a steward be faithful?
7. What are the supposed moral limitations of the conception of stewardship?
8. What is meant by a many-sided stewardship?
9. Tell of the stewardship of giving, of spending, of saving.
10. Explain the doctrine of tithing.
11. Why is stewardship more than tithing?
12. What are the five principles of stewardship?
13. How shall a Christian administer his possessions as a trusted steward of the Divine owner?
14. What does the word "tithe" mean?

15. What is the New Testament Standard? How should the Christian give?
16. Who should tithe?
17. How should Christians tithe?
18. What is the New Testament principle of "proportionate giving"?
19. What is meant by the stewardship of the Gospel?
20. In what sense did Paul have a keen sense of stewardship?
21. What is it to be a faithful steward?
22. What are the three great incentives to faithful stewardship?
23. In what sense is the conflict between Christ and mammon?

Problems for Further Discussion

1. What does the word "stewardship" mean? Why is it so difficult to get people to think of their possessions as a trust from God?
2. What is meant by the stewardship of life? of intercession?
3. Should a preacher tithe? See Numbers 18: 26–27. Can a woman tithe? How can a child tithe? How can a farmer tithe? A physician?
4. Interpret the following: One in every six verses of the entire Bible relates to the subject of giving; of Christ's thirty-eight parables, sixteen relate to a man's attitude toward money; in the four Gospels one verse in every seven deals with this subject.
5. Explain: "Whoso hath the world's goods, and beholdeth his brother in need, and shutteth up his compassion from him, how doth the love of God abide in him" (1 John 3: 17).
6. Distinguish between material and "intangible" possessions. What is the relation between Christian devotion and intangible possessions?

7. Is there any danger of pauperizing people with whom we share education, culture, or enthusiasm for high ideals?

8. What abilities does the world need most to-day? In the Church? In the local community affairs? In national politics? At school?

9. Who makes our ideas for us (the school teacher, the newspaper)? Are we too partisan? (Seeing nothing good in a Democrat because we happen to be a Republican, or vice versa. Republicans or Democrats because our fathers are?)

10. A big college paper printed recently the following: "We believe that X—— is preparing men, not to live, but to make a living. . . . Our students leave college uncontaminated by thought." Is this true? Why? Or why not?

11. Comment on: The ability to serve in one's proper place, whether as leader or coöperator. Who is more important: the general or the private? The mayor or the traffic policeman? Why?

12. Make a list of the men who have blessed the world with their possessions during the last fifty years.

13. What abilities should we develop if we are going to succeed, and how may we develop them? How does the proper use of our present abilities determine what we are going to do with our lives?

14. How should you decide as to the amount you should give to the local church, the mission boards, the Near East Relief, the Red Cross, Young People's work?

LESSON XXVIII

THE CHRISTIAN AND HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS

EVERY man for the completion of his being needs social contacts. He is stimulated by these to modes of expression which intricate him into society. This is instinctive. He needs to receive help and to give help. He needs the latter as much as the former. That man is dependent on his fellows is generally admitted, but often overlooked. Man and society are made whole and perfect together. A mutual dependence rests on all men, and this principle constitutes the foundation of social co-integration.

No individual is complete in himself. Each lacks something that another or others must supply; and each can do something that others cannot do; and each has something that others do not have. This is found to be true even in the most primitive society. As civilization advances, the need and the fact of association increase, so that they are always great in proportion to the degree of civilization. This does not conflict with individuality. Individuality is essential to association, since men associate only as they differ, and in proportion as they differ is their association.

Men stand in three relations to one another: (1) *The Relation of Descending Regard.* The two who confront each other do not stand on the same plane. The influence goes from the higher to the lower, such as the relation of governor to the governed, the learned to the ignorant, parents to children, and teachers to pupils. Men arrange themselves naturally in these relations. There is a duty in the relation, but what is

really essential is the free outgoing of love and benevolence from the higher to the lower, so that the former communicates to the latter. A father loves his son certainly, but when we look at the subject from that standpoint, we understand what a father might be to his son.

(2) *The Relation of Ascending Regard.* The interest here goes from the lower to the higher. If the father's heart goes out to the son's in love, the son's heart ought to be open to receive the love. Thus only can the son receive the blessing which the father is ready to communicate.

(3) *The Relation of Equality.* Here the influence goes from the one to the other on the same plane. For example, the sexes should complement each other, when the question is not which one is on the higher plane. In this way there is the same principle, but it is the going out of the one toward the other, and the mutual response.

There are, then, two sides, both necessary: (1) The side of activity, or impartation. This means much more than we can put into words. The minister must go to preach not simply because it is his duty, but rather because his heart is in the work and because he is desirous of giving out some of his own spirituality. He must pass the whole sense of himself over to others. True giving carries with it the love of the giver. We cannot communicate anything without ourselves, and doing ourselves good. The love of the giver counts. Some gifts shut out our hearts because the giver's heart was never open. Men are happier when they make others happy. This is a moral principle engrafted within us.

(2) On the other side is *receptivity*—a disposition

or capacity to receive what others offer; an inward openness to influences of the right sort. Openness is the sweet air of man's moral life. Some people are too proud to accept a favor. This is not to their credit. We cannot be open to all kinds of influences, but when the right relation exists; when we come into contact with the influence of others, there must be this openness of mind. Pupils must have an interest in one another and in the teacher, if the teacher's work is to be most helpfully performed. The same is true in the attitude of the hearer toward the preacher. In the relation of social co-integration, then, both natures are benefited and perfected by such interaction. It is as important for one as for the other. "Not to be ministered unto, but to minister." Perhaps it is even more important that the heart should go out in help to others than to receive help, and thus illustrate the statement: "It is more blessed to give than to receive." Not many of us are called upon to devote ourselves wholly to the work of helping others. Nor are we obliged to devote all our substance, if we have any, to this purpose. It is the performance of offices by the way and incidentally that is required. We do not have to neglect any other duty or violate any other obligation in order to discharge this. If the disposition we have cultivated be a kindly one, and genuine benevolence be a characteristic of us, there will be no lack of opportunities and means by which we shall be the instruments of beneficence more than we have ever dreamed of.

The Christian, then, should be concerned for society because he lives among others and is a part of society. There can be no social group without the individual. We are dependent on one another in all relationships.

Our attitudes and conduct either help or hinder the progress of society (Rom. 14: 7).

What, then, should be the attitude of the Christian toward others? It should be one of sincerity and truthfulness; one of fairness in play, of integrity in business dealings, one of honesty in politics and in all the relationships of life; one of genuine helpfulness and Christian service to others (Luke 10: 25–27); one of doing unto others as we would have others do unto us (Matt. 7: 12).

The individual and society are indissolubly linked together as the two factors in one unitary process. The interests, the success, the defects of the one are the interests, success, and defects of the other. But, while this is the case, each has its own particular function to perform in the common process. Society must give the individual a chance; his opportunities are to be made the most favorable possible; the social matrix must be a soil favorable to individual growth and development. The social atmosphere must be free from impurities, and must contain elements that will stimulate to individual effort and achievement. The social organization must rest on the ideal of the common good, and equal opportunity. The social standards must require and reward moral conduct, while still leaving room for individual judgment and independence. Above all, society must not fail in efficiently transmitting its social heritage to the individual, but efficiently perform the greatest of all its functions,—that of educating its youth. For failure at this point means inefficiency for the individual, and stagnation and decay for society. On the other hand, the individual man has a responsibility to society no less heavy. He is the legatee of a thousand generations who have

toiled and sacrificed to accumulate the splendid heritage placed in his hands. He owes a great debt to society which he can repay only as he first pays the debt that he owes to himself—that of making the most of his own powers and capacities. And this self-evident development is to be accomplished not selfishly for himself alone, but also for society in return for its gifts to him. He must realize the social aim, through attaining to the highest possible degree of self-realization. He must respond to the attempt to educate him.

The Christian possesses and manifests in his dealings with his fellow men, all those virtues of universal obligation which make up the body of common morality. Such are industry, temperance, veracity, fidelity, honesty, justice, and respect for liberty and life. In other words, he does his full share of the work of the world; he bridles all irregular passions and lusts; he speaks the truth; he observes the contracts into which he has freely entered; he fulfils the reasonable expectations which he has caused other men to form; he renders to every man his due. These moral dispositions are universally recognized as good; they appeal to the sense of obligation planted deep in every breast; their spiritual beauty engages all hearts; but neither bond nor charm suffice to impart to them the energy required to overcome the selfish passions of human nature. Hence it is necessary that they should be suffused with emotions drawn from other sources. This is accomplished when the love of God and man is engaged in their support. All the deepest convictions, emotions, and impulses of the Christian combine to sanction and sustain them.

Christian Motives. These virtues of common life arise out of the normal action of man's moral nature.

They are the plainest dictates of reason and conscience, and reason and conscience are manifestly intended to govern conduct. The opposite vices violate the essential constitution of human nature. They aggravate the disorganization of which they are symptoms. The Christian has a reverential regard for the economy of his nature, not only for its own sake, but because it is made in the image of God, and is the purest reflection on earth of the Divine excellence. Reason and conscience are the august authorities in his eyes, for they have been set in his soul by God as the exponents of his own truth and holiness. To obey them is obedience to God, the first law of His renewed will; to set them at naught is so far to cast off the government of God.

Society the Great Work of God. Not only are these virtues or duties the conditions of the integrity of human nature, but they are also essential to the existence of human society. Every form of community among men requires them as its binding and cementing principles. Idleness, lying, fraud, injustice, and the indulgence of unlawful passions, loosen the social fabric. If they were general, all wide and permanent association would be impossible among mankind. But human society is a Divine institution; it is the indispensable platform for all the highest purposes of the providence of God. Every act therefore that tends to disintegrate society impedes the march of the purposes of God. In one whose daily prayer is, " Thy kingdom come," such an act is a glaring inconsistency.

Society Necessary to Human Welfare. Further, society is a necessary condition of human welfare. From it the individual derives almost entirely the security of his condition, the conveniences of his life, his knowledge and his ideas, the stimulus of his exertions,

the satisfaction of his affections, the opportunities and incentives of his virtue—almost everything that gives amplitude, strength, inspiration, or grace to the estate of man. The Christian, as a lover of his fellow men, cannot but regard with reverence the fair order of human society, and cannot be slack in the practice of these virtues which establish and conserve it.

Social Virtues Contributory to Happiness. These social virtues are practised not only because they benefit men indirectly by holding together the various forms of human organizations; but also because they are a direct and immediate good to the men with whom he deals from time to time. In general, the diligence, the truthfulness in word and act, the self-control, the justice of an individual, increase the happiness of those with whom he has to do. True it is that there are cases in which speaking the truth and acting justly may inflict pain, but he is not responsible for these abnormal circumstances. Truth may be spoken, and punishment inflicted, in love. One of the trials of a man who loves his fellow men is that he is often compelled to inflict a measure of pain to prevent greater pain hereafter. From this the Christian does not shrink.

Further, he is solicitous about the moral well-being of his fellow men. To promote this the best means he can employ—more efficacious by far than instruction or exhortation—is the setting of a good example. It is more impressive than precept, more persuasive than preaching. It does not raise the opposition which *they* often excite. Setting a good example insinuates itself into the character and will. It appeals to those deep-lying tendencies to imitation which are natural to man. It has the power of the concrete and actual. It shows

that the difficult duty can be done. The Christian, knowing the effect of setting a fair example in the plain matters of conduct, is careful in the discharge of all common duties, for he prefers the goodness to the happiness of men when the two seem to be in conflict. Hence one who holds the Christian view of society, in whose eyes all men are equal, if not in actual condition, yet in original descent, in the regard of God, in the latent capacities of his nature, and in the possibilities of an endless life, cannot but deal with all men according to the highest dictates of an enlightened conscience. To him it seems quite natural to do unto others as he would that they should do unto him. The whole range of his relations to God, from creaturely dependence to filial love, binds the disciple of Christ to their observance.

Christian Principles. The Christian should carry into every sphere a sweetness of temper, a warm delight in the well-being of others, a kindness and serenity unperturbed by the provocations of common life, and an elevation of mind and magnanimity of spirit which can overlook and even forgive affronts and injuries. A kind, generous, forgiving disposition has a high place among the incentives which promote the happiness and good-will of men. It is impossible to exaggerate the degree in which ill-temper in its various forms—uncharitableness, envy, jealousy, intolerance, peevishness, and spleen—chill and poison the atmosphere of daily life,—not only quenching joy, but enfeebling all the nobler springs of conduct. On the other hand, a sweet, gracious, radiant spirit not only kindles joy, but stimulates the better feelings into full activity. It is a common observation that to treat men as though they were good, tends to make them so.

He who dwells in the Christian, whose fruit is "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance" cannot but be grieved by any temper opposed to these graces. The outward manifestation of these Christian graces is true politeness, genuine good manners, which do so much to soften and sweeten human intercourse. At their best they are the natural expressions of a kind, considerate, and generous spirit.

Present-Day Opportunities. Then the idea of Christian service, coming down through the history of the Church, has enlarged until it now comprehends a multitude of spheres and forms of action far beyond the conception of the largest understanding and the noblest heart of the apostolic age. From this viewpoint, three great characteristics of the present time deserve mention: (1) Before the Christian lie open to-day many spheres of service to his fellow men. The diffusion of knowledge, facility of communication, free choice of occupation, social, philanthropic, and religious movements, municipal and political franchises and powers, have multiplied wonderfully his opportunities of promoting the welfare of mankind.

(2) An allied fact—the multiplication of organizations for the amelioration and improvement of the general life, from little clubs, established to promote some local object, to vast societies whose aims embrace the world. By entering such associations the individual is able to take his part in work which he has not time or skill or strength to do alone. Ways of taking part in these various organizations are by contributions of money, and by unpaid personal services, which are often really more helpful than gifts.

(3) The appliances of science. Its rigorous meth-

ods, its stores of systematized knowledge, its appliances and instruments, are affecting profoundly the mind of man and the conditions of society. For example, natural science is enabling men to understand and master the world; economic science is helping to solve the problems of poverty and vice; medical science is diminishing disease and pain; and mechanical science is contributing in a thousand ways to the vast operations of our philanthropic and religious societies. And so science in its various branches is weaving innumerable ties which will make of mankind one great organism answering to the idea and spirit of brotherhood. The ministry of science, in discovering inventions, demanding ever higher organization of research and industry, has greatly modified the conditions of individual Christian service to mankind.

This deep and tender Christian love of men and communities, combined with an impulse to do the good in every way possible, springs out of love to God through faith in Jesus Christ. Philosophies, systems of ethics, and codes of laws are utterly inadequate to produce it, though they may show that it is supremely reasonable, and absolutely necessary to the entire soundness of human nature and human society.

References for Further Reading

Baldwin, J. M.: *Social and Ethical Interpretation,* pp. 66-98.
Betts, G. H.: *Social Principles in Education,* pp. 5–30.
Cooley, C. H.: *Social Process.*
Cooley, *Social Organization,* chs. 1 and 2.
Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics,* ch. 18.
Drake, Durant: *Problems of Conduct,* pp. 225–249.

Ellwood, C. A.: *The Social Problem,* pp. 33–39.
Giddings, Franklin: *Inductive Sociology,* Part II.
Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* ch. 14.
Peters, C. C.: *Human Conduct,* ch. 25.
Robinson, J. H.: *The Mind in the Making.*
Ross, E. A.: *Social Control.*

Review Questions and Problems for Discussion

1. Why does every man need social contacts?
2. How are man and society made perfect together?
3. Explain the three relations in which men stand to one another.
4. Distinguish between the side of activity and that of receptivity. Illustrate each.
5. Why should the Christian be concerned for society?
6. What then should be the Christian's attitude toward others?
7. Upon what must the social organization rest?
8. What is the function of society? Mention the virtues that make up the body of common morality.
9. How are the selfish passions of human nature to be overcome?
10. How do the virtues of common life arise out of the normal actions of man's moral nature?
11. Why does the Christian have a reverential regard for the economy of his nature?
12. Why is to obey reason and conscience obedience to God?
13. Why are the virtues and duties essential to the existence of human society?
14. What does the individual derive from society?
15. In what sense are the social virtues contributory to happiness?

16. Mention the fruits of Christian principles.
17. What are the outward manifestations of these Christian graces?
18. Mention the spheres of service to his fellow men open to the Christian.
19. Mention some of the organizations for the improvement of the general life of society. In what ways is the individual able to help?
20. List a dozen ways in which science is helping to solve the social and other problems of life.
21. What is the motivation for all this work?
22. Why are the philosophies, systems of ethics, and codes of laws inadequate?
23. Society is often spoken of as an organism. Is this correct? Give reasons for your answer.
24. In any social organization, the individual ceases to be merely an end in himself; he becomes also the means to the realization of the ends of others. Explain and illustrate.
25. What are the social problems (1) in Anglicanism? (2) In Calvinism? (3) In Lutheranism? (4) In primitive Christianity? (5) In Roman Catholicism?
26. Why is there a race problem in United States? Can it be evaded?
27. Will a sentiment of Christian love enable one always to do right to one's neighbor? What else is necessary? Why?
28. How does the belief that the Kingdom of God is to be established bring spiritual power? What is meant by the phrase "Christianizing the social order"?
29. Mention a list of Christian incentives to right living and working with others.
30. Why should the Christian be eager to discover ways of sharing the Kingdom-life with all men?

LESSON XXIX

THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD RECREATION

NOT all of man's time and energy is spent in those activities directly related to the maintenance of life and the satisfaction of the family, economic, civic, and religious interests. After these needs are met a margin of leisure remains. In these moments of leisure man may elaborate the common life, and weave into it meanings and appreciations which are not derived from external necessity. Thus grow up the recreational arts—songs, stories, games, dances, ceremonials, and festivals. These were some of the diversions of the primitive huntsman as in moments of leisure he realized in imagination some exciting adventure of the chase or contemplated the thrills of future exploits. Through activity as well as through rest the recreation of life proceeds.

Place of Recreation in Life. The primary object of recreation is neither the promotion of health nor an appendage to the economic, the family, the civic, or the religious life. A recreational activity is a genuinely leisure activity—an activity in which one engages for the sake of the activity itself without thought of reward, either in this world or in the next. Of course, recreation may and should promote health and further the social and religious life in their various aspects. But it must always enjoy an independent status.

Society has been slow to realize the fundamental value of play and recreation as a necessary part of a normal human life. But democracy is beginning to

recognize the fundamental importance of recreational values in the length of the working day and in the great democratization of the so-called fine arts. Practically all the forms of art, including music, painting, sculpture, literature, and the drama, are now within the reach of nearly all of the people at the very highest level possible for appreciation. We are to-day squandering annually millions of dollars for such lower forms of entertainment as simply stimulate, excite, and enervate the emotional life without bringing any worth-while satisfactions. These values should be so organized as to be genuinely the heritage of all the people. The knowledge, interests, ideals, habits, and powers of each individual should be so developed as to enable him to find and use his place for the advancement of himself and his fellow men. This should be the great aim of all education and life. To-day the practical problem before us is that of equipping the individual to supplement his hours of labor with a rich recreational life.

Psychological Significance of Recreation. While recreation requires no justification in terms of the other goods of life, the use to which man puts his leisure time must always be of great significance. Says Dewey: "Play and art are moral necessities. They are required to take care of the margin that exists between the total stock of impulses that demand outlet and the amount expended in regular action. They keep the balance which work cannot indefinitely maintain. They are required to introduce variety, flexibility, and sensitiveness into disposition." [1]

Psychologists and moralists are agreed that carefully directed recreation (1) promotes a wholesome devel-

[1] Dewey, John: *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 160.

opment of the capabilities and functions; (2) prolongs the period of youth by creating the conditions necessary for physical, mental and moral health; (3) serves as a tonic to the organism by adding to the zest of living; (4) lends color and sweetness and beauty to life; (5) provides opportunity for manifold expression of personality, and (6) permits self to develop according to the laws of its own being and in response to its own potentialities. Hence it is that art sustains such a close relation to the recreational life. This also suggests the great educational significance of recreation. In play the inhibitions are cast aside, freedom prevails, the spirit is exalted, attention is focused, the individual loses himself in the activity, the organism is modified, the habit is formed, the disposition grows, and the process of education advances at the maximum rate. Therefore what one does in his leisure hours shapes his personality and moulds his character.

Many Forms of Recreation. To-day the form of recreation changes with the individual and with circumstances. If we would make a canvass of the population in an American community and list only a few of the diverse leisure activities, we would find many attending social gatherings, going to theaters, appreciating music, watching athletic contests, reading newspapers and fiction, and engaging in out-of-door sports; others would be employing their spare time visiting museums, collecting stamps, motoring into the country, hunting rabbits, gambling in stocks, making extended vacation trips, walking in the parks, retailing community gossip, discussing the failings of other people's children, enjoying the companionship of friends, quarreling with neighbors, experimenting with radio, attending teas and dinners, using carpenters' tools,

painting china, bossing servants, studying birds, reading philosophy, visiting the poor and sick, making gardens, or spinning theories of education.

A study of these and other activities would reveal the fact that some of them are primarily intellectual, others æsthetic, others essentially social, and still others emphasizing the physical and the avocational. Some of them are worth while; others are anti-social and harmful.

Value of Recreational Activity. The Scriptures constantly warn against yielding to worldliness. It deals with man's moral and spiritual nature and with the relationships that have to do with man's every-day life.

There are two extremes in regard to amusement or play: First, the ascetic who says: "I die daily,"—and thus undertakes a rigorous discipline of natural impulses, thinking thereby to free himself from the temptations due to the flesh; and second, the voluptuary, who says: "To-morrow we die," and therefore indulge your appetites and impulses without restraint and realize the demoralizing consequences of seeking nothing but sensual pleasure.

Both are wrong, yet both contain elements of truth. Asceticism is more emphasized in some Pagan religions than in Christianity. The Christian seeks such situations and objects as arouse pleasurable sentiments rather than mere pleasure. Pleasure is a by-product rather than a primary aim. The sure Bible test for all popular amusements, as well as for all life, is given by Paul: "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." This is the test. Do only those things that you can do to God's glory. Conscience, enlightened by the Spirit of

God and prayer and thoughtfulness, will always tell you what to do. The warning cannot be sounded too often against the peril and fascination of some amusements. Self-control and discrimination must be learned. We must do nothing that will harm our best life, or that will hurt others. We must do only those things of which we feel God would approve. There is more in life than simply having a good time. Some are living as if amusements were the chief end of life. But there are better things. There are fine and wholesome recreations without moral perils. There are pleasant and profitable pursuits in music, art, literature, athletics, or some fascinating hobby that may furnish the best possible amusement. There are splendid interests in philanthropy, reform or public service, that are good fun and at the same time are worth while. It is a fine practice for one to make even his amusements a consecration to the glory of God.

Recent Growth of Play and Recreation Idea. Recent years have been characterized by the growth of play and recreation among the masses of the people. Play is a fundamental instinct and should be encouraged and directed. To a child, playing is living. Development is its result—physical, mental, social and moral. Life is built for proper amusement as well as for some other things. Childhood and youth readily lend themselves to a schedule of amusements. The nerve cells are fresh and tingling, the muscles are elastic, the bones are supple, the step springs, the eyes flash and the cheeks color. God wants young people to grow—to grow strong in every right way. They need a recreation department; they need to get into God's out-of-doors; to breathe free air and re-create themselves. Religion and gloom are not synonymous.

A long face and a clear conscience do not go together. Seriousness does not spell wretchedness. It should spell joyous vitality.

Play is not cessation of activity, not doing things that are easy but doing things that are more or less difficult without constraint or compulsion. Play being a permanent and universal instinct, our task is to discover its laws. Before denouncing the present amusements (and there are many harmful) let us hit upon better ones for our leisure time.

A Few Suggestive Principles. (1) As already suggested, play should be considered as recreative. Play should be not only a time of recreation, but of creation. Sometimes we get the idea that education is a matter limited to childhood, and that, once mature, the period of development is passed. Nothing could be further from the ideal. Growth, development, mental, social and spiritual enlargement and enrichment ought to go on continually throughout life. Every individual should have an avocation—a system of worthy interests and activities during his leisure hours which are not only enjoyable, but which also re-create and reconstruct his personal efficiencies. The temptation is to employ this leisure in the unprofitable ways of mere amusement if not in positively detrimental self-indulgence. Too often leisure time is spent wholly in the interest of impulsive and instinctive enjoyment, and thus undermines personality. Still further, "many persons to whom such low forms of amusement would be repellent, fail, nevertheless, to employ their leisure from work in such a way as to restore reduced physical and mental power. It is entirely possible for diversions, wholly innocent in themselves so far as moral wrong is concerned, to

result in a drain upon nervous energy or a dissatisfaction with the routine of daily work and thereby prove a hindrance instead of a help."[1] Play as recreative must consider both the complexity and the unity of man.

(2) Play should be considered as partner of work. It must, therefore, assist, not interfere. In work, one is interested chiefly in the end to be attained. For example, the day-laborer is looking forward for his pay at the end of the day. Play is always marked by the pleasure in the means rather than in the remote end. The winning of the game is really forgotten in the intense joy of the process. In so far as one enjoys the process, it is play, while in so far as one cares for an extraneous end, it is work. The normal man may and does engage in useful work with keen enjoyment in every moment of the activity. Palmer illustrates this attitude in the remark: "Harvard university pays me for doing what I would gladly pay the university for letting me do." Work done in such spirit becomes the partner of play. When a man's attitude is one of spontaneity, of free choice, of self-direction, of willing service, his work has all the joyousness, all the vitalizing, the humanizing, the unifying attributes of play. When his attitude is one of reluctance, of obedience to external compulsion, of service merely for pay, it has all the dull, benumbing, dehumanizing attributes of mere work. Both work and play should be free, spontaneous and loyal.

(3) Play demands the Best Conditions. Play is often imperiled by evil company, spoiled by impure and unwholesome forms, and injured by constraint of gain. In the interests of proper recreation, everybody should

[1] Betts, G. H.: *Social Principles of Education*, p. 114.

have not only a vocation, but also an avocation, which occupies his spare time. Generally, the chief work of each profits by the spare-time work. Indeed, many of the world's most noted men are known best for what they did during their leisure hours as pleasant avocation, as for example, Spinoza, Bacon, and Hobbes in philosophy; Galileo, Faraday, and Hugh Miller in science; Burns, Grote, and Madam de Geulis in history and literature. Instead of such systematic use of spare time, its place may be taken by hunting and fishing trips, or by various club or literary activities, all subordinated and supplementary to the central vocation and adding to its scope and momentum. From the psychological standpoint, reading offers the best possible method of increasing one's general and special knowledge and culture, of widening one's interests in the appreciation of the best that men have thought and felt and done in the past, of broadening one's sympathies through an increased understanding of the social process, of gaining a deeper philosophy of life, and a renewed enthusiasm for Christian living. What is true of reading as a leisure-time means of personal culture is true also of attendance upon church services, lectures, recitals, and social intercourse. "The air of refinement, the atmosphere of culture, the sense of the perfect, the love of the ideal, belong with the essential characterization of the educated person. They are the natural birthright of the human being, and neither economic opportunity nor material prosperity nor unæsthetic education should steal away these unmarketable but priceless possessions from the soul of man."[1] Every potential person needs to learn early the psychological and spiritual significance of putting first things

[1] Horne, H. H.: *The Philosophy of Education,* p. 236.

first. This would mean a vigorous work-and-play life in which work is shot through and through with intelligence and high purpose, and in which there is red-blooded amusement together with mentally and morally stimulating occupation for the remainder of the leisure hours.

(4) Play is also social. As such it demands consideration of the well-being of others. The age of childhood is the age of social play, the age of boisterous play, and the age of purposive play. But just as soon as the child begins to mingle with the group, he loses his individualistic tendencies, and his play becomes the related play of the group in which he finds himself. Nature is gradually evolving a good citizen, a desirable member of the group, a social being in every game of baseball, and in every game of tag, provided always that the non-social instincts and the unworthy motives are wisely discouraged by the good sense of the group as a whole.

Through play, one gets into the habit of being social in such normal ways and degrees as his mature life requires and learns also to give himself up to the social spirit. These play and recreative activities employ and develop those interpretative, appreciational, and organizing processes whose development is so vital to personality. The social contacts also furnish a profusion of suggestions and copy for imitation. Hence the value of play as a socializing agency.

Since the dominant element of modern life is the intensive exploitation of all the riches of the earth, the consideration of industry, commerce, inventions and wealth as the only serious occupations of men, the Christian faces a great responsibility and task. He cannot but be very conscious of the fact that into the

task of making the world beautiful, and of so using one's work and leisure time periods so as to make life sweet, agreeable and really helpful to those who live in it, but comparatively little energy is directed.

(1) The Christian must decide, What is right for himself? Will my attitude toward amusements harm my associates? The question arises, Should the Christian enter with a free heart into the delights of life? Should he mingle with his friends in happiness and laughter, and fling himself into the harmless pleasures of the day, such as have already been suggested? Should he rejoice in the thrilling strength of his body and in the pleasures of love and in the riches of thought? Most certainly, the answer is, if he realizes that he is God's child, and that God loves him, and that he longs to do His will and is trying to do His work. A thousand acts of thought and will and effort shape one's life. Of course, the Christian cannot enter into those frivolities which are harmful and tend to degrade. He must draw a clear distinction between real pleasures and apparent pleasures. People go wrong because of the fact of sin; their inner purposes are not right; they lack good sense and adequate knowledge of the conditions of Christian living. It is a fact that only the easy-going Christians are satisfied with their conduct. Such great Christian leaders as Moody, Spurgeon, Wesley, Saint Augustine, and Paul were extremely conscious of their sinfulness. There never was a generation of young people cleaner in morals, with more intellectual capacity, and of better disposition toward others than the generation just coming into the place of power. We must trust them and do all we can to help them to enjoy their own social, intellectual and spiritual life. Moral failures are due to

physical and social conditions, to lack of self-control, ignorance and inexperience—in short, to lack of right decisions. The lusts of the flesh and the deceitfulness of riches are real obstacles to Christian living to-day as yesterday.

(2) The Christian must always decide these questions on principle, utterly disregarding the rules which others desire to impose, and jealously guarding principles. All reasonable men will desist from sacrificing the more important thing to the less. It is plain also that a man's religious and moral condition is of incomparably greater importance than his diversion. So in estimating the propriety, or rather the lawfulness of a given amusement, the following principle may be laid down, namely, that none is lawful of which the aggregate consequences are injurious to morals, nor if its effects upon the immediate agents are in general morally bad—nor if it occasions needless pain and misery to men or to animals,—nor if it occupies much time or is attended with much expense. Concerning all amusements, the question is not whether in their simple or theoretical character they are defensible, actually existing, but whether they are defensible in their actually existing state. There are many species of amusement in which the evil outbalances the good and there are no grounds upon which a Christian can justify a participation in them. There are amusements that are destroyers of life; others that are builders of life—physical, mental, social, and spiritual. So the Christian must decide on principle. The violation of principle provokes paralysis; wrecks life.

(3) Having decided, the Christian must play. Play in the power of principles preserves potentiality. In thus concluding, it is possible that some may imagine

that we would exclude enjoyment from the world and substitute a system of irreproachable austerity. He who thinks this is unacquainted with the nature and sources of our better enjoyments. The Gospel is the "good tidings of great joy." The Christian is urged to "rejoice in the Lord." Christianity is a religion of joy. The true Christian is a happy person. However, experience teaches that many so-called religious amusements are quite unnecessary to the happiness of life. The world wants to see the followers of the Christ (Christians) bestowing smiles of cheerfulness everywhere, and great is its power. It is a builder of health and strong character. There is sound philosophy in common sense recreation, morality in choice amusement, and strength in humor.

If the joy of Christian living is to be stimulated and preserved at all under the conditions of modern industrial life, it must be preserved through a rich and abundant recreational life. Our industrial population must be taught to play—taught the right use of leisure time. This alone can insure for the routine worker those experiences which give life significance, experiences to which every individual has an inherent right. Through the development of the play life and the refinement of our æsthetic sensibilities and spiritual insights, the creative urges might be exalted and all the great interests of mankind—love, industry, politics, war, peace, religion—might be made more significant. This creative spirit must go into the home, the school, the factory, the street, the city, the village, the legislative hall, and the church, and into the fields of literature, music and art.

The church and school should become centers where the recreational needs of the entire community citizen-

ship—physical, mental, social, and spiritual—can be satisfied. The effective church or school is eager to touch the parents also in order to foster, satisfy, and elevate the recreational desires of their families.

References for Further Reading

Addams, Jane: *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets.*
Betts, G. H.: *Social Principles of Education.*
Curtis, H. S.: *The Play Movement and its Significance.*
Curtis, *Play and Recreation for the Open Country.*
Dewey, John: *Human Nature and Conduct.*
Edwards, R. H.: *Christianity and Amusements.*
Gates, H. W.: *Recreation and the Church.*
Groos, K.: *The Play of Man.*
Horne, H. H.: *The Philosophy of Education.*
Johnson, G. E.: *Education by Plays and Games.*
Powell, W. T.: *Recreational Leadership for Church and Community.*
Young, H. P.: *Character through Recreation.*

Questions on the Lesson

1. What is meant by leisure time?
2. What are the recreational arts? How do they grow up?
3. What is the primary object of recreation? Support your answer.
4. Why has society been slow to recognize the value of play and recreation as a necessary part of the normal human life?
5. Tell of the psychological value and significance of recreation.
6. Add other values to those enumerated.
7. Why and how does what one does in his leisure hours shape his personality?

8. List the various forms of recreation. Tell which are primarily intellectual, or æsthetic, or social, physical, or avocational.
9. What is the Scripture attitude toward amusements?
10. Discuss the two extreme views mentioned in this lesson.
11. Why are both wrong? Why do both contain some elements of truth?
12. Mention some wholesome recreations without moral perils.
13. Is play cessation of activity? Is it doing things that are difficult without constraint? If not, why not?
14. Discuss the four principles suggested.
15. Evaluate Palmer's remark concerning his opportunity in Harvard.
16. How does play increase sociability?
17. What seems to be the dominant element in modern life?
18. Why is the task of making the world beautiful and life sweet and agreeable so much neglected?
19. Why is the question of amusement one of individual responsibility?
20. How should the Christian decide the question?
21. Having decided, what must he do?
22. Why does industrial life need a rich and abundant recreational life?
23. Why should the church and school become centers where recreational needs of the entire community citizenship are satisfied? How?

Problems for Discussion

1. Why is the true Christian a really happy person? In what sense is Christianity a religion of joy? Has it always been such? Why not?

2. Why do the Scriptures condemn "worldliness"? What are the traits of a "worldly" person? Of an ascetic?
3. Why do demoralizing consequences always follow the seeking of nothing but pleasure? Why should recreation be considered as a necessary preparation for efficient living?
4. Critically discuss the problem of commercialized amusements.
5. Why is the problem of recreation of increasing importance? Why is the play problem in the cities so vital? How remedy the situation?
6. What religious, economic, and social factors operated in the early history of this country to dwarf the recreational life?
7. If recreation has no ulterior purpose, what principles must govern the relation of recreation to the serious activities of life?
8. What are the differences between work and play from the standpoint of: (1) Motivation? (2) complexity? (3) product? From these three viewpoints examine the activities of the following: (*a*) a professional football player; (*b*) an actor; (*c*) a primitive huntsman; (*d*) a boy playing baseball on the corner lot; (*e*) the politician; (*f*) the college teacher of independent means; and (*g*) the average student in a college psychology class.
9. In what respects do many of the health, family, civic, and religious activities approximate vocational rather than recreational activities?
10. Tell of the more important advantages and disadvantages which have arisen from the extension of recreational facilities through commercial agencies.
11. How has the growth of applied science, during the last hundred years, increased the time available for recreation and modified its modes?

12. How has commercialism artificially stimulated rivalry in the leading athletic events of our colleges, and thereby impaired their real educational function?
13. Why has gambling been associated so frequently with recreational activities? How does gambling reveal an impoverished recreational interest?
14. Without imperiling the recreational values involved, what steps could be taken to increase the wider educational and religious values that inhere in the following: the newspaper; the motion picture; the radio?
15. Because of its peculiar nature, show how recreation influences the growth of character out of all proportion to the time actually spent in the activity.
16. List the values of companionship in making life pleasant, agreeable, and significant.
17. What place, if any, should the following forms of recreation have in the program of a Christian church: Hiking? Camping? Playing together? baseball, or tennis, and the like?
18. How can sports be kept clean and amusements uplifting?
19. In what ways do people waste time? Are these ways the same for every one? Does all amusement waste time and all work save it?
20. What do you think of the following statement of a youngster who couldn't go to the County Fair and stayed home with his grandfather: "It seems that half of a fellow's life is spent in being too old or in being too young"?
21. Do you believe that all men would achieve superlatively, if they could be helped to find the work for which nature intended them? If so, why? If not, why not?

LESSON XXX

THE CHRISTIAN IN THE INDUSTRIAL SPHERE

THE industrial sphere offers the Christian another form of service for others. He renders this service in part by taking his place in the great industrial organization, by which the fabric of human society is maintained, adorned and improved. It rests on the division of labor.

Diversified Forms of Labor. Six grand divisions of diversified and organized labor have been discerned. The classification has been made on the basis of the kinds of ends achieved. These divisions are: industry, which deals with the raw materials of wealth, converting them into usable forms; business, which distributes these goods to the users; technological pursuits, which harness the laws of Nature so that they do man's bidding in creating satisfactions; scientific, which discovers the laws that may thus be harnessed; professional service, which ministers to the physical, mental, moral and spiritual needs of men as they labor; and artistic pursuits, which re-create and inspire men. There are almost countless subdivisions of each of these grand divisions of concrete types of labor, each of which contributes some special part to the production of the commodities or service which satisfy human needs. Some men are thus employed in production, some in distribution, some in regulating the labor of others, some in coördinating widely separated but

relative activities, some in keeping the workers in health and efficiency, some in settling disputes which break out, some in extending human knowledge and mastery, some in adorning the estate of man, some in strengthening those sentiments of truth and justice and good-will without which coöperation is impossible, and some in training future workers. All are busy. Society is a great hive of industry, each member thereof helping to maintain a fabric ever dissolving and ever renewing itself, conceived only in the mind of God, the unseen Architect of societies, the great Artificer of nations (Acts 17: 26).

The Christian has a deep and reverential regard for this great system of coördinated activity. Through it man subdues the earth, the God-assigned task, at the first; it increases the enjoyment of men; it exercises and develops their powers; it is the school of industry, steadiness, and patience; it is the chief occasion of human association, and of the virtues which association requires and cultivates. The wealth it creates is won from the material world, and made the instrument of the human spirit. It is also the means by which the world is held together as a great stage on which the purposes of God are wrought out. To have a useful place, however humble, in this great order is honorable; to stand out of it is base and fraudulent.

Their Ethical Significance. All these relations and interests, which for convenience we group under the name of Trade and Business, have a high ethical significance. While the world of things is neither good nor bad in themselves, yet they have moral significance because they produce moral and spiritual results in living creatures, in moral agents. Trade and Business have ends beyond themselves. There is a final

cause of Commerce and Labor, and that is moral character.

The duty of labor is solemnly laid upon man in the moral law of God. According to the law of God in the Old Testament and in the New, it is as wrong for a man to be idle as for him to be dishonest, or impure, or covetous. Idleness is an immoral thing; an idle man is not a good man. "If any man will not work, neither let him eat" (2 Thess. 3: 10). No man who has understood the meaning and value of life desires to escape work.

From the past we have inherited a false conception of the duty and dignity of work. Among the peoples of antiquity—in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Babylonia and Phœnicia, work was despised and was performed by the slave class, who were without rights, religion, and without hope. The pyramids are monuments of human cruelty, built by the enforced labor of thousands of slaves, who toiled without reward and died without regret. The Jews had a higher conception of work than the other nations; and every Jewish boy was expected to learn a trade. In Greece and Rome, from the earliest times, slavery was known, and where slavery prevails work is lightly regarded. The Grecian philosophers despised work and relegated it to the slave class. In early Roman times, the most noted men were not ashamed to handle the plow, and after the glories of war or the service of the state, they retired to their farms and spent their days in toil. But as the centuries passed, and wealth increased, and conquered nations were enslaved, labor became more and more dishonorable. The Feudal system has left us a bad inheritance, namely, that work is ignoble, and is unworthy the dignity of free men. In our times, the

impression more or less prevails that certain kinds of work are beneath man's dignity and are to be shunned or despised. The desire to escape manual toil is deeply ingrained in many minds, and is the source of many of the evils which afflict modern society. But no man should be ashamed of any honest work, however hard or commonplace it may be. Even the Son of Man was the carpenter of Nazareth, and Himself learned and followed a trade. He came to ennoble life, to reveal its Divine significance, to show its true glory, to disclose the Divineness of the commonplace. He chose His apostles from the ranks of toilers; that glorious company of apostles could show men with the hard and horny hands of toil.

What is Work? Basically, all true work is a co-operation with God and has a Divine significance. All workers—farmers, mechanics, millers, merchants—are so many agents and ministers of the Divine bounty; from their hands men receive those useful and finished articles which have been produced by the coöperation of this great host of servants in God's vineyard.

Trade and Commerce. What is true of the worker is no less true of the trader. Trade is an exchange of commodities or services, and being such it has a high moral significance. Trade and commerce are elemental facts of advancing human life. In a simple and primitive society the amount of trade between man and man and tribe and tribe is exceedingly small. But as life advances in the scale and wants multiply, trade becomes more necessary. The diversity of aptitudes, of soil, of climate and productions, necessitates trade between man and man and nation and nation. So long as one man has skill with tools and another skill with pen; and one district produces coal and another pro-

duces wheat, that long trade will be necessary. Commerce is the great civilizer of nations. The commercial nations have been the progressive nations. Civilization was born in the trading nations around the Mediterranean Sea.

The Moral Significance of Trade. But our purpose here is to show that trade is a rendering of services, and as such has a moral significance. The Christian trader or merchant who acts as intermediary between the different workers of society, who brings the utilities of one section where they are produced to another section where they are needed, is most truly rendering great service to his fellows. In a complex society a division of labor is necessary; and the merchant as truly renders service as the man who produces commodities.

Two things are evident: First, a man's daily calling is his priestly service to God and man. A man's work in the world, whatever that may be, provided it is honest and proper work, is his Divine calling. Business rightly done is a service of God in the welfare of man. The man's business is his altar of service and sacrifice. Any position in life, any work given man, affords a standing ground from which to reach forth and serve mankind. All labor, all trades, all business have ends beyond themselves. Not the kind of work done is well pleasing to God, but the *spirit* which shines through it. The merchant pays his employees the best wages possible, takes an interest in their welfare, studies the needs of society and brings commodities from afar to satisfy those needs, and sells the best goods for the money, thus really serving his customers; he is truly serving his day and generation according to the will of God. "Wise work," Ruskin

tells us, "is work done with God; foolish work is work against God." The Kingdom of God is wide-reaching, all-embracing. Every man who, in an honest and good heart, is working for cleaner literature and better laws, for better skill in trade and larger service in commerce, is a worker in the great Kingdom of God. When men see that they may work in behalf of the kingdom by the way they run their factories, make laws, edit newspapers, pay wages, mine coal, plow fields, a great change will come over the life and thought of the world. The mechanic may be as necessary to the coming of the Kingdom of God as the preacher; and the merchant may yet play as important a place as the missionary.

Second, the way in which one fulfils his daily tasks at once makes and reveals his character. Faithful, energetic, honest work means character. The qualities which enter into the making of right character are energy, patience, perseverance, faithfulness, love and sacrifice. Nowhere can these qualities be so fully gained or so truly shown as in the common occupations and tasks of daily life. All labor is honorable if the laborer is honorable. "Man's character has been moulded by his every-day work, and by the material resources which he thereby procures more than by any other influence, unless it be that of his religious ideals; and the two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and economic. . . . For the business by which a person earns his livelihood generally fills thoughts during by far the greater part of those hours in which his mind is at its best; during them his character is being formed by the way in which he uses his faculties in his work, by the thoughts and the feelings which it suggests, and by the

relations to his associates in work, his employers, or his employees." [1]

Old and New Economics. The old economic teaching was almost wholly devoid of moral content, and made wealth an end in itself instead of a means to an end. Selfishness was the basis of economic activity; each man was expected to look out for just one person in a trade—himself. Men were expected to be kind and unselfish in other relations of life, but not in trade and business. A recent writer says: "Economics can never be rightly invaded by ethics; its undeniable province is the facts and laws of human nature that concern the pursuit and expenditure of wealth. We have no choice about the intellectual acceptance of these truths." [2] The undeniable sphere of manifestation of ethical principles is human life with its interests, relations and activities. It has often been said that charity is one thing and business is another; that religion and trade have nothing to do with each other. Much of what has passed for economic science would have seemed antiquated and Egyptian to Moses, and Socrates would have been stoned on the streets of Athens as a corrupter of the youth for teaching some of the things that have been said under the name of "economic science."

Fortunately a new science of economics is being created in which ethical considerations hold a first place. Wealth is no longer seen to be an end in itself; wealth is weal, human weal. "Wealth consists of the relative-weal constituting elements in man's material environment." [3] "Communion through the material

[1] Marshall, *Principle of Economics*, p. 1.
[2] Gilman, *Socialism and the American Spirit*, p. 250.
[3] Clark, *The Philosophy of Wealth*, p. 4.

world with God is expressed by the word property," says Brownson. The Christian principle assumes that every part of life is subject to the dominion of Jesus Christ. The Kingdom of God is all-inclusive and comprehends every interest and relation and activity of man. The Christian principle implies that the Christ spirit and the Christ life are the law of life in trade no less than in the family and in the Church. The law of Christ imposes the obligation to bear one another's burdens, not only in the Church but also in the various places of business. To believe in the Golden Rule is to refuse to engage in any transaction which is not mutually advantageous to both parties. The strong are to bear the infirmities of the weak and not to please themselves. The principle is that we are to love our neighbors, to bear their burdens, to seek their interests in doing work, in paying wages, in selling commodities; that we are to please our brother unto edification in the stock exchange and in the corporation. This principle is absolute in its requirement and universal in its sweep. Of course, no one of us may measure up to this perfect law of God; but we are justified by faith when we have a vision of God's righteousness and make choice of His will. The following are a few illustrations of these general principles:

(1) Every man should be willing to earn all he receives. In modern times the passion is to get rich without any moral sense of its meaning and responsibility, —by speculation, by exploiting the labor of others. Getting on in the world has almost come to mean getting rich. Long ago Scripture declared: "He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be innocent." There is a speculation that is just and fair and advantageous

to the community; also a speculation which passes beyond the safety line and becomes a subtle form of dishonesty and exploitation. To attempt to discuss and define *just* speculation and discriminate it from *gambling* speculation would carry us too far into the region of casuistry. But Andrews, *Wealth and Moral Law,* page 72 and following, gives a good discussion of the subject; also Dale in *The Ten Commandments,* pages 197 ff. The principle is very clear: Every man should be willing to earn by his own toil whatever comes into his hands, and not seek to charm it out of the hand of his neighbor.

(2) Every man should strive to regard the other as his brother and to render him the largest and highest service possible. This applies to all classes and conditions of men, to working men and merchants, to employers, to traders, to farmers. For the working men of a certain line of manufacture to combine so as to control all the skilled workmen in that line of industry without respect to their interests or the state of trade would be a violation of the law of love. For the manufacturers of a certain line of goods to affect a combination, agree to pay so much wages to their employees without respect to their interests or claims, would be essentially unjust and unchristian. It is by the harmonious combination of laborer and employer that satisfactory results are secured. When either party, because of its possession of strength, takes advantage of the other party, injustice is done, and the law of love is violated. "The matching of strength against weakness is contrary to fighting codes; equal armor and equal weapons were the rule for knighthood."[1] Again: "A few without employment and a

[1] Clark, *The Philosophy of Wealth,* p. 165.

few employers without souls are the conditions of a general reduction of wages below the point to which more legitimate causes would reduce them." [1]

The Christian cannot be satisfied with the industrial system, as at present organized. Its gains are not distributed in harmony with the principles of justice or benevolence, or in such a way as to secure either the greatest happiness or the highest good of man in general. Some men have a supply of wealth out of all proportion to either their needs or their deserts. Such a condition is not good for them. It leads to forms of life which may bring no real satisfaction. It multiplies wants and cares. It separates them from their fellow men. They become proud and unfeeling, indolent and luxurious, objects of envy, sources of public danger. There are others who have not the material conditions of a healthy and virtuous life, who by their immorality and misery constitute a public danger of another kind. This condition of things is largely due to unrestrained competition which constitutes one of the mainsprings of energy in our industrial organization. It gives rise to an impatience which threatens social order. The Christian laments it and traces it to its roots in sin and selfishness. He knows that only a deep and general recognition of human brotherhood, based on the acknowledgment of the Fatherhood of God, will suffice. He hopes and expects that under the influence of the Christian principle there will arise a class of "Captains of Industry" who will seek to organize industries with other aims than a selfish accumulation, and will attack the problems of society in the spirit of the Golden Rule. (Study the methods in

[1] Clark, *The Philosophy of Wealth*, p. 169.

vogue by the Goodyear Tire Company and those of the Nash Clothing Company, Cincinnati.)

(3) No man should take any undue advantage of another. The fundamental idea of trade and commerce is a rendering of services or an exchange of commodities,—mutually advantageous to both parties. The old idea that the parties in the business transaction are enemies, and that any advantage may be taken the one of the other, belongs to the primitive, military, and jungle plane of society. The Christian conception of humanity obliges us to regard men not as enemies to be beaten but as brothers to be served. Hence all business between men is but an exchange between friends, and each desires that it be wholly just as between members of the same family. The resolute determination to trade and live on the moral and loving basis will require strong faith and fine courage. The strength, the coherence, the fiber of man's character will be treated here as nowhere else in the world. Said Phillips Brooks: "I think we all find it the hardest and most hopeless work of all our lives, the effort to keep our highest ideas and our commonest occupations in constant and healthy contact with each other."[1] But the degree in which one does this measures most accurately the fineness and fiber of his character.

Nothing can be more important than the enthronement of the Christian spirit as the law of life in the industrial world. So far as men learn to do this, they will learn to regard their daily work as a Divine calling and a priestly sacrifice. In every relation of man with man there is a field for justice. And Aristotle has suggested that wherever there is a field for justice there is also a field of love.

[1] Brooks, *Influence of Jesus*, p. 2.

Scientific writers have maintained that struggle is necessary to the full development of life. This we can readily believe. Life means effort; the way to victory lies across a battlefield; character is an achievement. But the discipline of struggle necessary to any man can come through the struggle for the lives of others. Surely it is not too much to expect that increasing numbers of Captains of Industry will arise who will organize industries for the benefit of all mankind. Under the increasing sway of the Christian spirit, "We may look forward to a time when the unselfish motives will have fuller development, when the wish to benefit the community will stimulate man's energies more fully than competition, and when the public recognition of service and the gratitude of those who are benefited may be an adequate guarantee for efficiency." [1]

True it is now that all work honestly done receives its due reward in the character of the doer. It is a co-operation with God in the creation of order and beauty. All trade that fulfils the royal law becomes a Divine service and contributes unto the building up of the body of society in love.

There is great need of Christ in the industrial sphere to-day, because temptations there are almost irresistible. Such temptations as taking a little more than is due, of giving less than a just return, of using opportunities in a questionable way for personal enriching, of participating in labor agitations, strikes, trickery, competitions, are ever present fascinations. The industrial world is sinful, Christless, and has no power to save itself. The many in this realm who are faithful to Christian character forcefully show how marvelous

[1] Freemantle, *The World as the Subject of Redemption,* p. 348.

would be the prosperity if Christ were really taken into partnership in all the relations, activities and industries. The Christian, actuated from deep motives of righteousness, will be characterized by honesty in all his relationships, will be enterprising and industrious, will be law-abiding, will recognize the industrial brotherhood upon Christian principles, will constantly recognize God's hand in material things, and will freely exercise conscience in his work—exercise his conscience as to Sabbath observance and real profit sharing. He will square all his practices by righteousness. Only Christians who have been with Christ and have learned of Him are workmen ready for the industrial scheme.

References for Further Reading

Andrews: *Wealth and Moral Law.*
Brooks, Phillips: *The Influence of Jesus.*
Brown, W. A.: *Christianity and Industry.*
Clark: *The Philosophy of Wealth.*
Coffin, H. S.: *A More Christian Industrial Order.*
Dale: *The Ten Commandments.*
Freemantle: *The World as the Subject of Redemption.*
Gilman: *Socialism and the American Spirit.*
Johnson, F. E., and Holt, A. E.: *Christian Ideals in Industry.*
Marshall: *Principles of Economics.*
Parker, C.: *The Casual Laborer.*
Roads, Charles: *Christ Enthroned in the Industrial World.*
The Church and Industrial Reconstruction. Issue of the Committee on the War and Industrial Relationships, Association Press, 1920.

Questions for Review and Problems for Discussion

1. Why does the industrial sphere offer the Christian a fine form of service for others?

2. How does he render this service?
3. Discuss the six grand divisions of diversified labor and the ends to be achieved.
4. In what sense is society a great hive of industry?
5. What should be the Christian's attitude to this system of coördinated activity? Why?
6. What is the ethical significance of the relations of trade and business?
7. What is the Old Testament conception of labor? The New Testament conception?
8. What was the attitude toward work of the peoples of antiquity?
9. What was the labor conception of the Jews? of the Greeks? of the Romans?
10. What influence did the Feudal system leave concerning labor?
11. How is labor regarded in modern times?
12. In what sense is all true work of Divine significance?
13. What is Trade? Commerce?
14. Why is it the spirit which shines through work rather than the kind of work that is pleasing to God?
15. In what sense is the way in which one does his work a revelation of his character?
16. Why was the old economic teaching so nearly devoid of moral content?
17. How far reaching was and is the conception that religion and trade should have nothing to do with each other?
18. What is the meaning of wealth? Why is it no end in itself?
19. What is implied in the statement of bearing one another's burdens in business? Illustrate.

20. Explain the significance of practising the Golden Rule in business. Tell of instances known to you of its practice.
21. Explain: Every man should be willing to earn all he receives.
22. When is the law of love violated between labor and capital?
23. Why cannot the Christian be satisfied with the industry as organized at present?
24. What is the danger of unrestrained competition?
25. How would you inject higher motives into our industrial and economic thinking?
26. Upon what conditions is permanent business success based?
27. Why is a government official who attempts to use his position to enrich himself rightly held up to public scorn? Cite examples.
28. Tell how the giving of workers a voice in determining the conditions under which they are required to work would reduce friction and ill-feeling in industry.
29. Tell how the ideal of coöperation can displace that of conflict. Do Christian people agree as to what reforms in our industrial system should be urged?
30. Is there a distinctively Christian pattern for the industrial order? Why cannot the Church immediately right industrial wrong?
31. Explain the implications in the following terms: Profit; profiteering; profit-sharing; minimum wage; collective bargaining; bargain-hunting.
32. Are the "politics" in the labor movement morally worse than the "politics" of your own city government? What should be the attitude of the Christian toward labor unions?
33. What improvements can Christianity make in our present industrial system?

LESSON XXXI

THE CHRISTIAN IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

ANOTHER sphere of service to the Christian is the discharge of political duties. To prepare for the treatment of these duties, let us consider briefly the nature, the origin, and the design of the state.

The Nature and Origin of the State. The state is the organic unity of mankind. It is not the laws, which do but express the principle of this organic relationship among men; it is not the rulers, nor the collective body of the people. All these change while the state remains the same. The laws are only the mouthpiece of the state; the rulers do but express and execute its will; laws and rulers and people are all subject thereunto. A given community can justify its claim to be a state only on the ground that the organic unity of mankind requires its separate existence as such; and acting now legislatively, now judicially, and now executively.

Essential to a state are association, organization, civil government, and a common place of abode for its members. Historically, the state is but an outgrowth of the family, which is the unit or atom of society. The one family becomes in time many families; the government of one family, the government of many families. The natural order is: the family, the community, the tribe, the state, the patriarch, the chief, the king or president.

The state is one of the three Divine institutions

known to men, the other two being the family and the Church. The state has its own functions, though covering much the same sphere as the family and the Church. Each has its own mission, though they all work together toward the one common end. Each is a medium through which man ascends to God, and through each the life of God is getting itself reborn into the life of humanity. Each aims to realize the ideals of the Kingdom of God, to translate them into human lives, and to fulfil them in human relations.

The State a Divine and Human Institution. The state is a Divine institution, since God has made man a social being and placed him in such relations in this world as that association, organization and civil government are the natural results of his development, and since the law which ought to govern it rests on the Divine law.

The state is a human institution in the sense that its form of organization and government originally depend upon the choice and moulding influence of men. However little foundation there may be for the theory of social contract, or social compact, it is clear that men do actually have largely to do with shaping their political institutions.

Function of the State. The design of the state is to furnish man a wider sphere of social activity, and to ensure freedom and security in that sphere, and to direct men, as associated in the nation, in working out a national mission. The family has been seen to be but the training-place for this wider sphere. In its larger community, the state furnishes broader interests, more varied relations, and grander scope for activity. In this wider sphere, there are protection, freedom, and security of rights. As the states of the earth approxi-

mate to the true idea of the Christian state, the sphere of activity must be widened, through the relation of states to one another, so as to take in all the nations of the globe, and give man the whole world as the scene of his free development and effort.

Its National Mission. A national mission is the natural result of the organic unity and life of a nation. It is the accepted doctrine of the foremost political thinkers of modern times, that "a nation is not a mere conglomeration of individuals. It is an organized body. It has of necessity its national life, its national organs, national principles of action, national character, and national responsibility." Each nation has providentially given it a mission to embody some great social order or idea, or solve some great social problem, or push forward some great social enterprise. If this is accepted as the true theory, then one function of the state is to work out this appointed national mission.

As we have seen, the state is a Divine institution, arising naturally out of the expansion of the family. It is no mere device of human policy. It has its foundations deep in the constitution of man's nature, and in the providential relations of his life. It is based on common territory, ancestry, language, history—the gifts and ordinations of God. It enshrines and embodies to some extent the Divine principle of justice. It is an open school of theology and ethics. From it men acquire the idea of a ruler with large, high, remote ends, who govern by general laws. The constitution under which they live determines to a great extent their view of government in general, and of the government of God. Imperfect as it is, it brings immeasurable blessings to men. Almost all the security,

dignity, wealth, and beauty of human life, and almost all the arrangements which constitute man's moral discipline depend upon it.

The Christian and Patriotism. Toward this institution, at once Divine and human, the Christian cherishes the profound sentiments called *patriotism,* which is capable, in times of stress and danger, of making efforts and sacrifices which no other passion can outdo. Patriotism was scarcely possible to the original members of the Church. For the early Christians to have a hand in politics was considered dangerous. They were living in daily expectation of Christ's return to destroy the existing powers and to set up the real Kingdom of God. Yet we find in the New Testament explicit recognition of the benefits arising from established government, and of the obligations which it imposes. The inner religious life of the individual was the concern of the New Testament.

Early Relation of Church and State. Through the intermediate centuries the relation of the individual to the state has been mainly one of subjection. As the power of the Roman Empire waned, the Catholic church became largely the guardian of the social and political order. The church herself promulgated laws, maintained armies, entered into warfare with other political powers, and attempted to insist on certain definite relationships between herself and the rulers of Europe. A distinct theological conception of the nature of the state had grown up to the effect that political government was ordained by God for the express purpose of restraining evil. Obedience to the ruler meant obedience to God. Hence the duty of the Christian was to be obedient to the existing government which he had no part in making; his duty was to obey

the ruler. The ruler was responsible to God for the way he administered the trust divinely committed to him.

The Church Also Divinely Established. The Christian must be obedient to the Church for the same reason. The Church also was divinely established. The state had jurisdiction over the temporal interests of man, while the Church looked after his spiritual interests. But since the spiritual or eternal welfare of men was more important than the temporal, the demands of the Church should take precedence.

Church Control of Politics Destroyed by Reformation. It is thus seen that the mediæval Church was very much in politics. The Reformation, however, destroyed that church control of politics, which gave the ruler more absolute power than ever in his realm. Ecclesiastical pressure was broken and the era of royal absolutism arose. While Christians still obeyed the political ruler, they began to defy a church which sought to coerce conscience. Soon an attempt was made to enforce uniformity in religion within a nation. To this the dissenters objected, even at the cost of disobedience to the state. They felt that obedience to God required them to maintain their form of worship even though the state had forbidden it. "Religious loyalty was thus enlisted in defiance of political authority, just as religious loyalty in the early days of the Reformation was enlisted in defiance of ecclesiastical authority. The dissenting religious communities demanded liberty of prophesying (freedom of speech) and freedom of worship (right of free assembly). These demands were later widened to include the rights of men in general as over against a government inclined to be tyrannical." Such assumption of rights

causes Christian ethics to be somewhat uncertain today in its interpretation of political duty.

Christian Patriotism. The rise of Christian states, and more recently, the organization of public opinion through representative forms of government, have profoundly modified this relation, and created new sentiments and obligations. The Christian shares all that the good citizen feels on grounds of reason, interest, and natural affection; but he has higher points of view, which give rise to more exalted feelings and to a larger sense of obligation.

Christian love both of God and man combines to produce Christian patriotism. Inspired by this sentiment, the Christian laments the sins and sorrows of his country; rejoices in its soundness and prosperity, and exults over its real glories. Nothing arouses in men a moral devotion to the state more effectively than patriotism. Without it, it is doubtful whether the spirit of social good-will could be aroused throughout a nation. It is patriotism that constrains man to support anything he believes to be worthy of his country, believing that this is usually the best means of establishing a régime under which mutual trust and cooperation become possible. Christian leaders have generally urged patriotism as a general duty, but whenever loyalty to the state involves disloyalty, the Christian must be loyal to Christ at all costs.

The Christian's Duties to State. As the state, by the exercise of authority, protects the Christian citizen in the enjoyment of all his blessings and furnishes him a wide sphere for development and activity, there obviously arise the duties of honor and affection for the state and its constituted authorities; of support and defence of its existence, rights, and institutions; and

of obedience to its just laws, established forms and usages, and its magistrates and officers, whether legislative, judicial, or executive.

The sentiments of honor and affection prepare the Christian citizen for the duty of self-denial and effort for the support and defence of the existence, rights and institutions of the state. It has led men to be willing to peril everything to preserve it in its integrity and glory, and have judged it to be right and virtuous to do so; to submit to taxation and to the regulations of trade and commerce by which the revenue is secured for this end. Men have universally agreed to defend the state against its enemies by personal service, even to the extent of risking the life, in repelling foreign enemies, and in putting down domestic sedition and rebellion.

The Christian citizen takes his share of the responsibilities involved in the defence and government of the state. To avert its destruction, or its serious damage, he will sacrifice his goods, and even his life, or the life of his children. War, the sum of all evils, may be justified by the necessities of defence, and the Christian may even find his vocation as a soldier. He will strive that justice shall be done, that evil shall be overthrown, that the laborer shall obtain the hire of which he is worthy, that every citizen shall have free access to the place in which he can best serve the community, that the state shall be purged of the disorders and miseries which afflict it. He will endeavor to set up those forms of political organization, and to secure the election of rulers, under which these ends can best be secured.

Christianity is committed to no particular form of government, whether monarchy or democracy. But

the principles of the kingdom are to be the informing, vitalizing principles of each and every nation. The idea of the Kingdom of God supplies us with civil and social ideas, with constructive and regulative principles the highest and noblest. The essential truths of Christianity furnish at once the foundation basis, and the regulative ideal for the social order. So the Christian must either refrain from all participation in civil affairs, or he must make his civil acts the expression of his Christian convictions. To do the former does not commend itself to the better Christian conscience as the wise course. In a popular government like ours, the responsibility of the state is laid upon the minds and consciences of the people. They must face all the problems of the state; they must consider the social welfare; they must frame legislation; they must form the nation's conscience; in a word, every citizen is called to bear the burden and heat of the struggle for life and progress in the state.

The Christian, then, takes an interest in everything that concerns the welfare and progress of the state. It is all too common for the partisan to construe the welfare of the nation in terms of the party's platform. Instead of this, they should construe their party in terms of the nation's interests. Patriotism is that deep, strong passion for the higher, larger interests of the people. Finely has the poet sung:

"Breathes there the man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land!
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,
As home his footsteps he hath turned,
From wandering on a foreign strand?"

Our sympathies are to be as broad as the world, and our parish is to be all mankind, but we can best fulfil our world-wide mission by making our own nation all that it ought to be. To know the past of one's nation; to enter into the present need; to live for her future; this is Christian patriotism and citizenship.

The Christian will apply moral principles to his public duties. Moral principles have been more or less applied to the personal and family life of men. We have come to expect men to be pure in life, unselfish in the home, self-sacrificing and without guile. But somehow, men have been very slow and very reluctant to govern their civil duties by moral principles. Men who would be shocked at the thought of a lie in the home or duplicity in the Church will deceive in politics and practise all sorts of guile. Christianity teaches that for all our acts we are to give an account to God. It teaches also that the will of God is universal in its sweep and absolute in its requirements, a law for men, for homes, for churches, for political parties, for halls of legislation. God will bring every work into judgment, whether in the home or in the state. We must all give an account for political deeds and misdeeds, as fully as for our personal and family affairs. This fact is too much denied and evaded. The man in office is made to feel that he is answerable to the party machine through whose agency he has won office. Public office is a public trust, for which the holder must give an account to God. However, in practical affairs, public office is regarded as a party gift, to be used for the interests and advantage of the party. The man who acts on this dictum is a traitor to his trust; he is selling his soul for a mess of party pottage; he is recreant to every high trust of God or man. A United States

senator recently said: "The decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount have nothing to do with a political campaign." He explained himself afterward to the effect that he was describing things as they are and not as they ought to be. In many communities it has come to this that a man is hardly expected to be interested in the affairs of his city or state unless he has some office to seek or some interest to subserve.

A man's duty in the state is just as sacred and obligatory as his duty in the family or in the Church. The Christian who prays: "Father in heaven: Thy will be done on earth, as in heaven," is so to speak, so to live, so to vote, that his life and word and ballot may hasten on that glad day. The world has come to insist upon this: that the men who stand in Christian pulpits shall be above reproach, men who love the truth, men who hate covetousness, men who fear God and seek righteousness. But it is just as wrong, just as unfit, just as degrading to the idea of government for a bad, selfish, untruthful, dishonest man to hold office in the state. There is one law, only one, for every man, for every part of life, for every institution on earth—the holy will of the eternal God. And men are no more free to play the knave and the cheat in public office than in the family or in the Church.

Enactment of Good Laws. The Christian will also do all he can to secure the enactment of good laws, to bring in a better social order. One great purpose of all law is to declare what is socially right and wrong. One great function of law is to be the standard of social judgment and conduct. The legislation of a nation is at once the expression of the nation's life and the determiner of the nation's morality. "Good laws elevate men; bad laws, if persisted in for a series of

years, will degrade any society. It is one of the greatest blessings to live under wise laws administered by an upright government, and obeyed and carried out by good and stanch citizens; it is most grateful and animating to a generous heart, and a mind which cheerfully assists in the promotion of the general good, or salutary institutions." (Francis Lieber, *Political Ethics.*) More important even than the written statute is the regard for right and truth which lies back of the statute. Deeper than all questions of expediency is the great question of what is right. Right and wrong are not the creations of the ballot box; justice and injustice are not the will of the majority. To read that law whose dwelling-place is none other than the bosom of the living God is the business of the human lawmaker. The only agreement in favor of any law is its fairness, its justice, its righteousness. The mere question of expediency and popularity does not enter. Only by the honest votes of good men and women can moral distinctions obtain sway in political affairs. Only by the sincere efforts of Christian citizens can the social customs be inspired, legislative halls be motivated, national policies be dictated, the nation's conscience be enlightened by the great eternal principles of the Kingdom of God—righteousness and peace and gladness in the Holy Spirit.

The world is full of men who lament the evils of politics, but will do nothing to improve things. The true Christian must go to work for the redemption of political life; must raise his voice in brave protest and appeal tactfully and whole-heartedly. Every citizen who sees a wrong has a Divine call to rebuke and oppose it. Many excuse themselves on the ground that it is none of their business; they are not public officials;

so they do nothing but criticize the public officials for failing in their duty. Each citizen in a popular government is a public officer, and has official duties. The people are the kings, the authorities, the sovereigns.

The Comity of Nations. The Christian will seek the international mind to understand the part assigned to his own nation in the comity of nations. He will be eager for attempts at international coöperation and good-will and for the development of such judicial agencies as a world court, league of nations, a system of arbitration treaties, to which disputed questions may be referred. No nation liveth to itself. The international mind is that which was in Christ. The international motive is the Christian ideal. To help in guiding the peoples of the Orient into the larger liberty is the present-day opportunity which shuts, in the faces of Christians, the door of wars. To cultivate this Christian attitude toward other peoples is the greatest service. The Christian's profound sense of the universal love of God, which has no partialities, will lead him to respect other nations as his own. Each nation is the special depositary of some gift of God, and has its own place and function in the accomplishment of a universal purpose. This is the only adequate basis of a true comity of nations.

The basic idea in our Christian thinking is that God is over all and loves all; that all power belongs to God; that human rulers use their power rightly only as they use it in love; that the Christian is to think reverently of government, and meet its requirements as a matter of conscience; that the only government destined to last is the government of the King of Love. Hence the Christian will strive to make his politics and government effective as a gracious ministry of God to

men; he will take interest in the questions of voting, equitable taxation, economy in government, and law enforcement; he will appreciate his heritage of the heroes and heroines of faith of whom the world was not worthy, and will practise all the loyalties and ministries of a good neighbor in the home land and abroad.

References for Further Reading

Addams, Jane: *Democracy and Social Ideals.*
Cunningham, W.: *Christianity and Politics.*
Lieber, Francis: *Political Ethics.*
Tufts, J. H.: *Our Democracy.*
Westcott: *Social Aspects of Christianity.*

Questions and Problems for Discussion

1. Discuss the nature and origin of the state.
2. In what sense is the state both a Divine and human institution?
3. What is the design or function of the state?
4. What should be the attitude of the Christian toward the government?
5. What was the conception of politics held by Plato? By Aristotle? By the men of the intermediate centuries?
6. Why was it dangerous for the early Christians to show interest in politics?
7. What was the political theory of the mediæval Church?
8. What was the new freedom introduced by the Reformation? Explain.
9. Who were the Dissenters? Tell of their demands.
10. In what sense is the modern state utilitarian? Tell of the moral weakness of such a state.

11. Discuss the moral significance of the state.
12. Distinguish between Christian citizenship and religious partisanship.
13. What is patriotism? In what sense is it a Christian duty?
14. A certain daily newspaper has as its motto: "My country! May she ever be in the right. But right or wrong, My country." Is this the best expression of patriotism? If not, why not?
15. Explain: "The best government is one which governs least."
16. What was the New Testament conception of the duties of a Christian citizen?
17. Criticize the doctrine of the "Divine right" of rulers. Was it Christian?
18. In what sense is a man's duty in the state just as sacred and obligatory as his duty in the family or in the Church?
19. What can the Christian do to secure the enactment of good laws?
20. Cite instances of what he can do and has done toward the enforcement of laws.
21. What is implied in "the comity of nations"?
22. What is the international mind and motive? How develop and foster them?
23. What keeps governments alive? Why do they perish? What is the proper Christian attitude toward wicked rulers?
24. What is the place of conscience in such citizen as to paying taxes, observing laws against fishing, hunting, and speeding?
25. Cite the contrasts between the governments of today and those of the first century.
26. Tell of the influence and achievements of some great Christian statesmen.

27. What is the effect of slight infractions of law by influential citizens? Cite instances.

28. Why is their great need of concerted, confident, persistent loyalty to all laws, especially to such laws as are under constant and determined attack? Illustrate.

29. Justify the making and enforcing of laws that some people consider a violation of their personal liberty.

30. What measure of Christian obedience is due to a government that is bad? What should a Christian do to make it better?

31. Interpret the statement: "If you need learning, you may get it from books. If you lack grace, you may pray for it. But if you lack judgment, God help you."

32. Christians most interested in doing what God wants done will find themselves keeping both God's law and the law of the State.

33. Tell of Christianity's efforts in doing away with slavery, and in abolishing the saloon in America.

34. Why should not the business of politics be considered apart from education and Christianity?

LESSON XXXII

CHRISTIANITY THE ONLY ADEQUATE SOLUTION OF PERSONAL AND WORLD PROBLEMS

VIRTUE, duty, conscience, the realization of human capacity, the happiness or well-being of mankind, the moral progress of the race, are all aspects of moral truth which must be accounted for in every ethical system which aims at completeness. Is there any ethical Ideal, or any form of moral teaching which includes all of them? The principal schemes which have been proposed and are still on trial are: (1) Self-reconstruction; (2) the False Religions; (3) the New Philosophies, and (4) Christianity. It can easily be shown that all these proposed solutions, save that of Christianity, are inadequate philosophically and historically because they have failed to meet the conditions of a true solution.

First, *Self-reconstruction* is impracticable because it fails to meet the laws of mind in accordance with which all successful conflict with the wrong and evil must be carried on, such as (1) man must understand and give heed to the moral law as the rule of life; (2) he must bring all his powers and dispositions, and all his urges to action under the control of the will and into accord with this moral law, and (3) he must respect the act of voluntarily subjecting his powers to this law until the ascendancy of the right becomes complete and habitual. These principles place the true

moral manhood and the complete moral task beyond his reach without some aid from above.

Second, the *False Religions* are insufficient because they hold only a modicum of the truth concerning man's nature, relations, condition and destiny. They fail to furnish power to produce the highest manhood and the highest life. For example:

Confucianism has as its central idea reverence for the past, and its great end is to secure the permanent stability of the social and governmental order. The sum of its maxims is: "Follow the fathers; in them is to be found all wisdom." Its spirit is, therefore, the spirit of conservatism, of stagnation. It ignores all the noblest elements and elevating motives peculiar to man's nature, and from which all progress and high attainment must proceed. It also ignores the moral wreck of man's nature and furnishes no regenerating and reconstructing agency from without and above, and thus must fail utterly to meet man's needs, and consequently must result in mental, moral, social and political stagnation.

Brahmanism is a system essentially deadening to all man's nature, because it leaves out all that is of any value in it, freedom, progress, immortality, union with God. It is a form of Pantheism. All forms of life and activity are only manifestations of the one, all-pervasive pantheistic Brahm, who is eternally absorbed in a sort of day-dream slumberous self-contemplation. It takes a radically false view of man's whole condition and destiny, thus furnishing nothing to lift man up to his true place. Hence as a scheme of moral reconstruction, it must inevitably fail.

Buddhism is an attempted reformation of Brahmanism. It adds to Brahmanism a proposed method of

escape from this perpetual round of life and death, into Nirvana or the Buddhist perfect life or heaven. Its central idea is "the selfish salvation of the individual soul from the rounds and changes of continued earthly existence, by contemplation of truth and good works." Death is its salvation; personal annihilation, its heaven. There is nothing in it to make a true man. Its own principles doom the system to failure.

Mohammedanism has held sway over many millions for more than a thousand years. Its essential elements are deism, fate, the Divine mission of a cruel and sensual impostor, inhumanity, and an immortal sensuality. Along with supreme loyalty to its one God, it fosters ignorance, treachery, cruelty, and sensuality. It furnishes no watchword of elevation and progression, individual or social, and it proposes no regenerating agency from without. Islamism can never produce the true moral man, nor the complete moral life. It is a cut-and-dried system, and fails to call man to his highest creative endeavor.

History shows that the more completely men have conformed their lives to these false religious systems, the more incomplete and ignoble and enslaved and fossilized has been the manhood.

Third, the *New Philosophies* also furnish inadequate solutions. Modern Pantheism, Positivism, and Culturism are the principal theories proposed by recent philosophers concerning man's life and manhood. Philosophically speaking, they are partial and shallow in their view of the universe, and of man's nature, relations, condition and destiny. They ignore the essential conditions of a true moral reconstruction.

Modern Pantheism, as originated and advocated by German thinkers, begins with denying all dualism in

the universe. It therefore denies the essential distinction between soul and body, mind and matter, between God and the world, between the infinite and the finite, and affirms that there is but one substance, one real being. This infinite and absolute being (the universe) has in itself neither consciousness, intelligence, nor will, save only as it comes into existence in the finite —in animals and men—and therefore is not a personal being. Man who is only a mode of God's existence, a moment in His life, is not an individual subsistence. His personality perishes with that body upon which it depends. His acts are God's acts, the results of necessary forces, so that there can be no freedom, no responsibility, no sin. There is no essential distinction of good and evil, since both are elements of the All, or of God. In place of moral reconstruction, it offers only moral extinction.

Positivism originated with M. Auguste Comte, a French philosopher of the nineteenth century, and has been further developed by his chief disciples, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, aided by Lewes, Buckle, Bain, and Huxley. Man has come to his present advanced position by a social progress consisting of three stages: (1) The infancy or childhood of the race began with the *theological* stage, in which all things are referred to Divine causes and agents. (2) The race advances toward maturity through the *metaphysical* stage, in which it deals with transcendental ideas and relations, and attempts to ascertain the nature and causes of things. (3) The race reaches its mature manhood in that of the *positive philosophy,* in which it learns that man can know nothing of the nature and causes of things; in short, that he can know nothing beyond observed material facts and changes. The in-

dividual man is of no importance; he is only an element in the great solidarity of humanity. If he has a spirit, if he has an immortality, it cannot be known. If there be a God, He must forever be an unknown God. Finding that man would have some religion, in spite of the *positive* philosophy, Comte hits upon an object of worship in *collective humanity, the grand Being*. It ignores the soul, immortality, and God. It is linked with atheism and sensuality. There is no promise in it of a true moral life and manhood.

Culturism is the latest and most pretentious solution offered of the great moral problem. Huxley has reached a theory of *scientific culture* which he proposes for the adoption of mankind. The goal of humanity is to be found in a truly liberal education. His theory of a liberal education has all the philosophic defects of Positivism. It acknowledges no human and immortal spirit, and not even an unknown God. It does not even furnish a single moral motive to elevation, since in fact it has no morality. It would annihilate virtue.

Matthew Arnold, along the line of classical and literary study, has reached a theory of literary and æsthetic culture which he proposes. Greece, rather than India, had the true idea of the perfected humanity. Religion must become secondary to culture. Its aim is to develop self; its ideal is the best self; its agency is self-reliance, "built on the criticism of inward experience and the experimental sanction of our moral instincts and intuitions." Such a theory can do little for man in solving the great moral problem. It puts literary culture in the place of God and duty and immortality, and proves the inadequacy of its author's view of all the wants of man's highest being.

History shows that all these new philosophies disregard the highest obligations,—social, moral, and religious, and thus have failed to produce the complete manhood and highest life.

Christianity Offers the only Adequate Solution. Christianity alone meets the moral reconstruction demands because it exalts God to His true kingdom of power and wisdom and love over the life and destiny of man. It proposes to make the most and the best of body and soul, of intellect and moral nature, of the individual and of society. It provides for the wreck of moral manhood by an almighty reconstructing power; it embodies its perfect system of morality and its marvelous scheme of grace in a person, Jesus Christ, Who is at once the perfect example of human right doing and the complete exhibition of Divine love for man, and the Almighty Helper of man in struggle up toward the right life and manhood.

From the philosophical viewpoint, Christianity points man always to the noblest and the best, and proposes to lead him toward conformity to that moral law which requires of him supreme devotion to God, a wise regard for his own being, and an unselfish love and helpfulness to his fellow man. Christianity's solution of the moral problem includes the following elements: the perfect moral rule, the perfect example of moral manhood and life, the perfect moral mission, and above all, the Divine regenerating power, and the mediatorial sovereignty of the Christ,—these are a few of the elements that have no part in any other scheme of moral reconstruction that has ever been proposed. Even the worst enemies of Christianity admit that when those who claim to adhere to it fail to reach a noble life and manhood, it is not the fault of the

system, in its aim, in its method, or in its agencies, but the fault of themselves. History demonstrates that wherever Christianity has been allowed to do its appropriate work, it has actually reconstructed the moral life,—individual, social, and national. "The faith in Christ combines in itself the absolute self-surrender and self-abnegation of Orientalism, and an intense enthusiasm for a lofty ideal, and has thus shown itself able with equal ease to transform the cultivated and the savage Africaner. It has shown men, up to the highest and down to the lowest, their true and noble manhood and mission; it has made them 'new creatures.' It summons every man to know, to act, and to be for himself alone as accountable to God, and offers to every man a place among the sons of God. Its universal product is a nobler life and man. The world owes to it its best men and its grandest and most beneficent lives in all ages."

Christianity has shown itself able to transform not only individuals, but also society and nations. It has introduced an intense love and an enthusiastic self-sacrifice for universal humanity, as evinced by the records of the missionary movements of the present age. Jesus Christ is not only Saviour of individuals, but Lord of the world's life. His principles of brotherhood, service, and the ethics of love are to be applied to all human relations until He is Lord of all organized life. No individual can be wholly a Christian until the home in which he lives is Christian. No home can be wholly Christian until its neighborhood or city is Christian. So no city can be wholly Christian until the nation is Christian, and no nation can be wholly Christian until the international order is Christian. The international Christian mind is needed in all the rela-

tions of life. The greatest enterprise in which the Church is interested (Foreign Missions) is profoundly affected by the Christian or un-Christian character of international relationships. The only hope that the Church may again become, as its Founder meant it to be, one brotherhood transcending all divisions, lies in the outworking of a true international order so that Christians can be international in spirit and act without ceasing to be patriotic. The Church must contribute to human society the faith which is its breath of life, for real strong and lasting internationalism is no achievement of legislation, agreements, covenants, understandings merely. There must be a great reservoir of good-will, a strong and growing spirit of faith and love to give life to these resolvings—these world-wide understandings—too strong and too sound to be broken down by national or international covetousness. When we think of the huge cost of approximately three hundred and thirty-seven billion dollars to the twenty-three nations drawn into the world conflict and the great tragedy in the death of thirteen million men and the incurring of billions of dollars in debts, should there not be born a mighty world-wide desire for permanent peace? What the millions of our fellow men who died heroically in a "war to end a war" undertook, we must finish by methods of peace. War is the supreme enemy of mankind, and its continuance is the suicide of civilization. The whole war system must be outlawed. We must fulfil our pledges made to the dead and assert our Christian ideals for the living. Preconceived notions, prejudice, and passion must be put aside. Secret diplomacy and political partisanship must not draw men into the dilemma of deciding between support of country and loyalty to the

Christ. Unless we get back to the *Source,* our civilization is doomed.

Extreme Views. There are two extreme views on the Arms question, namely, militarism and pacifism. Both doctrines have their advocates, who in turn are divided into groups of various degrees of mildness and intensity. They range all the way from the militant-minded, who advocate the imposition of our will upon the world by virtue of superior force of arms and whose motto is: " Say it with cold steel," to the ultra non-resistants, who take the position that we, as a nation, should discard all battleships, disband the army, and trust in Providence alone for protection. In neither of these extreme wings is to be found the solution.

What then should be the attitude of Christians toward this problem? Christians should believe and strongly advocate that the future policy of America must be decided upon principles, and not by indulging in personalities. Free and open discussion should be encouraged.

Christians should continue relentlessly the battle against the war system until Jesus comes, should seek to strip war of its glory, point out its barbarism and its flagrant violation of Christian ethics and demonstrate its futility. They should go forward with their God-given task of educating the human consciousness and conscience until war among nations is outside the pale of civilization, just as murder is between individuals; they should insist upon the application of the accepted principles of justice and square dealing—the principles of Christianity—in international relationships; should point out the absolute need of an international agreement, embodying what the best minds of

the world can evolve, for the establishment of an enduring peace in the world; should remember that in the task of making the world what it ought to be they must begin with the world as it is; that the Kingdom of God comes slowly, travailingly, but very surely. There is no short cut to Utopia.

War will ultimately be banished from the earth. We may not live to see it, but we can help to bring it about. It is only through love that such an end can be achieved. Jesus Christ must be reënthroned. Interdenominational wrangling does not set a good example for international peace. The Church has a task of setting its own house in order religiously as well as setting the world in order politically. When religious groups set the example of "dwelling together with one accord," as did the early Christians, their influence for world peace will be infinitely more effective.

Then, again, no political, industrial, social or economic scheme in itself will provide world redemption. Ninety per cent. of the world's business is done on credit, but the foundation of credit is human character based upon the teachings of Jesus, and functioning through sterling honesty, thrift and intelligence. The basis of any plan of regenerating the world must be Christian character in those who formulate and operate the plan; Christian character reflecting the mind and spirit of Jesus. It is the task of the Church to provide that character. Governments are no better or no worse than the people who make them, and the status of the people reflects the fidelity of the Church which trained them, because religion is still the dominating influence in life. No good comes from mocking history or from casting reflection upon those who bravely have gone forward according to the best of their

knowledge. Gandhi, India's greatest leader of two centuries, has said that "if Christian nations will take their religion in earnest, will live it, neither apologize for it nor compromise it, the entire world will be Christian in a generation." While the Church should ever continue to emphasize the need of the application of Christian principles to every phase of life—international, social, economic, industrial, recreational, educational—no such application will be made unless the impulse is planted in the individuals involved in the collective transactions. If the Church under the direction of the Spirit of God will train Christian business men, Christian statesmen, Christian mechanics, Christian teachers, and Christians for all the fields of endeavor, they in turn will carry the spirit of the Christ into all the walks of life with regenerative influence and power. The sinless Christ is the only adequate solution of our personal and world problems.

Problems for Further Study

1. What should be the attitude of the Church toward war: (*a*) Try to prevent it? (*b*) Do what the State thinks is right? (*c*) Ignore the problem? (*d*) ————? Give reasons for your answer.
2. Why should a Christian refrain from using such terms as "dago," "nigger," "wop"?
3. What is the problem of international friendship in your own community?
4. Evaluate the claims of Christianity upon modern living.
5. What are the best means of making the personality and teaching of Jesus the positive factor in the student life of the world?

Printed in the United States of America

R77


Date Due
2/17
APR 8 '33
OCT 13 '51
DEC 2 '75
FEB 7 '80
FEB 22 '80
LINCOLN BIBLE INSTITUTE

171.1
R77

Roop, Hervin U.
AUTHOR

Christian ethics.
TITLE

171.1
R77

2054

Lincoln Christian College & Seminary
171.1R77 C001
CHRISTIAN ETHICS$ NEW YORK
3 4711 001032988

P8-AAH-497